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PUNJABI UNIVERSITY PATIALA
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THE PARTITION
OF THE PUNJAB
THE PARTITION OF THE PUNJAB
KIRPAL SINGH
M.A., Ph. D.
PUBLICATION BUREAU
PUNJABI UNIVERSITY, PATIALA
First Edition : UOO
1989
Revised and enlarged
Second Edition : 1100
Price: Rs. 60/-
Published by the Registrar, Punjabi University, Patiala
and printed at Royson Printers, Patiala
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
In the Subcontinent of India the Punjab occupied a position
of unique importance. It was on the highway between the
nomad breeding grounds of Central Asia and the rich and fertile
valley of the Ganges. It had, therefore, been the arena of religious,
racial and political conflicts like Palestine in the Middle East and
Belgium in Europe. Its climate bred a hardy and martial people.
At the time of the transfer of power to Indian hands, it was the
only province ruled by its Governor under Section 93 of the
Government of India Act of 1935. Again, only in the Punjab was
the transfer of power followed by bloodshed and mass migration.
The scope of the present work is limited to analysing the
factor leading to the partition of the Punjab, study the partition
machinery and discuss the causes of subsequent mass migration
and its consequences, in general.
So far there have been three types of publications which have
dealt with some limited aspects of this subject. Most of them deal
with the Punjab communal riots in 1947 because of the international
importance they acquired when the Pakistan Government raised
the question of ‘genocide’ in the Security Council. Books published
in Pakistan and India, like East Punjabis Blood Bath by Zia-uI-Islam
(Pakistan), Muslim League's Attack on the Sikhs and the Hindus by
Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee Amritsar, Inside
Pakistan hy Gauba (Bombay) and Stem Reckoning hy G.D.
Khosla (New Delhi) deal with the Punjab communal riots in detail.
The Pakistan Government publications, like Sikh Plan, Sikh Plan
in Action, illustrate the Pakistan Government's version of the
origins of communal riots in the Punjab. Similarly, booklets issued
by the Public Relations Department of the East Punjab Govern¬
ment give an account of the resettlement of the refugees. A number
of booklets and pamphlets written by evacuees after their migration,
like Ah ! Amritsar (Urdu), Lahore, Mehsharlstan-i-Kapurthaia
(Urdu), Pakpattan; Ah ! Jullundur, (Urdu), Lahore, (West Punjab);
Saka Bhuller (Punjabi), Amritsar; Roday de Shai.id (Punjabi)i
(viii)
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Ambala; Mokhdumpur Ke Khuni Halat (Urdu), Rohtak; claim to
be based on the personal experiences of the writers affected by
adverse circumstances. The present work is the first of its kind
which deals dispassionately with all aspects of the partition of
the Punjab, viz political, constitutional, administrative, economic,
social, etc.
Every effort has been made to ascertain the facts and verify
the statements of various persons. It will be understandable that .
a completely objective presentation of the controversial issues will
be possible only when all relevant records are open for consolation.
I had access to the relevant files in the East Punjab Government
Secretariat and the Record Office and also the voluminous record
of Partition Proceedings in the Central Secretariat, Government of
India. The six chapters of this work, viz. from Chapter IV to
Chapter IX are based mostly on the records of the Partition Branch,
(Punjab Government), the East Punjab Liaison Agency, the Punjab
Partition Committee, the Awards of the Arbitral Tribunal and the
Partition Proceedings of Government of India. Almost all the
records in India except those in the National Archives, New Delhi,
have been consulted. I could not get access to the records of the
West Punjab Government, although I visited Pakistan twice.
During my six months research tour of England in 1964 I worked
in the India Office Library and British Museum. Unfortunately,
the records of this period were not open for consultation at either
place, as these were subject to the 50 years’ rule.
In addition to utilizing such recently published memoirs as
Mission with Momtbatteny Memoirs of Lord Ismay, India Wins
Freedom by Maulana Azad and various journals, both Indian and
foreign, I had the privilege of discussing various aspects of the pro¬
blems treated in these pages with the following :
Lord Attlee, the British Prime Minister in 1947
Lord Ismay, Chief of Viceroy’s Staff in 1947
Mr Alan Campbell Johnson, Press Attache to Lord Mount-
batten in 1947 and author of Mission with Mountbatten
Sir Cyril Radcliffe (Later Lord Radcliffe), Chairman of the
Punjab Boundary Commission in 1947
Sir Patrick Spens, Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal, 1947
Major J. M. Short who was on the staff of Lord Mountbatten
and had been specially appointed to keep contact with
the Sikhs.
FOREWORD
(FIRST liDITION)
“Knowledge of public action in the past”, it has been rightly
observed, “provides the best means of understanding the present
and the safest guide for the exercise of political power. Through
proper study of history we can join the wisdom of Solomon to
the counsel of Socrates by trying to get understanding and learning
to know ourselves.”
People often speak of the ‘verdict of history’, ‘philosophy of
history’, ‘science of history’, but as G.P. Gooch puts it, “There is
no agreed verdict, only individual verdicts; no agreed philosophy,
only welter of conflicting ideologies; no agreed science, only appli¬
cation of scientific methods. We continue our eager and never-
ending search for truth.’’ It is in the spirit of search for truth
that this book, The Partition of the Punjab^ is being published by
the University. It is very difficult to construct the contemporary
history, especially when we are living under the impact to those
events. An effort has, however, been made by the author to
present, as far as possible, a true account by exploring all the
available material in England, India and Pakistan, and by sifting
the verbal evidence obtained from the great personages involved in
the dramatic events of 1947.
The partition of the Punjab has proved an event of unique
importance in the history of the Punjab. No other single event
has been of such a magnitude and of such far-reaching consequen¬
ces. It was the long and harrowing tale of death and destruction,
of rape and abduction involving millions of people. Thus the
Punjab paid highest price for freedom. It was, therefore, very
essential to have a fairly comprehensive, objective and critical
account of this significant event.
The Partition of the Punjab was a doctoral thesis of S. Kirpal
Singh, an experienced research scholar, who has a number of
research publications to his credit. He is working as a Reader in
the Department of History, Punjabi University, Patiala. Some of
(vi)
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
the Indian historians suggested to me that this be got published by
the University. Professor Sri Ram Sharma, my old teacher and
Dr Fauja Singh had also gone through this thesis before publica¬
tion, and some of the modifications and suggestions made by
them, have been incorporated in this book. I am sure that the
book in its final shape will be a valuable addition to the current
historical literature. I also hope that it will benefit the scholars
in the field of historical research as well as the public, in general.
Punjabi University, KlRPAL SINGH NARANG
Patiala • Vice-Chancellor
December 16, 1971
PREFACE
TO THE SECOND EDITION
The partition of Punjab is a unique event because it was
followed by a large scale mass migrations unprecedented in the
history of mankind. I spent a number of years in the study of
this significant event. When I visited England in 1964 and inter¬
viewed important personages connected with partition of Punjab—
1947 (enlisted in the Preface of the first edition) the records of the
period were not open to the scholars. Soon after the limit to
release the records was reduced to thirty years. Consequently
the British Government decided to publish the selected records in
the form of Transfer of Power 1942-1947 series in twelve volumes,
the last of which was published in 1983. I planned to visit
England in 1983 to consult the newly released records in connec¬
tion with the project “Select Documents on Partition of Punjab—
1947.” This gave me an opportunity to consult huge India Office
Records relating to partition of the Punjab. I was also allowed
access to the Mountbatten Papers preserved in Broadlands Archives,
Ramsay I was able to locate the private papers of Lord Ismay,
Sir Francis Mudie, Sir Evan Jenkins and Major J.M. Short whom
1 had the privilege to interview in 1964.
The text of the Partition of Punjab has been subjected to
revision in the light of newly released records. At places more
details have been furnished and some of the opinions revised. At
a number of places footnotes have been added or replaced.
Bibliography has been improved. Epilogue has been added
discussing some controversial issues. For more details regarding
the controversial issues it would be advisable for the readers to
consult my ^^Select Documents on Partition of Punjab — 1947'*
which is being published separately.
I am grateful to the authorities of the Punjabi University
Patiala for publishing the 2nd revised and enlarged edition of
Partition of Punjab. I am thankful to Director British Library and
(xii)
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Records (Old India Office Library), Keeper of Records University
of London Kings College, London, Trustees of Broadlands
Archives England, Director of National Archives, New Delhi for
allowing me to have access to their records and providing me
the necessary facilities. My thanks are due to Dr Hazara Singh,
Head Publication Bureau, Punjabi University who showed interest
in bringing out the second edition of this book and also took
pains to get it printed and published. Last but not least I am
thankful to my wife Joginder Kaur who has been providing me
the comforts of life.
March 25, 1989
1288/Sector IS-B
Chandigarh
KIRPAL SINGH
PREFACE
(ix)
Sir Evan Jenkins, Governor of the united Punjab in 1947
Sir Francis Mudie, Governor, West Punjab in 1947
Dr Morris Jones, Constitutional Adviser to the Viceroy in
1947
Sir Khizar Hyat Khan, Prime Minister of the Punjab in 1947
Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan, who appeared before the
Punjab Boundary Commission on behalf of the Muslim
League in 1947
Sardar Baldev Singh, Defence Member of the Interim Govern¬
ment, 1947
Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan, Member Punjab Boundary
Commission
Justice Teja Singh, Member Punjab Boundary Commission
Sardar Harnam Singh, who appeared before the Punjab-
Boundary Commission on behalf of the Sikhs
Sardar Swaran Singh, Leader of the Panthic Party and Home
Minister, East Punjab, 1947
Dr Gopi Chand Bhargava, Chief Minister, East Punjab, 1947
Sardar Hardit Singh Malik, Prime Minister of Patiala State
in 1947
Sardar Sant Parkash Singh, Inspector-General of Police, East
Punjab, 1947
Master Tara Singh, the veteran Akali leader
Giani Kariar Singh, President Shiromani Akali Dal in 1947
I am grateful to all of them, particularly to the British dignita¬
ries who, keeping in view my short stay in England gave me
appointments and answered my queries at short notice.
For substantial help of one kind or another I am thankful to
S. Ujjal Singh, ex-Finance Minister, Punjab (India), Mr P.N.
Kirpal, ex-Secretary Ministery of Education, Government of India
Mr V.S. Suri, ex-Keeper of Records, Punjab Government, late
Raja Ghanzafar Ali Khan, High Commissioner for Pakistan in
India, Mr Kewal Singh, ex-Deputy High Commissioner for India
in the United Kingdom. I am indebted to the Punjab Govern¬
ment, especially to late S. Partap Singh Kairon, the Chief Minister
of the Punjab for sanctioning my six months* research tour to
England and to the authorities of Khalsa College Amritsar for
providing me with facilities for accomplishing this work. My
(X)
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
thanks are due to my supervisor Dr Anup Chand Kapur, to
Professor Dr K.A. Ballhatchet, S.O.A.S., London and Dr I.D.
Sharma of the Punjab University, Chandigarh, who went through
the major portion of this manuscript and gave me useful sugges¬
tions.
I am grateful to S- Kirpal Singh Narang, Vice-Chancellor,
Punjabi University, Patiala without whose personal interest the
publication of this book would not have materialized. He very
kindly agreed to write the foreword also.
. My thanks are also due to Professor Sri Ram Sharma, who
has revised this book with great care and erudition; Professor
Dr Fauja Singh, Head of the Department of History, Punjabi
University, who discussed with me a number of important points;
and to Dr Kishan Singh Bedi, Retired Joint Director of Agriculture
(Research and Education), Chandigarh for going through the
manuscript of this book from the language point of view and
suggesting some improvements, to S. Rawel Singh, (London) Shri
Madan Malhotra (Bombay) for providing some of the photographs,
incorporated in this book to Miss Harinder for helping me to
prepare the Index and last but not the least to S. Hazara Singh,
Production Oflacer, Punjabi University for taking pains to print
this book.
Patiala
December 17,1971 ^
KIRPAL SINGH
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword *** ^
Preface
Preface to the second edition •••
xi V
Lists OF MAPS
XV
Abbreviations
Chapter I
Introduction ••• ^
Chapter II
Genesis of the Partition ••• ^
Appendix —Memorandum Handed over to Sir
Stafford Cripps on March 31, 1942 ... 25
Chapter III
The Partition Plan •••
Appendix —Statement of Major J.M. Short ... 51
Chapter IV
The Punjab Partition Machinery ••• 53
Appendix— TYit Punjab Partition (Apportionment
of Assets and Liabilities) Order, 1947 ... 69
Chapter V
Punjab Boundary Commission •••
Appendix —(a) A Deputation by Sikh V.C.Os
and Soldiers •••
Appendix—{h) A Note by the Viceroy ••• 93
Chapter VI
The Award •••
Appendix —Sir Cyril Radcliffe’s Award ... HO
Chapter VII
The Punjab Boundary Force ••• IH
Appendix— of Action in the event of
possible clashes in the neighbourhood
of the boundaries ... 1^6
(xiv)
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Chapter VIII
Nature and Causes of Migration ... 140
Appendix—Iht West Punjab Ordinance
No. IV, 1947 ... 156
Chapter IX
Migration ... 161
Appendix —from the finding of Court
Martial regarding Jassar Train Incident ... 175
Chapter X
After-Effects ... 180
Epilogue ... 197
Bibliography ... 208
Index ... 219
Maps
Map of the Punjab (1947) showing the districts ... 4
Map showing distribution of religious communities... 8
Map showing the Boundary Line between the East
Punjab and the West Punjab ... 108
f
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ABBREVIATIONS
A.A.T.
A.P.P.C.
C. & M.
D. L.O.
D.P.P.C.
HANSAD
H.l.N.C.
l.O.R.
L. A.R..
M. B. Tiles
M.E.O.
P.B.R.
P.P.
S.D.I.C.
S.H.R.
Awards of Arbitral Tribunal on cases referred to it
by the Punjab Partition Committee.
Agenda for the meetings of the Punjab Partition
Committee.
The Daily Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore
District Liaison Officer.
Decisions of the Punjab Partition Committee.
Parliament Debates, House of Commons, London.
History of Indian National Congress by Pattabhai
Sitaramiya.
India Office Library and Records, London.
Liaison Agency Records, East Punjab Government
Mountbatten Papers (Photo copies) India Office
Library and Records London.
Military Evacuee Organization
Partition Branch Records, Punjab Government,
Chandigarh.
Partition Proceedings, Government of India,
National Archives, New Delhi.
Speeches and Documents on Indian Constitution
by Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai,
Sikh History Research Department, Khalsa
College, Amritsar.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The tract of the territory, now comprising Haryana, the
Punjab (India) and the Punjab (Pakistan), has been known by
different names down the centuries. In the Rig Veda, it was called
“Sapta Sindhu”^ or “Sapta Sindhwah”, the (land of) seven rivers.^
The “Hupta Hindu** of the Zand Avesta where it is described as
the earliest creation of Ahura Mazda—and of the Rock Inscrip¬
tion on the tomb of Darius I, seems to be a variation of the
Sanskrit name. The exact Sanskrit equivalent of the modern
Punjab is “Panchnada** which has been mentioned in the
Mahabharta and the Agni Parana.
Hiuen Tsang, the Chinese traveller (A.D. 629-644) gave an
entirely new name to this tract and called it' “Takia*’^ which,
according to Sir Alexander Cunningham, embraced the entire plains
of the Punjab from the| Indus to the Beas and from the foot of
the mountains to the junction of the five rivers below Multan.**
Whatever the earlier nomenclature of this region, it is certain
that the word ‘Punjab*, which is a combination of two Persian
words Panj (five) and ab (river) was first used during the Muslim
rule. According to the author of Farhang-i-Jahangiri a Persian
work compiled during the reign of Jahangir 1606—1627 A.D.
the first person who used this word was Jamal-ud-din Abdul Razaq
(died in 1192 A.D.) He wrote that “my eyes wandered over your
face in India and on account of tears from my eyes, my face
1. Book (Mandal) VIII, Hymn (Sukat) XXIV and Verse (Manter) XXVII
The Hymn of Rig Veda, T.H. Griffith, Vol. II, Benarse, 926, p. 159
2. Z.A. Ragozin, Vedic India, hondon, 1895, P. 107
3. Thomas Walters, On Yuan Ghawang's Travels in India, Delhi, 1961, page
4. Alexander Cunningham, Ancient Geography of Ma, Calcutta (1924) pp
170, 177 and 251 '
2
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
became the bed of five rivers.”* Evidently the word was first used
in a poetic sense and not signifying a tract of territory.
It is very significant to note that the Ayeen Akbery does not
mention the word ‘Punjab*. Abul Fazal describes the Lahore
Province and the Multan Province in the following way :
Lahore Province : “The length from the river Sutlej to the
Indus is 180 cose and the breadth from
Bhambber to Chowkundy measures 86 cose.
On the east lies Sirhind, on the north
Cashmeer, on the south Beykaneer and
Ajmeer and Multan bounds it on the west.
This SoobaH has six rivers issuing from the
northern mountains”.
Multan Province : “On its east lies Sircar Sirhind, the Pergun-
nah of Shoor joins it on the north, on the
south it is bounded by the Soobah of
Ajmeer and on the w'est are situated Kutch
and Mekran both of which are independent
territories. The six rivers which have been
described in Lahore pass also through this
Soobah.”®
The author of the Ayeen Akbery states that the Province of
Lahore was watered by six rivers. Sujan Rai Bhandari, the author
of Khulasat-ut-Twarikhy compiled in 1697 A.D. has used the term
‘Punjab’ for the Mughal Province of Lahore.’ He was followed
by Ghulam Mohyuddin, Bute Shah, the author of Twarikh-i-
Punjab who compiled his work in the first half of the nineteenth
century.®
5. Furhang‘i-Jehangiri, Persian MS., Language Department, Punjab, Govern¬
ment, Patiala MSS No. 269, Appendix.
6. Ayeen Akbery^ Translated by Francis Gladwin, London (1783), p. 394
7. Khulasat-ut-Twarikh (Persian), edited by M. Zafar Hasan Delhi, p. 67,
also Sir J.N. Sarkar, India of Aurangzeb, p. 80
8. Bute Shah, Twarikh-i-Punjab, Persian MS Khalsa College, Amritsar,
S.H.R. No. 1288, p. 4
INTRODUCTION
3
During the eighteenth century, the Provinces of Lahore and
Multan were divided into a number of small principalities,
following the decline of the Mughal Empfre and the death of
Ahmed Shah Abdali, the Afghan Emperor, who had annexed
these provinces’ to Afghanistan.^ Lahore, the capital, was held
by three Sikh chieftains viz. Lehna Singh, Gujar Singh and Soba
Singh. Maharaja Ranjit Singh unified the warring petty States
to establish a Sikh Kingdom. Some of the British contemporaries
of Maharaja Ranjit Singh used the term Punjab as synonymous
with the Sikh kingdom.
Murray wrote, “The region of the north western India known
in the modern times under the name,' of the Punjab, is remarkably
well-defined by the geographical limits. On the north it has the
Pir Panjal range of the vast Himalaya mountains, on the w'est the
Khybur and Soliman ranges and the great river Indus which runs
almost due south to the Indian ocean whilst on the south and east
the river Sutlej separates it from the territories of what is now
British India.
Formation of the British Punjab in 1849
According to the Administrative Report 1849-51, the British
Punjab was formed with the following :
(i) The Punjab Proper and the Trans-Sutlej Territories : At
the time of annexation in 1849 the kingdom of Maharaja Ranjit
Singh was described as Punjab Proper and the territory which was
annexed just after the First Anglo-Sikh War in 1846 was known
as the Trans-Sutlej Territory viz. areas of Jullundur, Hoshiarpur
etc.
(ii) The Cis-Sutlej Territories ; The territory between the
Sutlej and Jumna had never been included in the Punjab. The
Sutlej had been a traditional barrier between the Mughal provin¬
ces of Delhi and Lahore.
According to the Administrative Report of 1868-69, the
Punjab under the British was “bounded on the north and north-
9. Kirpal Singh, Maharaja Ala Singh of Patiala and His Times, Khalsa
College, Amritsar, p. 124
10. Captain Murray, Hisiory of the Pm,jab, London (1846) page 1.
4
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
east by the Himalyas, on the east by the River Jumuna; on the
south by the district of Mathura in the North Western Province,
the States of Rajputana and the River Sutlej : and on the west by
the Suleiman hills and Afghanistan.’*^^
By 1900, it was obvious that the Punjab Government was not
a fit instrument for dealing with the problems of the north¬
western frontier. Consequently, five frontier districts of the
Punjab viz Peshawar, Hazara, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail
Khan, were separated from the Punjab and the North-West
Frontier Province was constituted in 1901.^^ The District of Delhi
was separated from the Punjab in 1911, when the Indian Govern¬
ment transferred its seat from Calcutta to Delhi.
The Punjab before the partition in 1947 comprised twentynine
districts, each district having 1,000 to 2,000 villages and with
three or four tahsils. For administration all the districts were
grouped into five Divisions.
1. The Ambala Division which included the districts of
Gurgaon, Rohtak, Karnal, Hissar, Ambala and Simla
2. The Jullundur Division which included Kangra,
Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Ludhiana and Ferozepur.
3. The Lahore Division, the smallest but the most important
Division of the Punjab, included Gujranwala, Sheikhpura,
Sialkot, Gurdaspur, Lahore and Amritsar.
4. The Rawalpindi Division included six districts viz. Gujrat
Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Attock, Mianwali and Shahpur.
5. The Multan Division consisted of six districts of south
west Punjab, viz. Montgomery, Lyallpur, Jhang, Multan,
Muzafargarh and Dera Ghazi Khan.
11. Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies for the
year 1868-69, p. 2
12. Ronaldshay, Liye o/Lori/C«rzon, Vol. H, London, 1928, pp. 136-137
CHAPTER II
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
The right of representation granted to the Muslims in 1909
and extended to other communities in 1919 gave rise to communal
consciousness. The Muslims, who constituted about 55 per cent
of the population of the Punjab according to the Census Report
of 1921 and 57 per cent according to the Census Report of 1941
had apparently a very narrow majority over the Sikhs and the
Hindus. That made the communal problem acute between the
Muslims and non-Muslims. Sir Malcolm Darling wrote, “Nowhere
is communal feeling potentialy so dangerous and so complicated
as in the Punjab—it is dangerous because of the Punjab’s virile
hot headed people and complicated because there is a third and
not less obstinate party—the Sikhs who were more closely knit
together than either Hindus or the Muslims.”^ The Moti Lai Nehru
Report rightly recognised the magnitude of the communal problem
in the Punjab “a very potent factor to be taken into account is
the presence of the strong Hindu minority side by side with the
Muslim majority and Sikh minority. The Punjab problem has
assumed an all-India importance and we cannot look at it as an
isolated case arising in a single province.
Separate Representation for Muslims
In the Punjab the Muslims were in a majority. It was the
only province where the majority community had been granted the
right of separate representation. The Report of the Franchise
Committee, Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1919 stated, “...special
electorates for the Mohammedans could be admitted only in provi¬
nces where they were in minority of votes. As regards the Punjab,
1. Sir Malcolm Darling, At Freedom’s Door, London, 1949, page XIl.
2. Motilal Nehru Report, All Parties Conference Allahbad, 1928, page. 57
6
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
our calculation goes to show that Mohammedan voters are in a
slight majority over the combined strength of the Hindu and Sikh
voters. The margin is not great and it is even possible that actual
enumeration might convert it into a minority. As the Sikhs*
I claim to separate representation has been conceded it is clearly
consideration of expediency rather than logic that would place the
large majority of residuary voters in separate constiuencies.”^
The main considerations for this special and extraordinary treat-
men t of the majority community in the Punjab were their narrow
majority and their economic backwardness. The Hindus and the
Sikhs dominated in the fields of industry, commerce, trade and
banking. In the provincial capital of Lahore, the non-Muslims
owned 108 registered factories out of 186. They paid eight times
as much sales tax as Muslim traders and owned more than 75 per
cent of commerce and trade. Banks, commercial institutions,
insurance companies and industrial concerns were mostly in their
hands. The urban property tax, income tax and other taxes paid
by the non-Muslims were far in excess of those paid by the
Muslims.* Even in the Muslim majority districts trade and indus¬
try were in the hands of the Hindus and the Sikhs who lived in
the towns and cities. In the West Punjab districts of Rawalpindi,
Jhelum,Sialkot,Gujranwala, Gujarat, Shahpur,Layallpur, Mianwali,
Multan,Muzaffargarh,Montgomery and Jhang more than 5% of the
population was engaged in trade.® The non-Muslims owned more
than half of the total number of industrial establishment in the
whole of the Punjab.® In the central districts the Sikhs were the
biggest land owners. In the Lahore Division the Sikhs paid as
much as 46 per cent of the total land revenue.’ The Jat Sikhs
from the central districts of the Punjab were mainly responsible
for developing the colony areas of Lyallpur and Montgomery.
3. Report of Franchise Committee, Indian Constitiiional Reforms, Calcutta,
I 1919, page 317
4. Partition Proceeding, Govt of India, Vol. VI, page 186.
5. Census cf India 1921, Vol. XV, Part I, page 358.
6. Idem.
7. Sikh Memorandum to the Punjab Boundary Commission, page 27.
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
7
Next to agriculture, money-lending was the most important
commercial activity in the province. Money-lending was entirelly
in the hands of the Hindus and the' Sikhs as usury was taboo
among the Muslims. According to Sir Malcolm Darling the total
agricultural debt of the Punjab was about nineteen times the land
revenue and the Punjab agriculturist was more indebted than any
other agriculturist in India and more than half of the debt was
incurred by the Muslim rural population.® The Muslim peasants
of the West Punjab were as a body heavily indebted to the Hindu
and Sikh money-lenders of the Multan and Rawalpindi Divisions.
When most of the Hindus left Multan on account of severe plague
epidemic in the Multan Division in September 1922, the Muslim
peasants who were in debt looted their grains and burnt their acco¬
unt books which recorded their debts.®
This economic domination of the non-Muslims over the Mus¬
lims lent a force to the Muslim contention that they were in danger
of economic exploitation by the Hindus and the Sikhs. It was on
this ground that the Punjab Committee constituted in 1928 by the
Punjab Legislative Council to confer with the Indian Statutory
Commission, recommended that “the interests of an economically
and educationally backward community cannot be safeguarded un¬
less it is allowed a free choice in the selection of its representatives.
If common electorates are introduced, the money-lenders and finaci-
ally stronger community will be able to influence the voters of the
backward and poor communities and get their own nominees
elected which will practically mean the backward communities
being left unrepresented in the legislature.^®
Muslim Domination Opposed
The Sikhs and the Hindus opposed the communal representa¬
tion and reservation of seats which had been granted by the
8. Sir Malcolm Darling, Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt^ page 154.
9. The Punjab Administrative Report^ \912-23, page 3.
Hugh Kennedy Trevaskis, Punjab To-day, Vol. I, page 30.
10. Report of the Punjab Committee, constituted to confer with the Indian
Statutory Commission.
Report of Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. Ill, page 455.
8
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Communal Award to the Muslims because it gave them a statutory
majority of 51 percent in the legislature. The Hindus who
were adout 30 per cent argued that there should not be any reser¬
vation of seats for the majority community. The Sikhs who were
about 13 percent paid about 40 per cent of land revenue and
water rates combined^ and supplied a gallant and valuable element
in the Indian Army demanded that they must have substantial
weightage as enjoyed by the Muslims in the provinces where they
were in a minority. Secondly, the Muslim representation must be
less than 50 per cent so that no one community should be able to
rule over the other. The Sikh delegation to the Round Table
Conference, London, raised this issue and argued that “In the
Punjab, they (Muslims) claim to have their majority ensured by
statute...The Muslims’ demand for this majority is made a basis
of separates electorates which means that the other two communi¬
ties could not influence the permanent majority chosen as it would
be by constituents swayed by none but communal motives and
aims.’'»2
Significantly enough the claim put forward by every commun¬
ity had its own justification, but it could not be met with without
injustice to another community. In case the Sikhs were granted
sufficient weightage, the Muslims would be deprived of their narrow
majority in the Legislature. If weightage to the Sikhs was granted
out of the portion to the Hindus it would have resulted in injustice
to the latter. If no weightage was given to the Sikhs it would be
an injustice to them as similar privileges were enjoyed by the
Muslims in other provinces. In this way the communities in the
Punjab were so distributed that their individual claims were
mutually antagonistic and ihe solution of the problem seemed
impossible. The Nehru Report rightly stated: “It is this circum¬
stance in the Punjab which, apart from general consideration has
11. S. Ujjal Singh and S. Sampuran Singh’s Memorandum, Indian Round
Table Conference, Vol. Ill, Appendix N, page 1400.
12. 76/J., page 1400.
f
Muhamjjadan.
Above 8o p.c.
60-80 p.c.
Hikdu.
Above 90 p.c.
75-90 p. 3 .
50-75 p c
Sikh.
20—43 p.c.
Map showing the distribution of relig'ous communities.
sofar
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I 51!X
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&!r
i p£r(
I aDd
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. FP
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a I
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13
14
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
9
SO far defied all attempts at a satisfactory adjustment.The
soil was ready for the seeds of partition.
Proposals for Partitions of the Punjab
One of the basic factors which nourished the idea of the
partition of the Punjab was the fact that the Muslims were predo¬
minant in western Punjab and the non-Muslims in the eastern.
In the extreme westernmost district of Attock the Muslims formed
91 per cent of the population and were 88 per cent in the districts
of Jhelum and Dera Ghazi Khan. In the remaining districts,
from west to east, their population decreased. In the central
districts of the Punjab their relative strength varied from 40 to 80
per cent. They formed only 1 per cent of population of Kangra
and the hill states. The Hindus were predominant in the hilly
terrotories where they were about 94 percent of the population.
They formed a fairly large majority in the southern districts. In
the Rohtak district the Hindus were 82 per cent. In the central
districts of the Punjab and in the Princely States their population
varied from 10 to 49 per cent. The Sikhs were mostly concen¬
trated in the central Punjab. The four main centres of the Sikh
population were Ludhiana and Amritsar in British India, Faridkot
and Patiala among the Punjab States. The highest percentage of
the Sikhs population 44.5 per cent was in Faridkot state.
As a result of the growing communal consciousness there were
a number of communal riots at various places in India during
1923 and 1924. One of the most appalling was a Hindu-Muslim
riot at Kohat in the North-West Frontier Province. On Septem¬
ber 10, 1924, a Muslim mob from the surrounding villages resorted
to all forms of brutality against the Hindu population. Such was
the ferocity of the rioting that the police and military felt helpless
to protect the non-Muslims who were evacuated into Rawal¬
pindi. This communal outburst gave a rude shock to the
politicians of India and set them thinking about the gravity of the
13. Moti Lai Nehru Report, All Parties Conference 1928, page 57.
14. Census of India 1921, Vol. XV, pait I, page 258.
10
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
communal problem. According to Lala Lajpat Rai, the Kohat
tragedy was a unique incident of its own kind.^® He, therefore,
wrote a series of articles on the communal riots and in conclusion
he suggested some remedial measures. One of these was the
division of the Punjab into East Punjab and West Punjab because
the eastern part of the Punjab was predominatly non-Muslim and
the western predominatly Muslim. He argued that if democracy
was to work successfully and effectively under the system of
communal electorates, the partition of the Punjab was essential.^®
Lala Lajpat Rai was perfectly correct in his estimate. But he did not
mean any sovereign s tate for the Muslims as it has been conceded
in the case of Pakistan. Subsequently Chowdhury Rahmat Ali
wrote, “the Lala’s proposal was a decisive step in the right
direction.
In order to solve the communal tangle in the Punjab, Sir
Geoffrey Corbett who ,had served in the Punjab as Financial
Commissioner and was Secretary of the Indian Delegation to the
Round Table Conference, London, suggested another scheme. He
advocated the separation of Ambala Division from the Punjab to
make one community predominant. He argued, “Historically
Ambala Division is a part of Hindustan and its inclusion in the
province of the Punjab was an incident of British rule. Its
language is Hindustani, not Punjabi, and its people are akin to
the people of adjoining Meerath and Agra Divisions. Ambala
Division is not irrigated from the five rivers but from the Jumna
system on which the adjoining districts of United Provinces (of
Agra and Oudh) also depend. It is,S herefore, fair to assume that
15. Indian Annual Register 1924^ Vol. II, pages 26 and 422.
16. Lala Lajpat Rai, The Communal Problem, TAe Tribune^ Lahore, dated
21st Dec., 1924.
17. Pakistan—The Fatherland of Pak Nat ions ^ 3rd Edition, 1946, page 217
Chowdhury Rahmat Ali’s references in this book at pages 217, 218 and
223 indicate that Lala Lajpat Rai had first suggested partition of India
which appears to be wrong as nowhere else we find Lajpat Rai referring
to the partition of Punjab or India.
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
11
in any rational scheme for the redistribution of provinces Ambala
Division less Simla district and the north west corner of the
Ambala district would be separated from the Punjab.”^®
The scheme sponsored by Sir Geoffrey greatly attracted public
attention. Mahatma Gandhi during the Round Table Conference
had this scheme circulated to all members. The proposed
exclusions of Ambala Division meant the exclusion of 3,099,000
Hindus, 240,296 Sikhs and 1,418,136 Muslims^® which would have
raised the Muslim majority to about 63 per cent. This would
have solved the communal problem in Punjab by making one
community predominant over the others. But this line of
argument did not find favour with the Punjab Committee appoin¬
ted to confer with the Statutory Commission because if Ambala
Division were to be taken away from the Punjab, it would
reduce Hindus to a smaller minority and upset the balance
between the various communities. The Committee, therefore,
recommended that “any large disparity between the communities
in the present circumstances is undesirable in the interest of the
province and good government. As the communities are at
present balanced there is not even a remote chance for any one
community to form a Cabinet on communal lines.
In order to counteract Sir Geoffery Corbett’s scheme the
Sikhs delegates to the Round Table Conference made another
proposal for the division of the Punjab. They stated in their
memorandum ; “If the Muslims refuse to accept in this province,
where they are in a slight majority in population anything but
their present demand of reserved majority, we ask for a territorial
rearrangement which would take from the Punjab the Rawalpindi
and Multan Divisions (excluding Montgomery and Lyallpur
districts). These Divisions are overwhelmingly Muslim as well as
• Sir Geoffrey Corbett, The Communal problem in the Punjab, Indian
Round Table Conference, Vol., Ill, Appendix No. VX, p. 1431.
19. Census of India 1941, Vol. Punjab, Pages 43-44.
20 . The Report of the Punjab Committee, Indian Statutory Commission, Vol
HI, Page 410-11.
12
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
racially akin to the North West Frontier Province. These
overwhelmingly Muslim districts with a population of seven
millions can either form a separate province or be amalgamated
with the North West Frontier Province.”^^ The exclusion of
Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions would have raised the Hindus
and Sikhs to a majority in the remaining portion of the Punjab.
It may be noted that this demand was partially satisfied by the
partition of the Punjab in 1947.
It4s not of little significance that the various schemes sponsor¬
ed by Muslim intellectuals aimed at the disintegration of the
Punjab in one way or the other. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the great
Muslim poet and statesman of the Punjab who is considered to be
the father of the idea of a “single state for the Muslims after
amalgamation of the Punjab, North West Frontier Province and
Sindh’’, clearly foresaw that in his political arrangement, Ambala
Division and some other districts would have to be separated from
the Punjab. He stated in his famous address delivered at the
Muslim Conference in 1929 that “The exclusion of Ambala Division
and perhaps some districts where non-Muslims predominate will
make it (the Muslim state) less extensive and more Muslim in
population.”22 Nawab Sir Mohammad Shah Niwaz Khan
advocated splitting the Punjab into two zones. According to him
the“£astern Hindu tracts comprising Ambala Division and Kangra
District were to join Hindu India federation whereas the rest of
the Punjab was to join Indus Region Federation .22 Dr. Syed
Abdul Latif of the Usmania University, while discussing the
position of the Hindus and the Sikhs of the Punjab in his
“Cultural Zones Scheme”, wrote : “A similar zone will have to be
provided to the Hindus and the Sikhs of the Muslim block in the
21 . Memorandum of Ujjal Singh and Sampuran Singh, Indian Round
Table Conference, Government of India publication, 1932, Vol. Ill,
page 1400.
22 . Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, compiled by Shamloo, Lahore, 1944,
page 13
23. Nawab Sir Mohammad Shah Niwaz Khan, A Punjabi, Confederacy of
India, Lahore, 1939, page 243.
V
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
13
North West...a zone may be formed of all non-Muslim States at
present under the Punjab States Agency to be occupied entirely
by the Hindus and the Sikhs. The Hindu State of Kashmir will
be included in this Hindus Sikh zone. The districts occupied by
Muslims may by mutual agreement be transferred to the Punjab
proper and in return the North East of the present Punjab com¬
prising Kangra valley be added to the jurisdiction of the
Maharaja”24 (of Jammu Kashmir).
The climax came in the Lahore resolution the Muslim League
(1940) which is synonymous with the Pakistan resolution. It
clearly stated that the Muslim State (Pakistan) was to consist of
“geographically contiguous units, demarcated into regions
with such a territorial readjustment as may be necessary.”
According to Professor R. Coupland, the words “territorial
readjustment” were particularly mentioned for the splitting of the
Punjab and to exclude Ambala Division because the whole of the
Punjab could not be included in Pakistan as there were
areas where Muslim were not in a majority nor was there
any geographical contiguity with Muslim majority areas.”^® This
point has been made more clear from the letter of Dr. Syed Abdul
Latif, member of the Muslim League Constitution Committee
formed to work out the details of the Pakistan scheme. He wrote
to Sir Abdullah Haroon, Chairman of the Committee ; “The
Lahore Resolution aims at homogeneous compact blocks or states
with an overwhelming Muslim majority. But the Punjab and
Aligarh members of your Committee, through their imperialistic
designs over essentially non-Muslim areas, would like to have
larger Punjab extending even to Aligarh covering all non-Muslim
States from Kashmir to Jaisalmir which reduces the Muslim
percentages to 55%. This zone cannot be called a Muslim zone as
it contains 45 per cent non-Muslims in it.”^®
24. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, India Dividedt 3rd edition, Bombay, 1947, page 189.
25. Prof. R. Coupland, The Future of India, Report on the Constitutional
Problem in India^ 1944, Vol. II, page 8.
26. Dr. Syed Abdul Latif’s letter dated 8th March, 1941, Pakistan Issue,
Nawab Nazar Jang Bahadur, Lahore, 1945, page 98.
14
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
The Demand for the Partition of the Punjab
Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, founder of the Chief Khalsa
Dewan, Amritsar, a Minister in the Unionist Government and a
veteran Sikh leader (died in 1941), was the first Sikh to realise
that ultimately Pakistan would mean for the Sikhs a parting of
the ways with the Muslims. The Khalsa National Party, of which
he was the leader, passed a resolution a week after the Muslim
League’s Pakistan resolution prophesying that “the Muslim League
has created a situation which may mean a parting of the ways for
the Sikhs and the Muslims with whom the Khalsa National Party
has been co-operating in the provincial autonomy regime in the
best interests of the Province and the Sikhs community...It would
be the height of audacity for any one to imagine that the Sikhs
would tolerate for a single day the undiluted communal Raj of any
community in the Punjab which is not only their homeland but
also their holy land. ”27
The Draft Declaration issued by Sir Stafford Cripps in 1942
gave an impetus to the demand for the partition of the Punjab as
one of its main features was to give a right to the provinces to
secede from the Centre, and “with such non-acceding provinces
should they so desire. His Majesty’s Government would be prepa¬
red to agree upon a new constitution giving the same full status
as the Indian Union.”^® According to Brecher the Draft Declaration
implied acceptance of Pakistan demand” by the British.^^ “This
clearly envisaged Pakistan and afforded us a clear chance to get
full Pakistan of our conception without danger of a claim for
partition of the Provinces of Punjab and Beagal,”3‘* subsequently
wrote Choudhary Khaliquzaman, a prominent member of the
Muslim League working Committee. Sir Stafford Cripps wrote to
Mr. Jinnah that any province which should secure 60 per cent
27. Indian Annual Register 1940, page 357.
28. S.D.I.C. [Speeches and Docutnents on Indian Constitution by Maurice Gwyer
and A. Appalorai) Vol. II, page 520.
29. Brecher, Nehru, A Political Biography, London, 1959, page 278
30. Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, Pathways to Pakistan, Orient Longmans,
Pakistan, page 277
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
15
votes in the Assembly for accession to India would have the right
to do so. In case of its failure to secure the required percentage
a party could claim a plebiscite of the whole population of the
province.®! It meant that the Sikhs and the Hindus of the Punjab
could never secure 60 per cent of votes for accession of the Punjab
to the Indian Union as the population of non-Muslims in the Pun¬
jab was about 44 per cent. The Draft Declaration greatly alarmed
the Sikhs in the Punjab because it meant that Punjab, being a
Muslim majority province, could secede from the Centre and
could acquire the same status as the Indian Union. In that case
the Sikhs and the Hindus were to be under perpetual Muslim
domination. In a memorandum to Sir Stafford Cripps the Sikhs,
therefore, lodged a vigorous protest by stating that “their position
in the Punjab has been finally liquidated.”®® They demanded :
“why should not the population of any area opposed to separation
(from the Centre) be given the right to record its verdict and to
form an autonomous unit.”^® It was argued in the memorandum,
that “the Sikhs cannot attain their rightful position or can effect¬
ively protect their interests unless the Punjab is redistributed into
two provinces with the River Ravi as forming the boundary bet¬
ween th*em.” It was asserted that “By delimiting the present
provincial boundaries of the Punjab, a new province comprising
Ambala and Jullundur Divisions with three districts of Amritsar,
Gurdaspur and Lahore to be constituted.Significantly enough
this demand for the demarcation of the boundary with the districts
of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Lahore was partially satisfied by
the Redcliffe Award. Again Master Tara Singh, the Akali leader,
stressed the idea of the partition of the Punjab in his letter to Sir
Stafford Cripps dated 1st May, 1942. He said, “1 thought I had
convinced you at Delhi that you could give Sikhs substantial
protection by dividing the present Punjab into two parts and giving
31. page 277.
32. Memorandum handed over to Sir Stafford Cripps by the Shiromani Akali
Dal on March 31, 1942. Vide Appendix
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
16
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
right of non-accession to each part. The Sikhs and the Hindus
do not want to go out of India. Why should the non-Muslim
majority of the central and eastern Punjab be forced to secede from
India against their wishes ?...If you can separate provinces from
India for the domination of the Muslims how can you refuse to
separate a big area for the protection of the Sikhs from the rule
of a single community.”®® In his press statement published on
December 2,1942, Master Tara Singh advocated the partition of
the Punjab into two provinces, one predominated by the Hindus
and the Sikhs and the other by the Muslims. He quoted the
examples of Orissa, Bihar and Sindh which had been made sepa¬
rate units without in any way destroying the integrity of the
country.®®
In order to counteract the Muslim League demand for sovere¬
ign Muslim State, the Shiromani Akali Dal put forth the demand
for a Sikh State. The main aim and the most prominent feature
of this demand was to insist upon the partition of the Punjab. It
was based on the argument that “the Panih®’ demands the splitt¬
ing up of the existing province of the Punjab with its unnatural
boundaries so as to constitute a separate autonomous Sikh State
in these areas of the central, north-eastern and south-easterft Punjab
in which the over-whelming part of the Sikh population is concent¬
rated and which because of the proprietors in it being mostly Sikhs
and its general character being distinctly Sikh, is the de facto
Sikh Homeland.” The proposed Sikh State was to consist of
the territories of “Central Punjab with Divisions of Lahore,
Jullundur, parts of Ambala and Multan Divisions with the area
comprised of Sikh States and Maler Kotla with certain hills in
the North and North-East.”®® ,
Whatever the merits and demerits of this scheme, it proved to
35. Copy of the Letter of Master Tara Singh, Khalsa College, Amritsar,
S. H. R. No. 1815.
36. The Tribune, dated Dec. 2, 1942.
37. Literally Panth mjans path but the term is applied to the Sikhs collec¬
tively.
38. Justice Harnam Singh, The Idea of Sikh State, page 27 & 46.
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
17
be realistic and far-sighted in advocating an exchange of popula¬
tion. The Sikh leaders clearly saw that it would be impossible for
the Sikhs in general to live in a purely Islamic State. The demand
for a Sikh homeland rested on an implied resumption of an excha¬
nge of population. The Sikh States were to provide the facilities
for such exchange. It was stated that a State Commissioner or
Board was to be constituted to evaluate and purchase the property
of the emigrant population on reasonable terms.
Mr. C. Rajagopalachari’s formula conceded the principle of
the partition of the Punjab as he agreed to separate the “contig¬
uous Muslim majority districts.” The Rajaji formula stated...“a
commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts
in the North-West and East of India wherein the Muslim popula¬
tion is in an absolute majority.”^® The Congress agreed to the
principle that Muslim majority areas were to be given the right
of self-determination and they were not to be compelled to join
the Centre. This new development, according to Master Tara
Singh, vitally affected the Sikhs.
There was no clarification by the Congress about the position
of the Sikhs. In order to make their position clear, the Shiromani
Akali Dal put forward the Azad Punjab Scheme.^^ According to
this scheme a new Punjab was to be carved out after separating
the overwhelming Muslim majority areas. It was argued that it
was to be an ideal province with about an equal proportion of
Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. In the event of partition of the
country it was to remain in the Indian Union.^^ Master Tara
Singh explained the basis of this province in his letter to Sir Staff¬
ord Cripps. He said, “The Sikhs certainly cannot dominate in
any decently large portion of the country and hence they do
not demand domination. But a big province, much bigger than
many of the existing provinces in area, population and wealth, can
39. Sadhu Sawrup Singh, The Sikhs Demand Their Home Land, Lahore, 1946
pages 71-73,
40. S.D.I.S. Vol. II, page 549.
41. Congress te Sikh (Punjabi), by Master Tara Singh (1945), pages 3-4.
42. Swagati Address Azad Punjab Conference, Amritsar (Punjabi), 28th
February, 1944.
18 PARTITION OF PUNJAB
certainly be carved out in which the Sikhs are dominated by no
single community.”-^®
Mr. Jinnah’s Rejection of Partition Proposals
Mahatma Gandhi accepted the principle of partition of the
Punjab when he wrote to Mr. Jinnah, President of the Muslim
League, saying, “I proceed on the assumption that India is not
to be regarded as two or more nations but as one family consist¬
ing of many members of whom the Muslims living in the North¬
west zones, i.e., Baluchistan, Sindh, North West Frontier Province
and that part of the Punjab where they are in an absolute majo¬
rity over all other elements and in parts of Bengal and Assam
where they are in an absolute majority, desire to Live in separa¬
tion from the rest of India...The areas should be demarcated by
a Commission approved by the Congress and the League. The
wishes of the inhabitants of the areas demarcated should be asce¬
rtained through votes of the adult population of the areas or thro¬
ugh equivalent method. If the vote is in favour of separation, it
shall be agreed that these areas shall form a separate State as
soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination.”**
Mr. Jinnah, did not agree with Gandhiji because he opposed the
partition of provinces. In a reply he argued that he did not want
separation on the basis of plebiscite in which all inhabitants could
participate but he wanted the issue to be decided on the basis of
“self-determination confined to the Muslims alone.” He wrote to
Gandhiji, “We claim the right of self-determination as a nation.
You are labouring under the wrong idea that “self-determination”
means only a “territorial unit”...Ours is a case of division and
carving out two independent sovereign states by way of settle¬
ment between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims and not
of severance or secession from any existing union.Again on
43. The letter of Master Tara Singh dated 1.5.42. Khalsa College, Amritsar,
S.H.R. 1815.
44. Gandhi Ji’s letter dated 24th Sept. 1944,7b the Protagonist of Pakistan
p. 132-33,
45. Mr. Jinnah’s letter dated 2lst Sept. 1944. Mahatma Gandhi, Last Phase,
Ahmedabad, 1958, Vol. I, page 95.
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
19
September 25, 1944, Mr. Jinnah wrote to Gandhiji, “If this
term were accepted and given effect to, the present boundaries
of these provinces would be maimed and mutilated beyond rede¬
mption and leave us only with husk.”^6 After the failure of the
talks with Gandhiji, Mr. Jinnah said to the representative of the
London News Chronicle: “There is only one practical, realistic
way of resolving the Muslim-Hindu differences. This is to divide
India into two sovereign parts—Pakistan and Hindustan—by
recognising whole of the North West-Frontier Province, Baluchis¬
tan, Sindh, Punjab, Bengal, and Assam as sovereign Muslim terr¬
itories as they now stand.”^7
*The Conspicuous Part' by Dr. Mohammad Iqbal
According to Mr. Jinnah, Dr. Mohammad Iqbal played a
conspicuous part though it was not revealed at that timers “in
consolidating the Muslim League influence in the Punjab. Not
only did he convince Mr. Jinnah of “a separate federation of
Muslim provinces^^’* as early as in 1937 but he also took effective
steps to realise this objective. Dr. Iqbal had been persuading
the Muslim members of the Lfnionist Party to join the Muslim
League since 1936. He wrote to Mr. Jinnah in 1936 that the
Muslim members of the Unionist Party were prepared to make
following declaration : “That in all matters specific to the Muslim
community as an all-India minority they will be bound by the
decision of the League. “so strong contingent from the Punjab
is expected to attend the Lucknow session of the League. The
Unionist Muslims are also making preparations to attend under
the leadership of Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan.*’®^
Sir Sikandar’s joining Muslim League particularly at a time
when he had a solid majority of 119 members (95 Unionist includ¬
ing 74 Muslims—13 Khalsa National Board and 11 National
46. Mr. Jinnah’s letter dated 25th Sept. 1944, S.D.I.C. Vol. //, page 551.
47. Hector Bolitho. Creator of Pakistan^ London, page 161.
48. Our Struggle, 1857-1947, Pak. Govt, publication, Appendix II, Introduc¬
tion.
49. Ibid, Letter of Dr. Iqbal, dated June 21, 1937.
50. the Letter dated June 25, 1936.
51. Ibid., the Letter dated Oct. 7, 1937.
20
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
progressive Party)®^ in a House of 175 proved to be a blunder.
By this action Sir Sikandar sounded the death knell of the Union¬
ist Party of which he was the leader as he made the Muslim
members of his party subject to the discipline of the Muslim
League whose aims and objects were not identical with those of
that Party. The Unionist Party was devoted to inter-communal
harmony while the Muslim League’s objectives were “safeguarding
the Muslim political rights” and “welfare of Indian Muslims”
with the intention of acquiring Muslim ascendency and Muslim
domination. Sir Fazl-i-Husain, founder of the Unionist Party,
firmly believed that any communal approach to the political tan¬
gle of the Punjab was likely to disintegrate the Unionist Party
which was based on an economic programme and mutual co¬
operation among all communities.®® It was on this account that
Sir Fazl-i-Husain refused to accept the suggestion of Mr. Jinnah
to join the Muslim League in 1936.®* Sir Sikandar’s joining the
Muslim League greatly enhanced the power and prestige of that
party.
A political alliance, it has been significantly remarked, is
always a case of rider and horse. Mr. Jinnah ultimately played
the rider. Sir Sikandar had fundamental differences with Mr.
Jinnah on the future constitution of India. Sir Sikandar had
framed a scheme for an Indian Federation. According to his
scheme, India was to be divided into seven zones and each zone
was to have its Regional Assembly.®® The Central Government
was, accordingly, to have limited powers. In the meeting of the
Working Committee of the Muslim League on February 4, 1940,
Sir Sikandar pleaded for two hours for the acceptance of his
scheme but Mr. Jinnah rejected it on the ground that the Muslim
League should confine its demands to the Muslim zones only and
not to the whole of India.®® This resulted in the Muslim League’s
52. Press Information Bureau Series No. 21, dated March 5, 1946 Page 1.
53. Azam Husain, Fazl-i-Hussain, Bombay, 1946, page 345.
54. Mohammad Noman, Muslim India, Allahbad, 1942, page 330.
55. S. D. I. C. Vol. II, page 455-56.
56. Khaliquizamsin, Pathways of Pakistan, p 2 ige 234.
. ■ *. — ^ ■
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
21
resolution of March 1940 which is known as the Pakistan resol¬
ution. Sir Sikandar disliked the idea of Pakistan and he irrever¬
ently called it ‘Jinnahistan’ as he was convinced that Pakistan
would mean massacre in the Punjab.^’ In this respect his estimate
proved to be correct to a large extent. Perhaps, on account of
the trouble created by the Khaksar movement and owing to the
leanigs of some of his party men towards the Muslim League,
Sir Sikandar was always apprehensive that unless he walked warily
and kept on the right side of Mr. Jinnah he would be swept away
by a wave of fanaticism and was likely to be greeted with black
flags wherever he went. Despite this he never reconciled himself
with the Muslim League objective of Pakistan. He stated in the
'Punjab Legislative Assembly on March 11, 1941 : “We do not ask
for that freedom where there may be Muslim Raj here and Hindu
Raj elsewhere. If that is what Pakistan means I will have nothing
to do with it. I have said so before and I repeat it once again
here on the floor of House.”®® Subsequenly he was so much
disgusted with the policy of the Muslim League and its tactics that
he asserted in the Punjab Assembly t “Let us above all show
to the rest of the world that we in the Punjab stand united and
will not brook any interference from whatever quarter it may be
attempted. Then and then alone we w'ill be able to tell meddling
busybodies from outside hands off the Punjab.”®® Sir Sikandar,
perhaps, did not want to risk his political career by quitting the
Muslim League as it appeared to him very difficult to wean his
followers away from the League camp where he himself had taken
them. He, however, resigned from the Muslim League Working
Committee in 1942.®®
Muslim League Influence Consolidated
After the death of Sir Sikandar in 1942, the Muslim League
adopted a very firm attitude towards the Unionist Party. Mr.
Jinnah asserted that the Ministry in the Punjab should be named
57. Penderal Moon, Divide andQuit^ London 1961, page 20.
58. Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, dated March 11, 1941.
59. Ibid.
60. Khaliquzzaman, Pathways to Pakistan, page 280.
22
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
the Muslim League Coalition Ministry instead of Unionist Ministry
as all the Muslim members who constituted the majority in the
Unionist Party were members of the Muslim League. Sir Khizar
Hayat Khan, who succeeded Sir Sikandar, did not agree as he
wanted the regime of the Unionist Party to continue as had been
agreed to under the terms of the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. Since
Mr. Jinnah was very keen to have a Muslim League Ministry in
the Punjab, he personally went to Lahore on the March 20, 1944,
and asked Sir Khizar to persuade his non-Muslim colleagues to
join the Muslim League Coalition.®^ The Sikh and the Hindu
colleagues of Sir Khizar offered to cooperate with the Muslim
League primarily on the condition that “the idea of Pakistan is
abandoned for the period of the war and, in order to enable all
concerned to judge the merits of the scheme, its precise political
and constitutional implications are fully explained and the geogra¬
phical boundaries of the Punjab under the scheme of Pakistan as
well as the principles, to be adopted for fixation of such bound¬
aries, are indicated as clearly as practical.” This was not accep¬
table to Mr. Jinnah who was of the opinion that minorities in
the Punjab had no right to urge upon the League compromise
on issues of an all-India character as these matter did not come
within their rights as provincial minorities.”®^
Soon after Mr. Jinnah adopted a very firm attitude towards
the Unionist Party and intimated the following terms of alliance
to Sir Khizar Hayat Khan :
1. That every member of the Muslim League party in the
Punjab Assembly should declare that he owed his allegi¬
ance solely to the Muslim League party in the Assembly
and not to the Unionist Party or other party.
2. That the present label of the Coalition namely the Union¬
ist Party should be dropped.
3. That the name of the proposed coalition should be Muslim
League Coalition Party.®®
61. Khaliquzzaman, /o Pakistan, page 322.
62. Ibid., page 323.
63. Press information Bureau, Coverwme/z/ of India Series No. 2\, dated 5th
March, 1946 page, 5.
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
23
The leader of the Unionist Party could not agree to
such terms as it would have dealt a death blow to his party.
Consequently the Muslim League members of the Punjab Assem¬
bly whose strength had risen from 1 to 22 crossed over to the
opposition just before the dissolution of the Assembly for the
elections of 1946.®^
Meanwhile, the British Government was busy in offering a
solution to the Indian problem. The Cabinet Mission put for¬
ward proposals whereby a Constituent Assembly elected by the
members of the provincial Legislations in 1946 was to be set up
to settle the Constitution of India under a three-tier plan. The
proposals were accepted by the Muslim League and the Congress,
but with mental reservations. The existing Punjab Legislati\e
Assembly was dissolved and new elections were ordered. Natur¬
ally, the main question before the electors was the shape of the
constitution to come.
Muslim League Victory in Elections
The elections of 1946 proved a turning point in the history
of the Punjab. The Muslim League secured 73 seats of the Punjab
Legislative Assembly out of 85 seats contested whereas the Uni¬
onist party won only 19 seats out of 99. The Muslim League
polled 75.26 per cent votes whereas the Unionist Party polled only
26.61 per cent votes of all communities. This was but natural.
The Unionist Party had no objective so far as the framing of a
Constitution for India was concerned. Its only objective could be
presented to be to stick to power. Despite the Muslim League’s
victory in the election Sir Khizar Hyat Khan succeeded after
considerable manouvering in forming a Coalition Ministry with
the support of the Akali Party and the Congress Party. For the first
time, the largest party of the Muslims found itself totally excluded
by an undreamt combination of the Congress, the Unionist and
the Akali Party. It is possible that if the League leaders had
been left free to form a coalition, they would have been compelled,
just in order to gain power, to adopt a more conciliatory attitude
64. Ibid
m
24
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
towards the minorities. In that case, they would have been less
tempted to stir up strife. The allies forming the coalition govern¬
ment—the Congress, the Akalis and the rump of the Unionists—
must all share blame for the situation that arose. The Akalis and
the Congress seem to have miscalculated both their own strength
as well as that of the new Chief Minister. As the chief architect
of this ill-started coalition, (as he claims to be) Maulana Azad was
responsible, above all, in giving this unnatural twist to the Punjab
politics*^.
The League emrgedas the largest single party in the Punjab
Legislative Assembly.®* Sir Khizar Hyat Khan formed a coalition
Ministry with the support of the Akali Party®’ and the Congress
Party. He was right, to some extent, in foreseeing that the Muslim
League with all its zest for Pakistan was not likely to come to terms
with the non-Muslim political parties. He, therefore, formed a
ministry as a matter of political expediency. But this had a very
adverse effect on the Muslims of the Punjab who had been playing a
leading role in the Punjab politics as their numbers entitled them
to. Now for the first time the largest party found itself totally
excluded by an undreamt combination of the Congress, Unionists
and Akali Party. If Sir Khizar had not formed the ministry and
the League leaders had been left with some hope of olfice, they
would have been compelled, just in order to gain power, to adopt
a more conciliatory attitude towards the minorities. In that case
65. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom pp. 128-29,
66. Press Information Bureau Series No. 22, dated March 5, 1946, pages 5,
10 and 12. The relative strength of the various parties just after
elections of 1945-46
was :
Muslim League
73 seats
Akalis
21
Unionist
19 „
Independent
11
Congress
51 „
Total Seats
175
67. The Akali Party was formed of the reformist Sikhs who wanted to
reform their religious shrines. After the enactment of the Gurdwara
Act, 1925, the Akali party entered politics. In the elections of 1937, the
Akali Party won 10 Sikh seats. In the elections of 1945-46 it secured
21 seats. Ibid.
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
25
they would have been less tempted to stir up strife.
The election results in 1946 had clearly indicated that the
Muslims of the Punjab were solidly behind the Muslim League and
were aspiring to establish Pakistan with the Punjab as one of its
provinces. In that event the Sikh and Hindu minorities of the Pun¬
jab would have been left in Pakistan. In order to avicd this, they
demanded the creation of a ‘Sikh-Hindu Province.’ It was stated
in A Case for a New Sikh Hindu Province in the Punjab : “If this
demand is not conceded, it will mean the ruin of the Hindu martial
as well as commercial classes under the permanent domination of
those who believe in their being a separate nation. Similarly the
Sikhs, 95 per cent of whose world population resides in the Punjab,
will become politically extinct. A people who, not hundred years
ago, were the rulers of this land would become subservient to those
whom they had conquered and ruled. This is unjust, unfair and
preposterous and shall not be permitted. Therefore, by the right
of self-determination, by the right of majority and by the inherent
right of a culturally homogeneuos people to live their own life, the
division of the Punjab is absolutely essential.”®®
APPENDIX CHAPTER II
Memorandum Handed over to Sir S. Cripps on March 3], 1942
on behalf of Sikh All Parties Committee^
Dear Sir Stafford Cripps,
May we begin by stating most after giving careful considera¬
tion to the proposals which have now been published from the
point of view of India’s integrity and the Sikh position, we find
them unacceptable because :
1. Instead of maintaining and strengthening the integrity of
India, specific provision has been made for the separation of
provinces and the constitution of Pakistan and
2. The cause of the Sikh community has been lamentably
68. Giani Kartar Singh, The Case for A New Sikh-Hindu Province in the
Punjab, Dt\\\\^ 1945, page 9. As stated in his statement preserved in
Oral History Cell-Punjab Historical Studies Department Dr. M. S Ran-
dhava, I. C. S. retired (died on March 3, 1986) was the author of this
pamphlet which he got printed in the name of Giani Kartar Singh.
26
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
betrayed. Ever since the British advent, our Community has fought
for England in every battlefield of the Empire, and this is our reward
that our position in the Punjab, which England promised to hold
in trust, and in which we occupied a predominant position, has
been finally liquidated.
Why should a province that fails to secure a three-fifths major¬
ity of its legislature, in which a community enjoys a statutory
majority be allowed to hold a plebiscite and given the benefit of
a bare majority ? In fairness, this right should have been conceded
to communities who are in a permanent minority in the legislature.
Further, why should not the population of any area opposed
to separation be given the right to record its verdict and to form
an autonomous unit.
We are sure you know that the Punjab proper extended up to
the bank of the Jhelum, excluding the Jhang and Multan Districts,
and the trans-Jhelura area was added to it by the conquest of
Maharaja Ranjit Singh and retained by the British for administra¬
tive convenience. It would be altogether unjust to allow the
extraneous trans-Jhelum population, which only accidentally came
into the province, to dominate the future of the Punjab proper.
We give below figures which abundantly prove our conten¬
tion
From the boundary of Delhi to the ’bank of the Ravi River
the population is divided as follows:
Moslems 4,505,000
Sikhs and other non-Moslems 7,646,000
From the Delhi boundary to the bank of the Jhelum River,
excluding Multan and Jhang districts the population figures are :—
Moslems 8,288,000
Sikhs and other non-Moslems 9,348,000
To this may be added the population of the Sikh States of
Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Kapurthala and Faridkot, which is about
2,600,000. Of this, the Moslems constitute barely 20 per cent and
this reduces the ratio of Moslem population still further.
We do not wish to labour the point any more. We have lost
all hope of receiving any consideration. We shall resist, however.
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
27
by all possible means the separation of the Punjab from the All-
India Union. We shall never permit our motherland to be at the
mercy of those who disown it.
Yours sincerely,
Baldev Singh President
Sikh All Parties Committee
Tara Singh
Jogendra Singh
Ujjal Singh
Mohan Singh (Ex-adviser to
the Secretary of state for India)
We append herewith a note which gives some particulars of
the position of our community in Punjab.
NOTE ON THE SIKHS’ POSITION
On behalf of the Sikhs, we wish to place the claims of the
Sikh Community in the proposed Scheme of His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment for the governance of India. We begin by giving a historical
background of our case.
The Sikhs are an important and distinct community, mainly
concentrated in Punjab of which they were the ruler until 1849.
Sikhism recognises no caste and strictly enjoins upon those who
profess it to treat all human beings as equal.
The Sikhs play an important role in the economic and civic
life of the country and a leading part in its defence. In the British
Punjab with their 3| million population (13.5%of the whole) the
Sikhs pay 25% of the land revenue and 40% of the lard revenue
and water rates combined, the main source of the Provincial
exchequer. They maintain at their own expense over 400 schools
and four colleges open to all communities and classes without
distinction. The percentage of literacy among the Sikhs is higher
than in any other community in the Punjab. They have got a
large number of Sikh shrines with big landed estates attached to
them which are the centres of the Sikh culture and tradition.
The authors of Montford Report recognised the importance
of the Sikhs and “the difficulty of denying to the Sikhs in the
Punjab a concession which is granted to Mohammedans” (para 163).
28
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
The Simon Commission states : “Sikhism remained a pacific
cult until the political tyranny of the Mussalmans and the social
tyranny of the Hindus converted it into a military creed. It is a
striking circumstance that this small community contributed no less
than eighty thousand man (actually 89,000 combatant recruits in
addition to 32,500 already serving when the war broke out”) to
serve in the Great War, a larger portion than any other community
in India.” (para 44)
With a population of over six millions in India, the share of
the Sikhs in the Defence forces of the country has always been out
of all proportion to their population. The Sikhs are perhaps the
only community which is making an organised war effort by the
establishment of the “fChalsa Defence of India League * to maintain
its glorious tradions in the Army. We do realise that with our past
traditions and the excellent fighting material that can be found
in the Sikh districts, we should have done still better in mobilising
our man power, but we are constrained to remark that nothing
has been done by the Government to rouse the enthusiasm of the
Sikh community in the way of recognition of its status in the
Central Government of providing effective safeguards for it in the
Punjab to which it was entitled on its unrivalled position—histori¬
cal, political and economic.
The Sikhs were deeply disappointed at the differential treat¬
ment meted out to them under the so-called “Communal Award”
of 1932. In spite of their unique position in the Punjab, they
were not given the same weightage in the legislature as the Muslim
minorities were given in other provinces. By way of illustration,
it may be stated that the Muslims with 14.8% population in U.P.
were given 30% seates in the Provincial Assembly as against
18.8% seats to the Sikhs in the Punjab with their 13.5% popula¬
tion. Their influence in the administration and political life of
the Punjab was further weakened in the formation of the Provin¬
cial Cabinet. Whereas in the days of dyarchy out of three
Punjabis appointed as ministers and members of the Governor's
Council, there was one Sikh from 1921 to 1926 and one Sikh out
of four Punjabis from 1926 to 1937, since the advent of the
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
29
Provincial autonomy there has been only one Sikh out of the
total of six ministers. It will thus be observed that in the sphere
of the supreme executive of the Province, the representation of
the Sikhs was reduced from 33% to 25% in 1926 add to 16% in
1937.
This progressive deterioration of the share of Sikhs in the
Punjab Cabinet is strongly resented by the Community, as it has
led to encroachment on their religious and cultural rights and
the waning of their influence on the political and economic life
of the country.
We submit that under the existing Constitution the strength
of the Sikhs in the Punjab Cabinet should be maintained normally
at 33% and in no case below 25%, so that there may always be at
least two Sikh ministers in the Cabinet. We also feel that so
long as communal electorates continue to be the method of
representation in the legislature, the Cabinet should be formed on
a coalition basis in the true sense of the word. We may here
point out that when ministries were functioning in all the provin¬
ces, in U.P. where the percentage of the Muslim population is
nearly the same as that of Sikhs in the Punjab, there were two
Muslim Ministers in a cabinet of six.
In the sphere of the Central Government, the Sikh commu¬
nity in spite of its important state in the country, its sacred
shrines scattered all over India and the valuable services that the
Sikh soldiers and technicians are rendering, has been unjustly
treated. The Sikhs have suffered a great disillusionment by the
deliberate neglect of their claims, and the omission of any reference
to the Sikh minority by the British statesmen and the Viceroy of
India in their statements made from time to time during the last
ten years on the Indian question. It seems as if in their opinion,
Muslims alone or the Depressed Classes, sometimes, constitute
the important minorities of India.
Although for seventeen years a Punjabi has been appointed
on the Viceroy’s Council, no Sikh has ever been considered for
such an appointment. Even at the time of the last expansion of
the Executive Council, the claims of the Sikhs were entirely ignored.
30
partition of PUNJAB
In this connection we would like to invite attention to the
decisions of the Allahabad Unity Conference which were arrived
at between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in November 1932.
Resolution No. 4, regarding Cabinets reads as follows :
1. “In the formation of the cabinet of the Central Govern¬
ment so far as possible members belonging to the Muslim, Sikh
and other minority communities of considerable numbers forming
the Indian Nation shall be included by convention”.
2. ‘Further during the first ten years in the formation of
the Central Government, a seat shall be offered to a member of
the Sikh Community”.
Resolution No. 7 reads as under
“It is agreed that in the Central Legislature out of the
total elected seats allotted to British India 33% shall be reserved
for Muslims and 4|% or 14 seats out of 300 for Sikhs”.
It will thus be observed that leading Indians of different
communities recognized the importance of the Sikh minority and
agreed to accommodate it in the Central Cabinet, and also to
give it nearly 5% representation in the Central Legislature.
We favour immediate transfer of power to Indian hands,
entrusting all portfolios, including Defence, to Indians with experi¬
ence of public life. We feel that in this way alone, the moral
and material resources of India can be tapped to the fullest extent
and Indians can participate in the war with full vigour and
enthusiasm.
The Sikhs stand for national unity and the integrity of India.
They would! ike the provinces to enjoy as wide a measure of
autonomy as may be compatible with good government in the
country as a whole but they also feel that any weakness at the
Centre will expose India to internal and external danger.
They are strongly opposed to the vivisection of India into
two or three rival Dominions or sovereign States as is contempla¬
ted in the British proposals. They feel that such a step would
lead to a state of perpetual strife and civil war in the country. •
. If the object is to give self determination to the provinces in
the matter of accession to the “Union of India”, the right to
-
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
31
st^nd out and break the unity of India should not be exercised
by a bare majority but by at least 65% of Indian members
present at the meeting of the Provincial Assembly when the Res¬
olution is considerd. A plebiscite on the issue of secession is
certain to lead to intercommunal riots of a most serious character
and magnitude and should in no case be resorted to.
We are constrained to remark that the proposed scheme does
not make any provisions for safeguarding the intersts of the Sikh
minority. The decisions of the constitution-making body are to
be by a bare majority and no provision is made for recourse to
arbitration by the aggrieved party as was even assured by Maha¬
tma Gandhi in his statement on the Congress scheme of Constit¬
uent Assembly.
The treaty which is proposed to be negotiated between the
constitution-making body and His Majesty’s Government for
protecting the religious and racial minorities in accordance with
undertakings given by the British Government will have no
sanction behind it. Besides, we are not sure how political rights
which relate mainly to a share in the legislature and the admini¬
stration of the country will be incorporated into the treaty.
The treaty might cover the cultural, religious and linguistic rights
of minorities as such treaties in European countries after the last
Great War did. But the under-takings given to the Sikhs by
His Majesty’s Government from time to time relate to the position
and status of the Sikhs in the governance of the country and
not merely regarding the exercise of their religious or cultural
rights.
The Sikhs, therefore, feel that they cannot attain their rightful
position or can effectively protect their interests unless the Punjab
is redistributed into two provinces with the River Ravi as forming
the boundary between them.
We might invite attention to the All-India Muslim League
resolution of the Lahore session held in March 1940 which is
populary known as the Pakistan Resolution.
“That no constitution would be workable in this country or
acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following
32
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
basic principle, viz. that geographically contiguous units are
demarcated into regions which should be • so constituted with
such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas
in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the
North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped
to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units
shall be autonomous and sovereign.”
A careful reading of the resolution discloses the fact that the
Muslim League itself visualised the readjustments of areas and
the inclusion in their separate state of only those areas in which
the Muslim were in a majority.
The population of the Punjab is so distributed that the two
western divisions of Rawalpindi and Multan are predominantly
Muslim and the two eastern divisions of Ambala and Jullundur
are predominently non-Muslim. The three central districts of
Amritsar, Gurdaspar and Lahore have a balanced population.
The separate figures of population for each district of the Punjab
are attached as annexure to this statement. If a new province
of a contiguous area of the two divisions of Ambala and Jullundur
plus the three districts of Lahore, Gurdaspur and Amritsar is
carved out, it will have a total population of 12,151,000 (according
to the 1931 Census) with non-Muslims forming 63% and Muslims
37% of the population. The other province to the west of the
River Ravi comprising Multan and Rawalpindi Divisions plus
the three districts Sheikhupura, Sialkot and Gujranwala will have
a total population of 11,429,000, with Muslims forming 77.3%
and non-Muslims 22.7% of the population.
The Sikhs do not want to dominate but they would certainly
not submit to domination of a community which is bent upon
breaking the unity of India and imposing its personal laws and
culture on the other sections of the population.
We submit that in any interim arrangement or in the perma¬
nent scheme the following safeguards should be provided either
in the treaty which might be enforceable or in the constitution
itself :
1. By delimiting the present provincial boundaries of the
GENESIS OF THE PARTITION
33
Punjab, a new province comprising Ambala and Jullundur Divi¬
sions with the three districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Lahore
be constituted.
2. The Sikh minority in the provinces be given the same
weightage and measure of protection as the Muslim minority.
3. So long as communal electorates exist, provincial cabinets
should be formed on coalition basis.
4. The Sikhs should always be given 5% representation in
the Central Legislature.
5. A Sikh should always be given a seat in the Cabinet of
the Central Government.
6. A Defence Advisory Committee should be set up for
advising the Indian Defence Minister and a Sikh should be given
a seat on that Committee.
7. The position of the Sikhs in the defence forces of India
should be maintained in keeping with their past tradition and
strength in those forces.
8. The share of the Sikhs should be fixed in provincial and
all India services on the lines it has already been provided or may
be provided for the Muslims.
9. Religious laws of Sikhs enacted, may only be amended
by the votes of the majority of the Sikh members in the Legislature.
10. No restrictions should be imposed by the State in the
exercise of the religious rights of the Sikhs in the matter of
eatables and religious performances.
11. The State should provide for the teaching of Punjabi in
Gurmukhi script where a certain fixed number of scholars is forth¬
coming.
Baldev Singh President
Document No. 467, Transfer of Power 1942-47, N-Mansergh,
Vol. 1, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London-1970.
ANNEXURE
Districtwise Percentage of Muslim Population {1931)
Jullundur Division
1. Kangra
2. Simla J 5.5
3. Hoshiarpur 31.8
34
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
4. Jullundur
44.5
5. Ludhiana
35.1
6. Ferozepore
44.6
Ambala Division
7. Hissar
28.3
8. Rohtak
17.1
9. Gurgaon
32.7
10. Karnal
30.5
11. Ambala
31.0
Lahore Division
12. Amritsar
47.0
13. Gurdaspur
50.8
14. Lahore
59.2
15. Sialkot
62.2
16. Gujranwala
70.8
17. Sheikhupura
64.1
Multan Division
18. Montgomery
69.8
19. Lyallpur
62.6
20. Jhang
83.2
21. Multan
80.3
22. Muzaffargarh
86.8
23. Dera Ghazi Khtin
88.7
Rawalpindi Division
24. Gujrat
85.4
25. Shahpur
82.7
26. Jhelum
89-1
27. Rawalpindi
82.8
28. Attock
90.9
29. Mianwali
86.9
ii
CHAPTER III
THE PARTITION PLAN
After the termination of the Second World War in 1945,
circumstances took a favourable turn for the independence of
India. The Labour Party in England, having the independence of
India as one of the issues in its election manifesto, won the
elections.^ Thus the question of granting independence to India
came to the forefront. Moreover Mr. C.R. Attlee (later Lord
Attlee), the leader of the Labour Party and Britain’s Prime
Minister, took personal interest in the various plans for the
transfer of power to India.-
Failure of the Cabinet-Mission Plan
Soon after coming into power, Attlee sent a mission to India,
consisting of three members of the Cabinet. After discussing first
in England and then in India, it put forward its proposals. They
apparently made a serious attempt to meet the Muslim League’s
point of view half-way and thus preserve the unity of India. It
provided limited powers for the Centre. The Constituent Assembly
to be set up was to have the following compulsory grouping of the
provinces for making the Constitution of a free India :
Section A : Consisting of Madras, Bombay, U.P., Bihar,
the Central Provinces and Orissa.
Section B : Consisting of Punjab, the North Western
Frontier Province, Sindh and British Baluchis¬
tan.
Section C : Consisting of Bengal and Assam.*
In Section B, the Muslim representatives were 22, Hindus 9
1. Herbert Morrison, Government and Parliament, p. 222
2. C.R. Attlee, As it Happened, London, pp. 78-79
Mr. Attlee was a member of the Simon Commission and hence one of
the architects of Government of India Act. 1935.
S.D.LC. Vol. II, p. 582
3.
36
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
and the Sikhs 4. The Sikhs protested against this compulsory
grouping and in a letter, dated May 25, 1946, to the Secretary of
State, Master Tara Singh, the Akali Leader wrote, that “a wave
of dejection, resentment and indignation has run through the Sikh
community. The Sikhs have been thrown at the mercy of the
Muslims.”-* S. Baldev Singh, the Defence Member of the Interim
Government, wrote to the Prime Minister of Britain, seeking his
intervention to remedy the wrong done to the Sikh community.® In
a memorandum submitted to the Cabinet Mission, the Shiromani
Akali Dal stated, “As an alternative to the existing province of
the Punjab, a new province may be carved out as an additional
provincial unit in the united India of the future in such a way
that all the important Sikh shrines (Gurdwaras) be included in it
as also a substantial majority of the Sikh population of the exist¬
ing province of the Punjab.”®
The Indian National Congress was opposed to the compul¬
sory grouping of provinces and suggested the splitting up of the
Punjab : “...there must be no compulsion to any province ora
part of a province by another province. The Congress cannot be
a party to any such compulsion or imposition against the will of
the people concerned.the rights of the Sikhs in the Punjab
should not be jeopardised. In the event of any compulsion a
province or a part of a province has the right to take such action
as may be deemed necessary.’”^ This greatly irritated the Muslim
League which soon after condemned this resolution in these
vigorous terms: “...these qualifying clauses confer the right of
veto within a section on a province and what is more absurd on a
part of a province and on the Sikhs in the Punjab.”®
There were vital difference between the Congress and the
4. Papers relatings to the Cabinet Mission Plan in India, p. 61
5. V.P. Menon, Transfer of Power in India, Calcutta, 1957, p 291
6. Memorandum submitted to Cabinet Mission, S.H.R. No. 1815, Khalsa
College, Amritsar
7. H.I.N.C. Vol. II, p. 823, Framing of the constitution, B. Shiva Rao, Vol.
I, page 353
S.D.I.C. Vol. II, p. 660-61
8.
THE PARTITION PLAN
37
Muslim League regarding the Cabinet Mission Plan. The Congress
apparently felt that when it came to forming zonal Government, a
province or a part of a province could opt out of the zone. It had
not really accepted either the three—tier Government or limita¬
tions on the power of the Constituent Assembly laid down in the
Plan. After the elections of the Constituent Assembly, the Congress
insisted on its functioning. As the Congress had a predominant
majority, naturally it was likely to insist on its own interpretation
of the Plan and secure that the Constituent Assembly went its
way. Mr Jinnah described this as “a blunder of a very grave and
serious character.”® The Constituent Assembly started its working
on December 9, 1946. The Muslim League boycotted it and stated
that “the elections to and thereafter summoning of the Constituent
Assembly in spite of strong protests and most emphatic objections
on the part of the League, were ab initio void, invalid and
illegal.”^®
Conflict in the Interim Government
Apart from fundamental differences regarding the long term
arrangement, there had never been smooth working of the Interim
Government. The Muslim League had at first refused to join the
Interim Government in the hope that this would keep out the
Congress. When the Governor-General invited Mr. Nehru to form
the Government, it was greatly upset. After some time, it also
decided to join the Government. The object of the Congress
members in the Interim Government was to bring into existence
healthy conventions of non-interference by the Viceroy and the
Interim Government working as a team, so that it may be replaced
by the National Government in due course. The Muslim League
members had entered the Government with the avowed object of
holding Congress to ransom, lest anything should be done which
might prejudice its claims for Pakistan. In this campaign, their
chief weapon was the emphasis on legality “preventing the
Government from functioning as a Cabinet and to increase the
power and influence of the Viceroy in order to save themselves
9. Ibid., page 657
10. Ibid., page 666
38
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
from being overridden by the Congress majority.’’^ Mr Jinnah
held that the “Interim Government has been formed under the
present Constitution the Act of 1919 which is in operation.It is
a sheer flight of the imagination to call it a Cabinet, a National
Government or even a Coalition.It can, therefore, only func¬
tion in the terms of the Government of India Act of 1919, so far
as the day-to-day administration is concerned. He was obviously
mistaken. The canstitutional development in Great Britain has
mainly arisen because of the popular representatives in power,
claiming more than the law allowed them. To the Congress
members that attitude seemed reactionary, as it insisted on keep¬
ing the status quo and forbade any progress by conventions. There
was continual friction between the League and the Congress in
the Interim Government. Liaqat Ali Khan, who was the Finance
Member of the Interim Government, seldom agreed to the propo¬
sals coming from the Congress members.^3 Lord Clydesmuir, who
officiated as Governor General during the absence of Lord
Mountbatten in May 1947, observed, “At that time relation bet¬
ween the Hindus and the Muslims (members of the Government)
had almost reached breaking point. At the Centre there was a
joint Cabinet in name only.”^^
The New Approach
Since the Cabinet Mission Plan had practically failed, the
Viceroy suggested a ‘pretty defeatist’ scheme about which Lord
Attlee wrote, “Wavel and his chief service advisers were despon¬
dent and could only suggest progressive retirement from India,
Province by Province which was in my view a counsel of despair...
Well, I thought that was what Winston could certainly quite
properly describe as an ignoble and sordid scuffle and I would not
11. E.W.R. Lumby, Transfer of Power in India, London 1954, p. 123
H.V. Hodson, Great Divide, London, 1969, p. 182*83
12. Mr. Jinnah's statement dated Nov. 26, 1946, S.D.I.C., Vol. II, PP.
485-86
13. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Orient Longman, 1954,
p. 16
14. Lord Clydesmuir, “Transference of Power in India,” Asiatic Review,
Oct. 1948
THE PARTITION PLAN
39
look at ^ change in the holder of the office of the Viceroy
was considered necessary. The British Prime Minister added, “I
had great admiration for Lord Wavel, both as a soldier and as a
man, but I did not think he was likely to find a solution. I did
not think that he and the Indians could really understand each
other. New men were needed for a new policy.”^®
On the appointment of Lord Mountbatten as Viceroy of India,
the British Prime Minister made a very significant speech in the
Parliament. He said, “His Majesty’s Government wish to make
it clear that it is their definite intention to take the necessary steps
to effect the transference of power into responsible Indian hands
by a date not later than June 1948.His Majesty’s Government
will have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Govern¬
ment in British India should be handed over, on the due date,
whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for
British India or some areas to the existing Provincial Governments
or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best
interests of the Indian people.”^’ This statement, according to
Andrew Mellor, “altered the course of history. The echoes of this
momentous announcement reverberated throughout the Subconti¬
nent.”^® For the first time, the Indians felt that the British
irrevocably intended to leave. It “paved the way for partition and
even represented an indirect concession to the League demand for
Pakistan.”^® Gandhiji rightly perceived its meaning when he wrote
to Nehru “This may lead to Pakistan for those provinces or
portions which may want”. 2 ® This statement together with the
Muslim League’s policy of obstruction prepared the Congress
leaders to accept partition, as they were fed up with the Muslim
League’s tactics. Pandit Nehru, subsequently said, “There was an
overwhelming sense of conflict during the Interim Government
15 . Lord Attlee, As it Happened, p. 183
16. Ibid
17. 5.7)./.C.. Vol. II, p. 668
18. Andrew Mellor, India Since Partition, London, 1956, p. 9
19. Brecher, Nehru—A Political Bicgrafhy, London, 1956, p. 336
20. VyoiiQ Last Phase Vol. II, Alimedabad, p. 566
40
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
days by pulls in different directions by the Muslim League. It
was lelt that even if some arrangement could be arrived at to
prevent partition, these conflicts and disruptions would continue
and might come in the way of any marked progress in the
economic and other planning later. It would have left the
Federal Government weak.”^^ Unlike his predecessors, Lord
Mountbatten had demanded, and had been given, a free hand in
settling the Indian question without reference to the Home
Government. The negotiators could not bank upon an appeal to
the Home Government. He insisted on binding the parties to what
he got settled
The Congress Demand—Partition of the Punjab
The appointment of a new Viceroy and the fixation of a date
for the transfer of power to Indian hands had a significant impact
on the Punjab politics. Soon after Attlee’s statement Sir Khizar
yielded to the pressure tactics of the Muslim League and resigned.
Justifying his resignation he said, “If I were now to continue to
lead a Coalition in which the Muslim League is not represented,
this might put in serious jeopardy such chances as might otherwise
exist of a settlement being arrived at between the communities
in the province’V^ Mr Jinnah’s idea of a settlement was the
inclusion of the whole of Assam, Bengal and the Punjab in his
Pakistan. But Lord MouiPbatten would have none of it. Mr.
Jinnah was now definitely told that he could have Pakistan if its
writ would run only in the areas where the Muslim were in a
majority. If the Muslims were to opt out of India, the non-
Muslims in the predominantly non-Muslim areas would have to
be allowed to opt out of the Punjab, and Bengal and the Muslim
claim in Assam would be limited to Muslim parts of the Province
alone.
Meanwhile, instead of any communal settlement in the Punjab,
there broke out communal riots in the districts of Rawalpindi,
21. Nehru’s Press statement on “India Wins Freedom.” The Tribune^
Ambala, dated February 8, 1959
22. H. V. Hudson, Great Divide, London, 1969, page 201
23. The Tribune, Lahore, dated March 4, 1947
THE PARTITION PLAN
41
Attock and Multan. These riots vitiated the political atmosphere.
I'andit Nehru said in a press conference at Lahore, after visiting
the riot-affected areas, “Obviously all that has happened is
intimately connected with political affairs. I propose to say
nothing about that aspect, except this that if politics is to be
conducted in this way, then it ceases to be politics and become
some kind of jungle warfare which reduces human habitationto
the state of a desert”.^^ On April 8, 1947 the Congress passed,
among others, the following resolution “...These tragic events
(the communal riots in the Punjab) have demonstrated that there
can be no settlement of the problem of the Punjab by violence
and coercion and no arrangement based on coercion can last.
Therefore it is necessary to find a way out which involves the
least amounts of compulsion. This would necessitate the division
of the Punjab into two provinces, so that the predominantly
Muslim parts may be separated from the predominantly non-
Muslim parts”.*®
The resolution adopted a new stand which told the Muslim
League that it could not have it both ways. It could not claim
to take Muslim majority areas out of India and insist on keeping
non-Muslim majority portions in Pakistan to tyrannise over them.
They could not include the whole of the Punjab into Pakistan.
The areas with non-Muslim majorities must be allowed to opt
for inclusion in India. But the division of Punjab could cnly be
conceded after the Congress had reconciled itself to the creation
of Pakistan. By this lime, Mountbatten, the new' Governor-
General had discussed his tentative plan with the Congress
leaders and Mr Jinnah. The Congress high command, barring
Maulana Azad, had tentatively accepted the partition of India.
This laid the foundation of the Partition Plan. Following the
lead given by the Congress, the Hindu and the Sikh members of
the Central Legislature, belonging to the Punjab, addressed a
letter in April to Jawahar Lai Nehru with the request that their sub-
24. D.R. Bose, New India Speaks, Calcutta 1947, p. 133
25. Indian Annual Register 1947, Vol. I, pp. 118-19
42
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
mission be endorsed by him and communicated both to the Vice¬
roy and His Majesty’s Government. The letter ran : “The Muslims
and non-Muslims are equally balanced and no Government can
carry on without the support of three communities. Fortunately, the
population of the Province is so divided that there are districts and
contiguous areas where Muslims and non-Muslims predominate.
We have given anxious and deep thought to this problem. After
considering all its pros and cons, we have come to the conclusion
that the only way out of the present deadlock lay in the partition
of the Punjab into two provinces.”^® The Sikh leaders jointly
with the Hindus as well as separately insisted upon the division
of the Punjab and the Shiromani Akali Dal asserted that partition
of the Punjab was “the only remedy to end communal strife.””
Master Tara Singh, Sardar Baldev Singh and Giani Kartar Singh
expressed similar views during their interviews with the Viceroy
on the April 18, 1947.^8
The communal riots of the Punjab received some attention
in England. The Times, London, described the Punjab situation
as “most critical”. On the 11th March in an article “Lesson
from the Punjab” it stated that “the Sikhs” complain with justice
that the Muslim League seeks to deny to them in the Punjab the
position which it claims in the rest of India.” It reverted again to
the Punjab communal riots on the 18th March and observed
editorially “Prolonged agitation directed by the Muslim League
against the Unionist Coalition Government of the Province paved
the way for the present outbreak of communal violence.” Punjab
had been put under the Governor’s rule under section 93 of the
Government of India Act of 1935. The resignation of Khizar had
not made possible the emergence of a Muslim League ministry in
power. This had further exasperated the Muslims and Lahore
had become a victim to constant rioting. When Lord Mountbatten
took over from Lord Wavell on 24 March, 1947, he was faced
with the most urgent and critical problem in the Punjab. As
26. P.P. Vol. VI, p. 234
27 . Indian Annual Register 1941, Vol. I, Calcutta, p. 244
28. Ibid
THE PARTITION PLAN
43
Alan Campbell Johnson put it, “We have inherited ‘inter alia’
communal rioting and the key province of the Punjab with three¬
fold Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communal problem governed by
emergency decree.
The Partition Plan
After discussing the Indian constitutional problem with
different leaders. Lord Mountbatten came to the following conclu¬
sions :
1. “On the assumption that Mr. Jinnah's power and purpose
were sustained, partition would have to be provided for.”
2. “Partitioning of the Centre involved similar treatment
for these provinces where two communities were evenly
balanced.”3®
The next problem, as Lord Mountbatten himself stated, “was
to see il the Congress party which had always stood for a united
India, would be prepared to consider the partition of the country
as a price for quick transfer of power and the restoration of peace.
It was pointed out that in the case of provinces, like the Punjab
and Bengal, partition would undoubtedly be involved. The
Congress was not prepared to agree to a partition of the country
with the entire Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal
going in Pakistan. Partition of India for them was necessarily
acceptable only if the non-Muslims majority portions of the
Punjab and Bengal were to be placed in India. When this was
put to Mr. Jinnah, he was against the performance of a surgical
operation on the provinces which had ancient histories of unity.”^^
Lord Mountbatten argued, “that the feeling invoked in his heart
(Mr. Jinnah’s heart) by prospects of partition of those provinces
was the feeling invoked in my heart and the heart of the Congress
against the partition of India itself. And we went, on one night
say, around the mulberry bush, always coming back to the same
point.” At last Mr. Jinnah came forward with an enquiry whether
the same principle of partition of provinces would be extended
29. Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, London, 1951, p. 40
30. Ibid. p. 55
31. London, Oct. 1948. Speech of Lord Mountbatten
44
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
beyond the Punjab and Bengal which meant the Partition of
Assam. Lord Mountbatten readily agreed to that also.®^
Punjab Governor’s Dissent
The following points which formed the basis of the Partition
Plan were circulated to the Governors of various provinces :
1. The provinces generally speaking to have the right of
self-determination.
2. The Punjab and Bengal to be notionally divided for
voting purposes.
3. The predominantly Muslim Sylhet district in Assam to
be given the option of joining the Muslim Province
created by partitioned Bengal through referendum.
4. Referendum to be held in the North West Frontier
Province on the issue whether it was to join one group
of provinces or another.*^
The Governor of the Punjab at that time was Sir Evan M.
Jenkins who had spent 17 years of his career in the Punjab.®^ He
expressed his dissatisfaction with the plan and argued that it would
satisfy neither Mr. Jinnah nor the Sikhs, because it would leave for
Jinnah a truncated Pakistan and it would cut the Sikhs in almost
two equal parts. Mountbatten was, however, very optimistic on
these two points. He said that “in the last analysis, Jinnah would
acquiesce and the only way the Sikhs could improve their position
was through negotiation.”^®
Consequently, meetings between Mr. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali
Khan and the Maharaja of Patiala and Sardar Baldev Singh,
the Defence Member of the Interim Government, were arranged.
32. Time only to Look Forward, (Speeches of Lord Mountbatten), pp. 20-21
London, 1949 ; Hodson, Great Divide, page 216
33. Asiatic Rtvitw, Oct 1948
34. Sir Evan Meredith Jenkins was born on Feb. 2, 1896. Joined Indian
Civil Service in 1920 and served in the Punjab. He was Chief
Commissioner of Delhi in 1937, Secretary of the Department of Supply
trom 1940-43, Private Secretary to the Viceroy and Secretary to the
Governor General (Personal) from 1943-46. He was Governor of the
Punjab from 1946 to Aug. 15, 1947
35. Mission with Mountbatten, p. 85
THE PARTITION PLAN
45
Since the Sikhs had already put forth the demand of a Sikh State,
the talks naturally centred on that issue. Mr. Jinnah and Liaqat
Ali Khan agreed to the formation of the Sikh Stat<^ with its
separate military establishment within Pakistan, provided the
Sikhs did not insist on the partition of the Punjab and agreed to
join Pakistan. ® I he Sikh leaders demanded the right of opting out
of Pakistan for the Sikh State to which the Muslim League leaders
did not agree.Master Tara Singh told the writer that if Mr
Jinnah had agreed they would have negotiated with the Congress
for better terms. It is difficult to visualize what better terms the
Congress could have offered short of creating of an independent
Sikh State in the portion of Punjab which fell to India’s share.
But Master Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh or Maharaja of
Patiala did not contact Congress after Mr. Jinnah’s refusal to
concede their demand.
There were several reasons for the breakdown of Akali-
Muslim League talks. There had never been any previous under¬
standing between them, though the Akalis and the Congress had
baulked the Muslim League of its right to form a government in
1946. An influential Akali leader Giani Kartar Singh, attended
the Muslim League M.L.A’s Conference in Delhi in April 1947,
and he tried to probe into Muslim League’s attitude towards the
Sikhs in case of the establishment of Pakistan. He was told noth¬
ing apart from being given assurances of good treatment.^® It has
been rightly stated that Mr. Jinnah “himself knew no more of the
Punjab than Neville Chamberlain did of Czechoslovakia.”3* But
this did not trouble Jinnah at all. He was trying to create Pakistan
of his dreams, an Islamic State for the Muslim Nation. He was
not anxious to give the Sikhs a Sikh State of their conception and
his only concern was to keep as much of the Punjab in Pakistan
36. “Mr. Jinnah’s offer of Sikh State,’’ Maharaja Patiala’s article. The
Tribune Ambala, July, 19, 1959. This would have left the Hindus of the
Punjab in Pakistan either of its Punjab part or in the newly created
Sikh Province of Pakistan
37. Statement of Master Tara Singh, The Tribune, Ambala, July 23, 1959
38. Ian Stephens, Pakistan, London, 1963, p. 140
39. Moon, Divide and Quit, hor\<lon, 1961, p. 37
46
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
as he could by hoodwinking the Sikhs, if he could.
From the Sikh point of view, the Sikh-Muslim accord might
at the most have saved them from the miseries of migration, death
and destruction caused by the communal riots. But even this is
doubtful as it presumes that in Jinnah’s Islamic State they would
have been left alone. Nothing could grant them protection against
Muslim fanaticism. As events later on were to show, the Muslim
could easily mount a Jehad in Pakistan even against the so-called
heretic Muslims, the Qadianis. Mr. Jinnah could not be expected to
create a Sikh province in Pakistan stretching as far as Nankana
Sahib or Lahore. The less would not have satisfied the Sikhs at
large. Mr. Jinnah wanted the Sikhs to join Pakistan and gave
assurances of good treatment towards them. The Sikh leaders
insisted on some constitutional rights when they met Jinnah in
1946 and 1947 which obviously Jinnah would not concede. The
later failure of the Moon mission was from the very beginning
foreseen. Mr. Jinnah’s Islamic State had no place for zealous and
aggressive non-Muslims. S. Baldev Singh rightly described the
attitude of Mr. Jinnah to that of a salesman who wanted to sell a
horse without convincing the customer of its good qualities by
trial and always asserted that the horse was a good one.^® When
Lord Ismay approached Mr. Jinnah in early August 1947 to issue
a statement assuring the Sikhs their religious freedom and
categorically stating that Pakistan was as much for the Sikhs as
for the Muslims, the latter refused.^^
An accord between the Akalis and the Muslim League would
only have been possible if the Sikhs could obliterate their past
bitter memories of the eighteenth century Muslim domination.
But to join Pakistan of Mr. Jinnah’s dream demanded great fool
hardiness on the part of the Sikh leaders when sufficient justifica¬
tion for joining it was not forthcoming from the Muslim League.
In the communal riots of March 1947, Sikhs had been killed in
large numbers by the fanatical Muslim mobs. But not a word
of regret had been expressed by any of the Muslim League leaders,
40. Writer’s conversation with Major J.M. Short
41. Lord Ismay’s conversation with the writer
L
the partition plan
47
Passions ran so high and tension was so great that any undersland-
ing between the Sikhs and the Muslims appeared impossible.
The Sikh leaders made the right choice in the long run.
Keeping in view their culture, history and past traditions, which
were more akin to the Hindus than to the Muslims, they permane¬
ntly linked their destinies with India. Joining Pakistan by the
Sikhs would have been just like their joining hands with Ahmed
Shah Abdali to build an Afghan Kingdom in the Punjab which,
according to Rattan Singh Bhango, the immortal author of the
Panth Parkash, was “mingling fire with gun-powder.”
Provisions for the Partition of the Punjab
Lord Mountbatien publically announced the Plan on the
June 3,1947. The following provisions were made for the partition
of the Punjab and Bengal in that Plan :
1. “The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and
the Punjab, excluding European members, will be asked
to meet in two parts—one representing the Muslim
majority districts and the other the rest of the province.
For purpose of determining the population of the
districts the 1941 census figures will be taken as author¬
itative.” The Muslim majority districts of the Punjab,
as given in the Appendix of the Plan, were defined as
Lahore Division : Gujaranwala, Gurdaspur, Sheikhupura,
Sialkot, Lahore
Rawalpindi Division : Attock, Gujarat, Jhelum, Mianawali,
Rawalpindi, Shahpur
Multan Division : Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Mont¬
gomery, Multan and Muzaflfargarh
2. “The members of two parts of each Legislative Assembly
sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether or
not the Province should be partitioned. If a simple
majority of either side decides in favour of partition,
division of the province will take place and arrange¬
ments will be made accordingly.
3. “In the event of partition being decided upon, for the
purposes of the final partition of these Provinces, a
48
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
detailed investigation of boundary questions will be
needed, a Boundary Commission will be set up by the
Governor-General.”^^
Acceptance of the Plan
On June 3, Lord Mountbatten reminded Mr. Jinnah that
Nehru, Patel and Kriplani had made an absolute point that they
would reject the Plan unless the Muslim League accepted it as
a final settlement.This really invited him to secure public
support of the Plan. The Muslim League, therefore, accepted the
3rd June Plan by passing the following resolution on June 9, The
Council resolves to give full authority to the President of the .All
India Muslim League to accept the fundamental principles of the
Plan as a compromise, although it cannot agree to the partition
of Bengal and the Punjab or give its consent to such partition,
it has to consider H. M. G’s plan for the transfer of power as
a whole.”-*^ The Congress Working Committee meeting thereafter
accepted the Mountbatten Plan with a reservation about N.W.F.
Province. In the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee
held on June 14 and 15, 1947, the resolution of the Working
Committee was considered. Mahatma Gandhi pleaded with
the members and argued that there was no other alternative
left for them.45 Political realism demanded that they should
accept the plan. Politics after all was the art of adopting
the possible. Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru argued, “It must be
realised that it is not possible to coerce even with swords unwilling
parts to remain under the Indian Dominion.”^® The Congress
Committee, therefore, passed the following resolution on June
15, 1947, “In view, however, of the refusal of the Muslim
League to participate in the Constituent Assembly and further
in view of the policy of the Congress that it cannot think in the
42. F.P. Vol. VI, p. 2
43. Mission with MountbatteUy p. 102
44. P.P., Vol. I, pp. 6-7
45. Azad, India Wins Freedom, pp, 195-96
46. New India Speaks, Speeches of Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru, Calcutta,
1947, p. 163
the partition plan 49
terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in
the Indian Union against their declared and established will, the
all-India Congress Committee accepts the proposals embodied in
the announcement of June 3, which have laid down a procedure
for ascertaining the will of the people concerned”.^’
The Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal and
thePanthic Pratinidhi Board jointly passed a resolution on June
14, 1947, emphasizing that, “in the absence of the provision of
transfer of population and property, the very purpose of partition
won d be defeated.”.* Giani Kartar Singh, President of Shiromani
Mali Dal, said on July 16, 1947, “The Sikhs will not rest conten¬
ted till the boundary line is demarcated in such a way that it
leaves at least 85 per cent Sikhs in India and both the States of
Pakistan and India are committed to facilitate the transfer of the
remaining 15 per cent from Pakistan to India.
S. Baldev Singh accepted the 3rd June Plan with partition
of the Punjab on the basis of contiguous majority areas.
Subsequently he said in a statement, “If the verdict of the Boun¬
dary Commission went against the Sikhs, they should be prepared
to make all sacrifices to vindicate the honour of the Panth”.®*
He did not foresee that actual boundary line could not be much
different from the notional division included in the 3rd June Plan.
The issue of the Sikh shrines, the question of transfer of Sikh
population and the exchange of the property for which the Sikh
leaders struggled subsequently should have been pressed before
agreeing to the 3rd June Plan. But the Sikh leader thought that
for his consenting to the plan which affected the Sikhs adversely,
the British Government would assert its influence to give them
concessions.
Estimate of the Plan
According to Lord Ismay, the Mountbatten Plan was a case
47. i’.P., Vol. I, pp. 6-7
48. C. &. M. Gazette, June 15, 1947
49. The Hindu, Madras, July 16, 1947
50. C. & M. Gazette, July 10, 1947
I
50
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
of “Hobson's choice’’/^ No one in India thought that it was
perfect. Lord Mountbalten himself admitted this in a radio
broadcast on the day of its announcement. He said : “The whole
plan may not be perfect, but like all plans, its success will depend
on the spirit of goodwill with which it is carried out. ®
The Plan, like most things in politics, was essentially a com¬
promise from every point of view. The Congress, which had
been struggling for independence, no doubt achieved it, but its
conception of Indian unity was shattered. The Muslim League
won its Pakistan, which it so forcefully demanded, but much
against its wishes the Punjab and Bengal were partitioned leaving
Pakistan “truncated”.
There are some who doubted the wisdom of Britain’s liquadi-
ting her empire in India. But no critic of the British transfer of
power to India has yet been able to suggest an alternative. The
British Government could notin 1947 hold India by force of
arms—to do so would have imposed an impossible burden on
her resources after the Second World War. Some critics bewail
the “hurry” in which the Plan was carried through in less than
three months. Protracted negotiations might have frayed
tempers. Whatever agreements were reached in a hurry were
made the basis of the Plan. The Plan was not comprehensive as
it lacked depth of penetration into some of the vital problems of
the Punjab. No machinery was devised to make proper and
proportionate adjustment in the Indus river system of irrigation,
which irrigated about 25 million acres of land and w'hich was
the source of livelihood for about 46 million people in the Indian
subcontinent. That is not to say that no departure from the
accepted British policy was made on that account. While drawing
up the plan for transfer of power every possible care was taken
to meet the points of view of only the two major communities
leaving aside the Sikhs. Winston Churchil, the then leader of
the opposition, had emphasized that if there were an effective
51. Lord Ismay, Memoirs of Lord Ismay, London, 1961, p. 420
52. Ibid., p. 425
THE PARTITION PLAN
51
acceptance of the plan by both the Congress and the Muslim
League, they (the opposition) would do all in their power to
expedite the necessary legislation.®^ Though ' these were the
major contenders for receiving power when it was likely to be
transferred, yet the Sikhs had been recognized as the third
important community for the transference of power, as it was
stated in the Cabinet Mission proposals :
“It is sufficient to recognise only three main communities in
India, General, Muslims and Sikhs, the General Community
including all persons who are not Muslims or Sikhs.”’^
Whatever the merits or demerits of the Plan, when agreed
to by the two major parties. Lord Mountbatton decided to imple¬
ment it and established various organizations for that purpose.
APPENDIX
Statement of Major J.M. Short
In reply to ray following queries J.M. Short gave this
statement;
1. How would you account for the bloodshed which followed
the transfer of power in 1947 ?
2. What is your opinion about the 3rd June Plan especially
with regard to the Sikhs ?
3. When did you arrive in India and what steps were pro¬
posed by you to avert the coming crisis ?
You ask me to account for the bloodshed in India soon after
we handed it over in 1947. It was, I think, inevitable.
You next ask where I was when the plan of June 3rd 1947
was concocted. I was in England.
You ask if I found the Sikhs liked that plan and if not, what
did I do about it. My impressions on getting to Delhi on the
22nd July, 1947, were these : the Sikhs did not like the plan ;
they had only agreed to it to meet us more than half-way and
to make it easier for us to go out of our way to meet their wish
for some sort of Sikhistan. 1 reported accordingly to our
53. Memoirs of Lord Ismav, p. 422
54. Para 18, Cabinet Mission Plan, S.D.I C, Vol. II, p. 581
52
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
authority in Delhi. They felt as I did, too, that they could
not now alter course ; but in so far as they could trim a trifle
to meet the Sikhs, they would. And so it was left.
J.M. Short
S.H.R. 3755
Khalsa College, Amritsar
CHAPTER IV
THE PARTITION MACHINERY
The 3rd June Plan had mentioned that before establishing the
partition machinery, it was essential to ascertain the wishes of the
people concerned. Therefore, according to para No. 9 of the Plan,
the members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly met in two
sections separately to decide whether they wanted to join the
existing Constituent Assembly meant for India or the new Consti¬
tuent Assembly to be established for Pakistan. The members
belonging to the Muslim-majority districts who met separately
voted for joining the new Constituent Assembly meant for Pakis¬
tan. Then the other members who also met separately opposed
joining the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and voted in favour of
partitioning the Province.^ Since it had been laid down in the
Plan that the partition of the province was to be effected even if
one section was in favour of it, it was decided to implement the
decision of the members belonging to the East Punjab to partition
the province. After the announcement of the 3rd June Plan, the
Viceroy established a Central Partition Committee which was
converted into the Partition Council after the Legislative
Assemblies of the Punjab and Bengal had decided in favour of
partition. It was the central body to decide various issues
connected with partition. It had a Steering Committee which
supervised the work of partitioning in the various departments of
the Central Government. The Partition Council decided the cases
referred to it by the Partition Committees of the provinces to be
partitioned.
The Punjab Partition Committee
According to Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947,
special powers were given to the governors of the provinces to be
1. The Tribune, Lahore, dated June 24, 1947
partitioned “for bringing the provisions of the Act into effective
operation.for dividing between the new Dominions and
between the new Provinces to be constituted under this Act, the
powers, rights, property and duties and liabilities of the Governor-
General in Council or as the case may be of the relevant provinces
which under this Act are to cease to exist.The Act was passed
on the 18th July, 1947, but it was provided in its para 3 : “This
section shall be deemed to have had effect as from the third day of
June Nineteen hundred and forty-seven.” The Governor of the
Punjab established the Punjab Partition Committee in order to
implement the decision of the partition of the Punjab. The Punjab
Partition Committee consisted of four members—two from the
East Punjab, viz. Dr. Gopichand Bhargava and Sardar Swaran
Singh, and two members from the West Punjab, viz. Mr Mumtaz
Daultana and Mr. Zahid Hussain. The Governor was the President.
The pattern of the functions and worikng of the Punjab
Partition Committee was the same as that of the Central Govern¬
ment’s Partition Committee which was converted into the Partition
Council after the 26th June, 1947.® The main function of this
organisation was “to work out the machinery for implementing the
partition.”^ A number of departmental committees were establish¬
ed to give suggestions for the division of personnel, assets and
liabilities. A Steering Committee consisting of one non-Muslim
member and one Muslim member, (Mr. M.R. Sachdeva and Mr.
Syed Yaqub Shah), was established in order to make liaison bet¬
ween the departmental committees and the Punjab Partition
Committee and “to provide day-to-day guidance, advice and
direction”® to various expert committees. The members of the
Steering Committee were to act as the secretaries of the Partition
Committee and were to see that the recommendations of the
various committees were presented to the Partition Committee in
a suitable form.
2. Indian Independence Act, Section 9 (b)
3. P.P. Vol. I, p. 33 and P.P. Vol. IV, p 71
4. PP. Vol. IV. p. 4
5. Ibid. p. 19
THE PARTITION MACHINERY
55
The Punjab Partition Committee was faced with a huge task
when it met for the first time on the 1st July, 1947. In order to
facilitate the^work, two seniormost officers, one Muslim and one
non-Muslim, were selected from every department to constitute
the departmental committee which was entrusted with the task of
submitting proposals for examining the cadres of the persons of
that department and submitting proposals for their allocation.
Besides this, a number of expert committees, viz, Budget Expert
Committee, Physical Assets and Liabilities Expert Committee, etc.
were established on the pattern of the Central Expert Committees.®
Reorganization of Secretariats
The Expert Committee working under the Central Steering
Committee of the Government of India had issued a directive that
“every Government servant should be given the opportunity to
select the Government he wishes to serve and cadres be separated
accordingly.’ In the light of the directive, it was decided by the
Punjab Partition Committee to give option to every government
official to express his choice whether he was to serve the West
Punjab Government or the East Punjab Government. It was also
decided that no official was to be victimized because of the
intention expressed by him of serving a particular Government.
For the reorganization of the East Punjab and the West Punjab
Secretariats the Government of the Punjab appointed Mr Ram
Chandra and Akhtar Hussain for reorganizing their respective
Secretariats. This was done with the concurrence of the Punjab
Partition Committee.®
6. D.p.p.c.,p 1
7. P P., Vol. I, p. 18
8. D.P.P.C , p. 9. The following programme was to be observed :
ia) The officers to be in all offices and departments by the 25th July
{b) Separation of gazetted and non-gazetted officers, office furniture,
equipment including stationery, duplicating machines, typewriters,
cycles etc. etc. to be completed by 20th July, 1947
(c) Physical separation of personnel, furnitures and record and
other equipment to be completed by 5th August, 1947
{d) Final separation of each part. Government will begin to transact
business independently by August 10, 1947. Secretariat and
Headquarters offices to be closed except for urgent work from
10th to 14th August, 1947 afternoon
56
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Punjab University, Lahore
Since there often was a clash of interests between the repre¬
sentatives of the East Punjab and those of the West Punjab all the
issues could not be decided amicably. One of the major points at
issue was the Punjab University, Lahore. The non-Muslim
members of the Partition Committee wanted the partition of the
University like that of the other provincial institutions, whereas
the Muslim members argued in favour of maintaining the integrity
of the University. The matter was referred to the Provincial
Institutions Committee which stated that the “University being
an autonomous body administered under its own Act was not at
par with the Provincial institutions directly controlled by the
Government.’’ It suggested that a special committee should be
appointed from the Syndicate and the Fellows of the University to
consider the question.®
Keeping in view the recommendations of the Provincial
Institution Committee, Partition Committee appointed an Expert
Committee, consisting of two judges of the High Court, one
Muslim and one non-Muslim (Justice M. Sharif and Justice G.D.
Khosla), to study the legal implications of the Punjab University
holding jurisdiction over both the parts of the Pnnjab or, alterna¬
tively, to suggest steps the Government might take to negotiate
and give effect to the partition of the University.^® The representa¬
tives of the West Punjab, however, argued that, before the Expert
Committee dealt with the legal aspect of the problem, a reference
should be made to the Central Steering Committee which worked
under the Partition Council as the problem affected not only the
Punjab but also BengaP^ and, in fact, it was a problem of an
all-India character. The case was, therefore, referred to the
Central Steering Committee, which in reply made out a case against
the partition of the University. It stated, “The Punjab University
is a body corporate incorporated under Section 2(3) of the Punjab
9. A.P.P.C. Item No. 8, p. 28
10. D.P P.C., Item No. 8 dated 1st July, 1947
11. A.P.P.C. Agenda Item No. I for the meeting dated July 19, 1947, p. 83
THE PARTITION MACHINERY
57
University Act, 1882, and under Section 3 thereof all the property,
moveable and immoveable vests in that Corporation. The seat of
the Corporation is unquestionably at Lahore. It is, therefore, the
legislature having jurisdiction at Lahore, which can determine the
capacity and the dissolution of the Corporation.”i2 It was argued
that the Punjab University was subject to the Legislative jurisdic¬
tion of the West Punjab because, according to the notional division
Lahore was in that region. The example of the Bombay Univer¬
sity was cited and it was stated that, after the separation of Sindh
from the province of Bombay, the Bombay University continued to
carry on its activities in the new province, such as conducting
examinations and affiliating institutions in Sindh. It was held that
it made no difference whether East Punjab was to be included in
a State distinct from the State in which West Punjab was included
as there was no bar, legal or constitutional; which precluded a
corporation constituted in one State from carrying on its activities
in another State just as a corporation constituted by a Statute of
the United States of America might carry on its activities in India.
Section 4A of the Bombay University Act, 1928 was quoted as an
instance. “The territorial limits within which the powers conferred
upon the university by this Act shall be exercised, shall comprise
the Bombay Presidency (excluding Aden) and such Indian States
and other territories as may, from time to time, be notified by the
Provincial Governments in the official gazette.”^^ This did not,
however, authorize the University of Bombay to exercise jurisdic¬
tion in another independent state without the concurrence of that
state. The example of a commercial corporation was misleading.
Whatever the terms of corporation, it could only function in
another state under the laws of that independent state.
In view of the note of the Central Steering Committee, the
Governor of the Punjab and the representatives of the West Pun¬
jab held that the Punjab University should not be divided, because
it could exercise its jurisdiction over both the East Punjab and the
I
58 PARTITION OF PUNJAB
c
West Punjab. This view was not acceptable to the representatives si
of the East Punjab on account of the following reasons:!. A \\
joint university arrangement could be made only with the mutual
consent of both the provinces. It was argued that this arrangement
was bound to fail. 2. Without special legislation to the contrary, 1
the present University of the Punjab would stand dissolved on c
August 15, 1947, because according to the Punjab University Act ]
of 1882, the Governor of the Punjab was to be the Chancellor of i
the Punjab University and the province of the Punjab, according to
the Indian Independence Act, “Shall cease to exist and there shall
be constituted two new provinces to be known the West Punjab
and the East Punjab.’’i** 3. “The assets of the Punjab University
have been created by the joint efforts of the people of the entire
province, who because of political developments stand divided in
two. Each one of these has a legal and moral right to the property
now vested in the University of the Punjab.”^® It was argued that
the Punjab University Senate was the competent body to decide
on the partition of the University, as according to Section 9(1)
and (2) of the Act of Incorporation 1882, “the Senate consisting
of the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor and the Fellows shall have
the entire management of the superintendence over the affairs,
concerns and the property of the University.” The Senate had
decided in favour of the division of the Punjab University. The
case of the Punjab University was, therefore, again discussed in
the meeting of the Punjab Partition Committee held on the 6th
August, wherein the representatives of the West Punjab represented
that “the Senate being a body with an effective non-Muslim
majority, its decision in this important matter should not be
approved by His Excellency the Governor in his capacity as
Chancellor without the concurrence of the Partition Committee.”^®
In the beginning, the representatives of the East Punjab were
14. C, G.C. Chatterji’s note dated June 27, 1947. Agenda item No. i
1 Aug. 1, 1947, p. 144 I
15. A.P.P C, Note of M.G. Singh, Registrar, Punjab University, Lahore, !
Agenda Item No. 1, p. 145. !
D.P.P.C. Item No. 6 August 6, 1947, p. 53
16 .
THE PARTITION MACHINERY 59
opposed to the view held by the West Punjab representatives, but
subsequently they were reconciled to this decision, as it dealt with
the Universities of Calcutta and Lahore in the same way.
Punjab High Court
The question of the division of the Punjab High Court,
Lahore, was referred to the Central Steering Committee. In its
communication, dated July 4, 1947, the Committee gave the
following suggestions which were accepted by the Punjab Parti¬
tion Committee :
1. The jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court should from
the date of the partition be limited to the West Punjab
only.
2. A separate High Court having jurisdiction over the East
Punjab and the province of Delhi should be constituted.
3. Appointments to the new High Court should, as for the
existing High Courts, be made by His Majesty after
consulting the Central Government of the Dominion.
4. It would be necessary to give an opportunity to the
judges, officers and the staff of the Lahore High Court to
choose which of the two High Courts they wished to
serve.
5. Both the East Punjab and the West Punjab High Courts
should have their seats at Lahore and function in the
buildings occupied by the Lahore High Court. This tem¬
porary arrangement should cease by the 1st March
1948 .'^
Administrative Set-up in the Disputed Districts
Regarding the posting of officers and the location of the East
Punjab and the West Punjab Secretariats, Sardar Swaran Singh
raised the following points in the Punjab Partition Committee
meeting held on July 7 : “Some sort of agreement w'as necessary
for the posting of officers in the districts until the declaration of
the award of the Punjab Boundary Commission. It was necessary
to reach an agreement on the continuance of the two sets of
17. A.P.P.C, Item No. 3, dated Ju/y 14, 1947, pp, 57-58
60
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
offices of the Governments of the West Punjab and the East
Punjab at Lahore, pending the award of the Punjab Boundary
Commission.”^* •
On July 9, M. Mumtaz Daultana raised an issue as to what
arrangements were to be made for the administration of disputed
districts and institutions situated therein. These districts were
Ferozepur, Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Gurdaspur, Lahore,
Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, Amritsar, Montgomery, Lyallpur,
Multan, Sialkot and Hissar.^*
The Punjab Partition Committee refused to settle these issues.
It was said that these could be decided only after the announce¬
ment of the award of the Punjab Boundary Commission. This
issue was, therefore, referred to the Partition Council, where it was
discussed on July 17, 1947. Sir George Abell, who had visited the
Punjab in order to watch the law-and-order situation and supervise
the work of the Punjab Partition Committee, was specially invited
to attend this meeting. In the course of discussion, it was announ¬
ced that Lord Mountbatten had expressed his desire to visit
Lahore in order to study the issues for himself.^® He, therefore,
visited Lahore on the 20th July and the following decisions were
taken at his instance :
1. The Government of West Punjab should prepare a paper
plan to leave Lahore incase Lahore was allotted to the
East Punjab. The East Punjab Government, in any case,
should move to Simla. When it was told in the meeting
that the Punjab Government Secretariat was to be closed
on August 10, and was to reopen in two separated halves,
the Viceroy suggested that the lOih August would be a
suitable date for the Government of the East Punjab to
start functioning in Simla.
2. The Viceroy asked the Punjab Partition Committee to
continue planning on the basis of the notional division, as
18. Ibid., p. 15
19. Ibid.
20. P.P. Vol. IV Case No. PC/56/6/47-Minutes of the Partition Council’s
meeting held on the 17th July, pp. 186-87
THE PARTITION MACHINERY 61
contained in the 3rd June Plan, and the postings should
be made accordingly, except in the case of Deputy
Commissioners and Superintendents of Police in the
districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Lahore.
3. In these three districts, there were British Deputy
Commissioners and Superintendents of Police. It was
agreed that they should remain in control until the 15th
August. Both sides should be entitled to nominate
personnel ready to take over from them. After the
declaration of the Punjab Boundary Award, the personnel
of the Government, not entitled by the Award should be
withdrawn.2^
The Viceroy by his personal visit to Lahore cleared many
administrative hurdles and paved the way for the smoother work¬
ing of the Partition Committee. It seemed to limit the disputed
area to three districts, viz, Lahore, Amritsar and Gurdaspur.
This was an indication that tall claims of both sides elsewhere
•were likely to be rejected. In other, districts, the work of transfer
and posting was to continue.
Current Administration
In order to execute the decision of the Punjab Partition
Committee regarding the day-to-day administration after partition,
a number of orders were issued by the Governor of the Punjab
under Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act. These orders
were gazetted on the 13th August, 1947, and they dealt with
a wide range of subjects, such as the adoption of the laws in the
East Punjab and the West Punjab,^* the division of the contracts,
deeds and covenants,^® transitory financial provisions for both
the successor Governments,^^ the use of the Public Service
Commission,2s the admission of students belonging to other
provinces in the Government training, research and educational
21 .
22 .
23.
24.
25.
D.P.P.C. pp. 35-36 and PP. Vol. IV, item No. 2, Viceroy’s note, p.
The Punjab Partition (Adaptation of Laws) Order 1947
The Punjab Partition (Contract) Order 1947
The Punjab Partition (Transitory Financial Provisions) Order, 1947
The Punjab Partition (Public Service Commission) Order, 1947
232
62
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
institutions, the payment of the salaries of civil officials^® who
were to continue their services in either of the newly created
provinces. An order was separately issued for the operation
of the Mandi Hydro-Electric Scheme by which the supply of
electrcity was to continue as on the 15th August till the 15th
November, 1947, and all expenditure was to be pooled together
for the adjustment between the East Punjab and the West Punjab.-’
Since some of the very important items of financial adjust¬
ment could not be settled before the 15th August, 1947, the
Governor-General prolonged the life of the Punjab Partition
Committee by issuing the Indian Independence Partition Council
Order on August 12, 1947. According to this order, the following
procedure was to be followed :
1. The representatives of the Partition Committee were to
be nominated by the Governor of the Province conce¬
rned. Different persons could be nominated for different
meetings.
2 The meetings of the Partition Committee were to be
held alternately in the capital towns of the two
provinces.
3. The Governor of that province in which the meeting
to be held to act as Chairman of the Partition
Committee.28
The Arbitral Tribunal
In order to settle the disputed issues which various p ovincial
partition committees could not decide, the Governor General
established an Arbitral Tribunal. Sir Patrick, Spens, who was
the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, was appointed its
26. The Punjab Partition (Training Research & Educational Institution)
Order, 1947
27. The Punjab Partition (Mandi Hydro Electric System Operation) Order
1947. All these orders were published in an Extraordinary Issue of
the Punjab Government Gazette dated August 13, 1947
28. Indian Independence Partition Council Order S.D.I.C. Vol. II, pp. 702-3
During the post-partition period, the Punjab Partition Committee has
been meeting and discussing outstanding issues
THE PARTITION MACHINERY
63
Chairman.29 The Arbitral Tribunal Order was issued on August
12, 1947. Justice Kania and Justice Mohammad Ismail were
appointed representing India and Pakistan respectively.®** Accor¬
ding to section 4 (1) of the Arbitral Tribunal Order, the Tribunal
waste decide cases referred to it’before December 1, 1947, or
with the permission of the Chairman before January 1, 1948.
The following decisions were made by the Partition Council
regarding the Arbitral Tribunal :
1. The Tribunal waste be located at Delhi or could shift
its office elsewhere with the concurrence of both the
Governments.
2. The Tribunal could appoint its own staff.
3 The parties on either side of the case would be represen¬
ted by their counsel.
4. The target date for the completion of the work of the
Tribunal was fixed for March 31, 1948.®^
The Punjab Partition Committee referred to the Arbitral
Tribunal thirty three cases in all—seven cases were referred to
earlier and the twenty-six later.®® Besides these cases, the Arbitral
Tribunal had to consider a number of orders issued by the Gover¬
nor of the Punjab under Section 9 of the Indian Independence
Act. Similar orders had not been issued by the Governor of Bengal
or of Assam. In these orders, certain assets and liabilities were
apportioned or dealt with not provisionally, as the Governor-
General’s Right of Properties Order indicated, but on a permanent
basis. For instance, the Punjab Partition (Training Research and
Educational Institutions) Order, 1947. issued by the Governor
laid down a procedure for the sharing of educational or training
establishments by the two new provinces. It necessarily required
modification, as willingness to share these institutions had dis¬
appeared. According to Sir Patrick (later Lord Spens), the
29. P.p, Vol. IV, Case No. PC/55/6/47, p. 186
30. S.D.I.C. Vol. II, Foot note, p. 703
31. P.P. Vol. IV, p. 186, Case No. PC/55/6/47
32. “Arbitral Tribunal in India” by Lord Spens, Problems of Public and
Private International Law, Longman Green Co., London 1951, p. 67
64
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Tribunal had the legal powers to override the provisions of these
orders. But in the circumstances and particularly keeping in
view the fact that th 3 >e orders had been in operation for several
months, when the Tribunal dealt with them, the Tribunal adopted
the decisions or principles implied in these orders.^®
The Arbitral Tribunal decided the following important cases
relating to the Punjab.
Division of Assets and Liabilities
The apportionment of the assets and liabilities to the West
Punjab and the East Punjab proved to be one of the most compli¬
cated problems. In the case of Bengal, the parties had agreed
that population alone should be the basis of the ratio for the
apportionment of assets and liabilities. Since both the East
Punjab Government and the West Punjab Government had vital
differences, the case was referred to the Arbitral Tribunal where
both the parties argued their cases. The representatives of the
West Punjab argued that each part should get a share equal to
its respective contributions to the general revenue. They argued
that the East Punjab got only thirty-eight per cent of the area and
contributed only thirty-one per cent to the general revenue of the
united Punjab and, hence, the East Punjab was only entitled to
thirty-one per cent of the assets. The representatives of the
East Punjab contended that every citizen of the State should have
the right to claim an equal share of the assets of the motherland
and the ratio for the division of the assets should be based on the
respective population of their parent province in the ratio of 44.4
and 55.6 per cent respectively, which should be made the basis
for the division of the assets.®^ As regards liabilities, it was
decided that the same ratio should be applied to them as to the
assets The following award was given by the Arbitral Tribunal.
•‘The Tribunal considered that there was no reason to adopt
exclusively either of these contended for by the parties, but pre¬
ferred to adopt figures based on average of figures for the popula¬
tion, the area and the contribution to revenue after such figures
33. Ibid., p. 66
34. East Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates Vol. /, p. 9
THE PARTITION MACHINERY
65
had been adjusted in view of the final boundary award. The
Tribunal, accordingly, awards that assets and liabilities of the
old united Punjab shall be adjusted for purpose of financial
settlement in the ratio of 60 percent for the West Punjab and
40 per cent for the East Punjab.”
Financial Adjustment of the Irrigation System
There arose various differences regarding the evaluation of
irrigation systems and financial adjustments regarding the profits
gained from them. The West Punjab Government argued that
there were adjustments of specific loans attributable to particular
assets and hence the payment of loans would be the liability of
the West Punjab Government against those assets. It was asserted
that the capitalization of profit was not only improper but irrele¬
vant, according to paragraph 38 of the Report of the Araery
Tribunal which was appointed on the separation of Burma from
India. The East Punjab Government, on the other hand, con¬
tended that the East Punjab was entitled to the financial adjust¬
ments on the basis of the capitalized profit from the irrigation
system of the united Punjab, because the Punjab Government
authorized and operated its irrigation system for commercial
considerations. The cost of construction of the system was agreed
to be Rs. 415,619,000. It was argued that over a series of years,
this investment had brought in a steady return of income varying
from Rs. 49,585,346 in 1936-37 to Rs. 66,305,466 in 1943-44.36
In the way, the public money spent on the irrigation system of
the Punjab had been a lucrative investment and the system was
a valuable asset of the united Punjab. Since the matter could not
be decided, it was referred to the Arbitral Tribunal on the 30th
November. 1947, and argued on the 4th February, 1948. The East
Punjab Government was represented by Mr Harnam Singh, Mr
G.N. Joshi and Mr Gurdev Singh, and the West Punjab Govern¬
ment by Mr Saleem and Mr Mansur Qadir. The Chairman of
35. A.A.T. Reference No. 6, p. 13
36. Of this the portion of the West Punjab amounted to Rs. 329,136,000
and that of the East Punjab amounted to Rs. 86,543,000
Ibid. Reference No. I, p. 2
66
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
the Arbitral Tribunal gave the following award :
“Twice the book value of the irrigation system as a whole shall
be taken as a value of the system and shall be apportioned between
the West Punjab and the East Punjab in the general ratio (viz. 60:40).
Each province shall bring into account the portion of the system
lying within its area taken at twice its book value.
Unrealized Balances
The issue of unrealized balances in respect of the Crown—land
proved to be another bone of contention. On account of the differ¬
ence of opinion, the members of the Committee could not agree on
the basic issues sinvolved. The Muslim members (Mr H.A. Majid
and Mr Abdul Hamid Butt) argued : “When a purchaser of agricul¬
tural land in the canal colony elects to pay the 50% balance of the
purchase money, he is put in possession in the capacity of a tenant,
so that the land continues to be owned by the State. The result is
that the land concerned will be property of the State and not of
the purchasers. The amounts previously deposited may be shared
between the two provinces. Land is a natural asset and, if future
recoveries of sale prices were claimed as divisible, it would be
possible to extend the principle on contracts for quarrying mines
which would yield royalties and rent for all years to come.”38
The non-Muslim members (Mr K.S. Malhotra and Mr Ram
Chandra) contended: “The unrealized balanceis an asset of the Punjab
and the East Punjab is entitled to a share in it as in other assets. The
deposit originally made by the purchaser was credited to extraordi¬
nary receipts and became a part of the general balance that will be
divided between the two new provinces. Similarly, the balance of
the purchase amount when recovered should be shared by the East
Punjab and the West Punjab. The East Punjab has claimed its
share of large amounts of unrealized balances which are due to the
Government of the Punjab on account of the land sold outright or
allotted to grantees before the 14th August, 1947. Since all such
transactions were contracted by the Government of the Punjab before
partition, the claim of the East Punjab is just and equitable.In
37. Ibid Reference No, 1, p. 6
38. A.P.P.C. Para 4 of Item No. 6. dated 9th August, 1947.
THE PARTITION MACHINERY
67
fact, the amount not paid are in the nature of advances to pur¬
chasers or grantees of land on which interest is also charged but for
purpose of adjustment, the amount of sale proceeds, exclusive of
interest only should be taken into account.”^*
The case of unrealized balances in respect of the crown—land
was discussed in the Punjab Partition Committee meeting on the
8th August and it was decided to refer this case to the Arbitral
Tribunal,^ A reference was accordingly made on the 30th of
November, 1947, and the Chairman of the Tribunal gave the follow¬
ing award : “That an appreciated value of Rs, 100 per acre of the
Crown wastelands, subject to long leases and temporary cultivation
and of Rs. 50 per acre of the 767,103 acres shall be deemed to be
the amount of appreciation on the appointed day due to the advent
of the canal irrigation and the total amount, so calculated, shall be
apportioned between the two general ratios taken into account in
financial settlement accordingly.”^
Seiginorage Charges
The States of Bikaner, Patiala, Nabha and Jind used to pay
seigniorage charges to the Punjab Government for the supply of
water 42 Since these States were geographically on the side of the
East Punjab, the West Punjab claimed a portion of the seigniorage
charges to be enjoyed by the East Punjab after the partition on
the following agreements of the united Punjab Government.
1. C/zorgger/Igreewenr with the Government of Bikaner for
the supply of water from the Chagger River and the Otu
reservoir.
2. Sutlej Agreement with the Government of Patiala, Nabha,
Jind for the supply of water from the Sirhind Canal. These
States contributed to the cost of headworks, the main
39. A PP.C. Note of Agenda Item No. 6 dated 9th August, 1947.
40- D.P.P.C., p. 62.
41. /t /4.r. Reference No 3 p. 6,
42. Following amounts were received every year : (/) Rs. 161000 under Agree¬
ment with Patiala, Nabha and Jind. (//) Rs. 200,000 under Agreement with
Bikaner.
Ibid, pp. 11 and 12.
68
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
line and the Patiala Feeder.
3. The Sutlej Valley Project Agreement of 1919 with the
Government of Bahawalpur and Bikaner. This agreement
allocated to the partner Government entire supplies as
were surplus to the requirements of irrigation upstream of
Ferozepur.
The Fast Punjab agreed to share the seigniorage with the
West Punjab. But there arose difference in the method of pay¬
ment. The West Punjab suggested that its share should be paid
over year by year in a fixed proportion. The East Punjab sugges¬
ted that these sums should be capitalized. The matter was, there¬
fore, referred to the Arbitral Tribunal which gave the following
award in favour of capitalization, stating that “sums received for
seigniorage charges shall be capitalized on the basis of twenty
years purchase and the total sum of Rs. 7,220,000 shall be
apportioned in general financial settlement between the East and
the West Punjab according to the general ratio.”^’
The representatives of the East Punjab and the West Punjab
could not agree on the issue of financial adjustment regarding the
irrigated forest plantations. More than 80,000 acres were under
shisham and mulberry plantation in Chhanga Manga, Chicha
Wanti, Khanewal, Daphar, Arifwala, and Miranpur. All were
situated in the West Punjab. The East Punjab wanted financial
adjustments between the East Punjab and the West Punjab on
account of these irrigated forest plantations, to which the West
Punjab did not agree. This matter was, therefore, referred to the
Arbitral Tribunal and its Chairman gave the following award :
“The portion of the appreciated value on the appointed day of
the two areas of 10,864 acres and 11,657 acres recently transferred
to the Forest Department due to irrigation shall be taken at
Rs. 60 per acre and the portion of the appreciated value on the
appointed day of the remaining 59,533 acres due to irrigation
shall be taken at Rs. 75 per acre. The total figure, so calculated,
shall be apportioned between the two Provinces according to the
43. Ibid., pp. 11 and 12
THE PARTITION MACHINERY
69
general ratio and brought into the general financial settlement.’’''^
Estimate of the Work
The Punjab Partition Committee had to accomplish the huge
task of partitioning the administrative machinery within a few
months. For the speedy settlement of all complicated issues,
considerable credit goes to the Governor of the Punjab, Sir Evan
Jenkins, who himself looked into the minute details of the issues
involved as is clear from the proceedings of the Punjab Partition
Committee. But for the prompt action and decision on certain
vital issues by Lord Mountbatten the Punjab Partition Committee
could not have worked smoothly. The systematic handling of
every problem first by the Departmental Committee or Expert
Committee, then by the Steering Committee and finally by the
Partition Committee solved most of the problems. Before the 15th
August, 1947 only two major problems-the Punjab University
and the posting of officers in the disputed districts—were referred
to the Central Partition Council. The cases in which differences
were substantial or vital on account of a clash of interests were
subsequently referred to the Arbitral Tribunal by the 31st Decem¬
ber, 1947, and the Arbitral Tribunal decided all those cases by the
31st March, 1948. It was mainly due to the efficiency of the
partition machinery that the East Punjab and the West Punjab
were partitioned within such a short time. A striking comparison
by Lord Mountbatten himself gives an idea of the speed with
which partition was carried out. It had taken three years to
separate Burma from India, two years to separate the province
of Sindh from Bombay and two years to separate the province of
Orissa from Bihar. The division of India, one of the biggest
countries in the world was accomplished in two months and
a half.^®
APPENDIX TO CHAPPER IV
The Punjab Partition (Apportionment of Assets and Liabilities)
Order, 1947
Whereas the Punjab Province is to be divided nto two new
44. Ibid,, p. 7.
45. Andrew Mellor, India Since Partition, London, 1951, p. 39.
70
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Provinces to be known as West Punjab and East Punjab respecti¬
vely in accordance with Section 4 of the Indian Independence
Act (10 and 11 Geo. 6, Ch. 30);
And whereas it is necessary to make provision for the
apportionment of certain assets and liabilities of the Punjab
Province between the two new Provinces;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause
(b) of subsection (1) read with subsection (2) of section 9 of the
aforesaid Act, and of all other powers enabling him in this behalf,
the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to make the following
Order, namely :
1. This Order may be called the Punjab Partition (Apportion¬
ment of Assets and Liabilities) Order, 1947.
2. In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires—
(a) “the appointed day” means the fifteenth day of
August, nineteen hundred and forty-seven ;
(b) “new Province” means West Punjab or East Punjab
or both West Punjab and East Punjab, as the context
may require.
3. In relation to the under-mentioned items of property,
namely : —
(/) Crown-wastelands ;
(//) land under irrigated plantations under the control of
the Forest Department;
{Hi) bins and sheds used for the storage of foodgrains held
on Government account ;
(/v) Seigniorage charges levied by the Punjab Province from
the States of Bikaner, Patiala, Nabha and Jind, on
account of canal water ; and
(v) canals owned by the Punjab Province ;
the respective rights and liabilities of the two new Provinces shall
be referred for determination to the arbitral body to which disputes
between the Dominions of India and Pakistan are to be referred
for arbitration.
4. (1) In relation to unissued stores and all such assets as
are immediately moveable, or which can be moved without major
THE PARTITION MACHINERY
71
structural alteration of immoveable assets, wherever they may be
situated on the appointed day, either of the new Provinces may
present to the other new Province, on or before the 15th Septem¬
ber, 1947, a claim that physical apportionment should be made
of any specified asset or assets, between the two new Provinces,
(2) Where the asset or assets in question are such that
physical apportionment is not possible without detailed technical
enquiry, each new Province shall nominate a representative, and
the two representatives together with a third person acceptable
to both parties, who shall be nominated as Chairman by both the
new Provinces, shall form a Committee of Enquiry.
(3) The Committee shall enquire and report with all possible
speed as to the feasibility of physical apportionment of the asset
or assets in question, and in making its report, the Committee
shall take particular account of the following factors, namely
(a) in the case of machinery or equipment (z) the capacity
required by the new Provinces for direct Government
work, such as the maintenance of Public Works required
by the new Provinces, and the execution of projects over
a period of five years, regard being had to other Govern¬
ment capacity available in the new Provinces ; and (//)
the capacity surpuls to (z);
(b) in the case of assets to which (a) cannot conveniently be
applied, the direct needs of each new Province and the
sources from which such needs can be met other than
the asset or assets in question ;
(c) the importance to both Provinces of economy and (in
appropriate cases) in balanced working ;
(d) the time and expenditure likely to be required to brinj
any assets that may be moved into effective use ;
(e) the time and expenditure likely to be required to buy
and bring into effective use similar assets from else¬
where ;
(/) the time and expenditure likely to be required for any
rearrangements in the Province in possession : and
(g) the disadvantages which will be suffered by the Province
72
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
in possession, including loss and damage arising directly
from the removal of the assets, the time and expenditure
required for essential rearrangements, and general loss of
efficiency.
(4) The report shall be submitted to the Government of the
two new Provinces with all possible speed, and if they do not
accept it, and no other agreed settlement is reached on the matter
in dispute, it shall be referred to arbitration in the manner
provided in clause 3.
(5) Where the asset or assets admit of apportionment without
detailed technical enquiry, the provisions of sub-clauses (3) and
(4) shall not apply, and the apportionment shall be effected in
accordance with such agreement as may be arrived at between
the two new Provinces, or if there is no such agreement by
arbitration in the manner provided in clause 3.
5. (1) In order to provide financial resources to the two new
Provinces sufficient to meet their immediate need on and after the
appointed day, the Provincial Cash Balance as it stands on the
appointed day shall be divided between the two new Provinces,
so that the share of West Punjab shall be two-fifths, and the
share of East Punjab, three-fifths thereof.
(2) The securities specified in column 2 of the second
Schedule hereto annexed, of the aggregate face value of rupees
ten crores shall be allocated to West Punjab and East Punjab,
as provided in columns 4 and 5 respectively, of the said Schedule
but account shall be taken of such apportionments in the general
financial settlement made under clause 6, and the remaining
securities shall be retained by the Reserve Bank of India in trust
for the two new Provinces and shall nol be endorsed or negotiated
otherwise than as part of the said general financial settlement.
6. (1) There shall be a general financial settlement between
the two new Provinces, and such settlement shall relate to and
include all the assests and liabilities of the Punjab Province, as they
stand immediately before the appointed day, excepting assets and
liabilities for the apportionment of which express provision is made
by any clause other than clauses 3, 4 and 5 of this Order ;
THE PARTITION MACHINERY
73
Provided that in taking account of the value of the assets of
the Punjab Province, the value of the following items shall be ex¬
cluded from consideration, namely : —
{d) forests (subject to any award of the arbitral body under
clause 3 («) ;
(b) roads ;
(c) contents of buildings other than buildings specified in
the First Schedule hereto annexed ;
Provided further that any award of the arbitral body given
under clause 3 or clause 4, any allocation of financial liability by
agreement between the two new Provinces, and any physical appor¬
tionment effected under clause 4, shall be taken into account in
making the general financial settlement.
(2) The general financial settlement shall be made by agree¬
ment between the two new Provinces, or, failing agreement, by
arbitration in the manner provided in clause 3.
7. Subject to the provisions of clause 6, all lands, works,
forests, roads, buildings and all moveable property of every type
including foodgrains held on Government account, but not includ¬
ing any unissued stores, contents of buildings, or other assets in
respect of which a claim for apportionment has been or may be
made under clause 4, being the property of the Punjab Province
immediately before the appointed day, shall on and after the
appointed day, be the property of that new Province in whose
territory they are situated on the appointed day.
8. The balance in the State Provident Funds Account shall be
divided between the two new Provinces in such manner that the
amount held in respect of any employee of the Punjab Province,
shall be transferred to that one of the new Provinces in or under
which he is serving on and after the appointed day ;
Provided that if such employee is serving in one of the new
Provinces as a lent official, such amount shall be transferred to the
other new Province.
9. The balance of Local Funds Deposits shall be divided
between the two new Provinces, so that the sum held in deposit on
account of any local authority shall be transferred to that one of the
74
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
new Provinces in the territory of which such local authority is
situated.
10. The balance on account of Civil Deposits shall be divided,
so that each new Province shall take the amount deposited in any
treasury or Court or other oflBce situated within its territory.
11. The balance in the Harijan Welfare Fund shall be divided
between the two new Provinces as nearly as may be in the propor¬
tion of their respective Schedule Caste populations, as determined at
the Census of 1941.
12. The balance in the Motor Transport Reserve Fund shall
be divided between the two new Provinces in the same proportion as
the Motor Vehicles owned by the Punjab Province are divided
between them.
13. In relation to the Depreciation Reserve Funds, maintained
for the following undertaking owned and operated by the Punjab
Province, namely (a) Electricity Undertakings (b) Motor Transport
Undertakings, (c) Printing Presses and (d) the Jallo Rosin Factory,
the balance held in respect of each such Undertaking shall be deduc¬
ted from the book value of such Undertaking, and the diminished
value so obtained shall be the value to be placed upon such Under¬
taking in the computation of the aggregate value of the physical
assets of the Punjab Province. The balance of such Funds shall be
included in the cash balance to be apportioned between the two new
Provinces under clause 6.
THE FIRST SCHEDULE
/. Industries Department
1. Tanning Institute, Jullundur
2. Hosiery School, Ludhiana
3. Punjab Institute of Textile Technology, Amritsar
4. Mayo School of Arts, Lahore
5. Industrial Research Laboratory, Lahore
6. Government Institute of Dyeing and Calico Printing,
Shahdara
7. Government Weaving and Demonstration Factory, Shah¬
dara
8. Surgical Instruments Centre, Sialkot
THE PARTITION MACHINERY
75
11. Forest Department
9. Forest School, Ghoragali
10. Jallo Rosin and Turpentine Factory, Jallo
III. Veterinary Department
11. Live Stock Farm, Hissar
12. Punjab Veterinary College, Lahore
IV, Medical Department
13. Glancy Medical College, Amritsar
14. Victoria Jubilee Hospital, Amritsar
15. King Edward Medical College, Lahore
16. Punjab Mental Hospital, Lahore
17. Chemical Examiner’s Laboratory, Lahore
18. Provincial Bacteriological Laboratory, Lahore
19. Mayo Hospital, Lahore
20. Lady Willingdon Hospital, Lahore
21. Punjab Dental Hospital, Lahore
V. Jails Department
22. Central Jail, Lahore
23. Borstal Institution, Lahore
24. Women’s Jail, Lahore
25. New Central Jail, Lahore
26. Old Central Jail, Lahore
27. Central Jail, Montgomery
VI. Education Department
28. Central Training College, Lahore
29. Government College, Lahore
30. Lady Maclagan Training College, Lahore
31. Queen Mary’s Women College, Lahore
32. Lawrence School and College, Ghoragali
VII. Agriculture Department
33. Punjab Agricultural College and Research Institute,
Lyallpur
VIII. Public Health Department
34. Vaccine Institute, Murree
35. Vaccine Institute, Lahore
76
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
36. Punjab Epidemiological Bureau, King-Edward Medical
College, Lahore
IX. Public Works Department
37. Government School of Engineering, Punjab, Rasul
38. Punjab College of Engineering and Technology, Lahore
39. Soil Research Laboratory, Lahore
X. Printing Department
40. Government Printing Press
THE SECOND SCHEDULE
Statement showing the distribution of certain Government
of India Securities held by the Punjab Government
between the West Punjab and East Punjab
s.
No.
Particulars
of
securities
Face value
of
securities
{36%)
East's
share
{64%)
West's
share
•
Rs.
Rs.
Rs.
1.
3% Loan, 1953-55
2,96,44,000
1,06,71,840
1,89,72,160
2.
3% Loan, 1957
1,99,38,000
71,77,680
1,27,60,320
3.
3% Loan, 1959-61
2,00,00,000
72,00,000
1,28,00,000
4.
3% Loan, 1963-65
2,35,00,000
84,60,000
1,50,40,000
5.
3% Loan, 1966-68
69,18,000
24,90,480
44,27,520
Total:
10,00,00,000
3,60,00,000
6,40,00,000
CHAPTER V
PUNJAB BOUNDARY COMMISSION
The 3rd June Plan suggested a notional division of the Punjab,
which had been included in the Indian Independence Act, 1947. It
was stated that the “districts specified in the second schedule of this
Act shall be treated as the territories to be comprised in the
new Province of the West Punjab and the remainder of the terri¬
tories comprised in the new Province of the East Punjab.” But the
notional division, as the very name indicated, could last only for a
short period and was to be replaced by the Punjab Boundary
Commission Award. It has been stated in the 3rd June Plan that
notional division was “only a preliminary step of a purely temporary
nature as it is evident that for the purpose of a final partition of these
Provinces (Assam, Bengal and the Punjab) a detailed investigation
of boundary questions will be needed. As soon as a decision invol¬
ving partition has been taken for either Province a Boundary
Commission will be set up by the Governor-General, the member¬
ship and the terras of reference of which will be settled in consulta¬
tion with those concerned.”^
Appointment of the Boundary Commission
The first and foremost work connected with the Boundary
Commission was the appointment of its chairman. Mr. Jinnah
suggested Sir Cyril Radcliflfe, the Vice Chairman of the General
Council of the English Bar to be the Chairman of the Boundary
Commission of Assam —Bengal and the .■’unjab.^ The Secretary of
State for India confirmed the choice of Sir Cyril Radcliffe whom he
described as “a man with high integrity, legal reputation and wide
experience.”3 The formal proposal for the appointment of Sir Cyril
1. PP. Vol. VI (Para No. 9 of the 3rd June Plan), p. 2.
2. Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Moimtbatten, London, 1951, p. 124.
3. P P. Vol. VI, Governor General’s Note dated 26th June, p. 6.
78
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Radcliffe (later on Lord Radcliffe) was, however, made by Lord
Mountbatten in the form of a note, dated the 26th June which was
accepted unanimously in the first meeting of the Partition Council on
the 27th June, 1947.« The previous decision that the members of
the Boundary Commission were to elect their own Chairman was
modified on the ground that the appointment of a European Chair¬
man would expedite the work which was to be finished by August IS.®
According to the announcement of the Governor-General on
the 30th June the following were appointed members of the Punjab
Boundary Commission :
1. Mr. Justice Din Muhammad
2. Mr. Justice Muhammad Munir
3. Mr. Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan
4. Mr. Justice Teja Singh^*
The Punjab Boundary Commission had just started its work
when a significant change occurred in the structure of the Commi¬
ssion. An amendment was introduced in the Indian Independence
Bill signifying that “In Section 4 the expression ‘award’ means in
relation to the Boundary Commission the decision of the Chairman
of the Commission, contained in his report to the Governor-General
at the conclusion of the Commission proceedings.”’ But for this
amendment, the Commission could not have worked smoothly,
because the Muslim members and the non-Muslim members, even
though they had been selected from among the judges of the High
Court, were likely to be equally dividedon account of theclash oftheir
communal interests. The chances of any compromise were remote ;
first, because members had no authority to promote any bargaining
between the two sides likely to affect a settlement, secondly because
the political atmosphere was too vitiated for any compromise settle¬
ment. It cannot, however, be denied that this amendment, as a
whole, finally, reduced any chances to a settlement by the Commis¬
sion, and practically reduced the Commission to a one-man body.
4. P.P. Vol. VI, case No. QC/2/1/47, p. 7.
5. Ibid, p. 6, Governor General’s note dated 26th June 1947
6. The Gazette of India Extraordinary Notification dated June 30, 1947,
Ibid, p. 8.
7. Hansard, Vol. No, 440, p. 76.
PUNJAB BOUNDARY COMMISSION
79
Its terms of refercEce were thus defined : “The Boundary
Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two
parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous
majority areas of the Muslims and the non-Muslims. In doing so it
will also take into account other factors”®
The notional division of the Punjab, as incorporated in the
Indian Independence Act 1947, had been based on the district
boundaries and not on the Doabs or the geographical divisions
marked by the rivers of the Punjab. The rivers in the Punjab did
not fulfil the requisite conditions to form the boundaries of two
distinct States. The “only type ofriver really satisfactory as a bound¬
ary is one flowing through a deep rock-walled canyon or possibly
through extensive marshes with fairly constant volume of water,
without shifts of course, with few crossing-places, useless for navi¬
gation or rafting, irrigation or hydro-electric pow-er.”®
Statement of the Case
According to the notional division of the Punjab, the following
districts had been included in the West Punjab Rawalpindi,
Attock, Gujrat, Jhelum Mianwali, Muzafargarh, Shahpur, Dera
Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan, Gujranwala,
Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhupura and Sialkot. All the remaining
districts of the united Punjab, viz. Rohtak,Gurgaon, Hissar. Karnal,
Ambala, Simla, Ferozepur, Ludhiana, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur,
Amritsar, and Kangra were included in the East Punjab.^®
Following the district pattern for the division of the Punjab,
there was no dispute regarding overwhelming Muslim majority dis¬
tricts in the north-West on the western side ; such districts were
Rawalpindi, Attock, Gujrat, Jhelum, Muzafargarh. MianwahVShah-
pur, Dehra Ghazi Khan, Multan, Jhang and Sialkot, or overwhelm¬
ing Hindu majority districts on the eastern side Rohtak, Gurgaon,
Hissar, Karnal, Ambala, Simla, Kangra and Ludhiana. The Central
Punjab constituted this disputed territory and the most contested
8. P.P., Vol. VI, The Gazette of India Extraordinary, June 30, 1947, p. 8.
9. ‘The Partition of the Punjab and Bengal’, O.H.K. Spate, The Geographical
Journal of Royal Geographical Society^ London, April 1948, p. 203.
10. Schedule Second of Indian Independence Act 1947.
80
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
area consisted of the following districts or some portion thereof :
Sheikhupura, Lahore,Montgomery,Lyallpur,Gurdaspur,Gujranwala,
Amritsar, Jullunder, Hoshiarpur and Ferozepur. However, for the
purpose of administration and posting of officers, the represent¬
atives of the East Punjab and the West Punjab in the Punjab Parti¬
tion Committee had decided the following fourteen districts as dis¬
puted districts : Ferozepur, Hoshiarpur, Jullunder, Ludhiana, Gur-
daspur, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, Amritsar, Montgomery,
Lyallpur, Multan, Hissar and Sialkot.^^
Procedure Followed
The Commission followed a judicial procedure. Its first
meeting was held on the l4th July under the Chairmanship of Sir
Cyril RadclilTe and it was announced that all interested parties should
submit their memoranda to the Commission by the 18th July. Sir
Cyril had planned to attend the meetings of the Bengal Boundary
Commission first and he proposed that Justice Din Mohammed and
Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan should preside over the meetings of
the Commission alternately in his absence. But Justice Mehar Chand
Mahajan refused to be a party to this ‘communal settlement’ and
suggested that Justice Din Mohammad should preside in the absence
of the Chairman of the Commission as he was the seniormost
members of the Commission.Punjab Boundary Commission
held public sittings from the 21st July to the 31st July 1947 wherein
eminent lawyers pleaded their cases. Mr. Mohammad Zafar Ullah
Khan, Mr. Seetalvad and Mr. Harnam Singh appeared before the
Commission in order to argue the case on behalf of the Muslim
League, the Congress and the Shiromani Akali Dal respectively.
Dr. O.H.K Spate, Lecturer in Geography, School of Economics,
London, was invited by the Ahmadya Community of Punjab to
plead their case before the Punjab Boundary Commission and he
appeared before the Commission to support their case.
The Muslim Case
The counsels for the Muslims advocated that the boundary line
to be drawn between the East Punjab and the West Punjab should
11. Z).P.P.C. Item No. 1, p. 13.
12. Mehar Chand Mahajan, Looking Back, p. 112.
PUNJAB BOUNDARY COMMISSION
81
be drawn near about the Sutlej. The core of their claim rested on
the population majority in the disputed areas and it was asserted
that the population majority was the major test to be taken into
consideration while determining the boundary. It was argued that
the major political parties in India had agreed on the partition of
provinces on the basis of ‘‘contiguous Muslim majority areas”
because this basis was included in the 3rd June Plan itself. On this
basis, it was argued that the disputed districts of Lahore, Gujran-
wala, Sialkot, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery and Multan
could not either in whole or in part be taken away from the West
Punjab because these districts were Muslim-majority areas with the
following percentages of Muslim population :
Name of District
Name of Tehsil
Percentage of
Muslims
Lahore District
60.6%
Lahore
60.05%
Chunia
60.99%
Kasur
57.2%
Gujranwala District
•
70.4%
Gujranwala
61.3%
Wazirabad
76.7%
Hafizabad
82.9%
Sialkot District
62.00%
Sialkot
61.4%
Pasrur
66.2%
Narowal
54.9%
Daska
66.09%
Sheikhupura District
63.6%
Sheikhupura
53.5%
Nankana Sahib
74.3%
Shahdra
69.1%
Lyallpur District
62.8%
Lyallpur
54.5%
Samundri
72.3%
Toba Tek Singh
68.4%
Jaranwala
57.1%
82
partition of PUNJAB
Montgomery District
69.1%
Montgomery
67.6%
Okara
69.5%
Dipalpur
76.7%
Pakpattan
64.5%
Multan District
78.00%‘»
Besides, the following tehsils from the non-Muslim majority
district, which according to the notional division were in the East
Punjab, were demanded for the West Punjab on account of the
Muslim-majority of population :—
Percentage of
Muslims
Ferozepur Teshil (Dist. Ferozepur) 55.2%
Zira Tehsil (Dist. Ferozepur) 65.2%
Nakodar Tehsil (Dist. Jullundur) 59 * 4 %
Jullundur Tehsil (Dist. Jullundur) 51 . 1 %
Ajnala Tehsil (Dist. Amritsar) 59 . 4 %
Great emphasis was laid on the population factor and it was
argued that the district of Gurdaspur should belong to the West
Punjab as had been done in the notional division on account of the
majority of the Muslim population :—
District Gurdaspur 50.4%
Batala 55*6%
Shakargarh 51-3%
Gurdaspur 51.1%
Pathankot 38.8 %^4
In this case, there would have been no straight line demarcat¬
ing the boundary between the East Punjab and the West Punjab and
there would have been numerous pockets created in the East Punjab.
Amritsar would have been left an island surrounded by Pakistan
territory which would have created numerous administrative and
International problems. Moreover, such demarcation would have
done grave injustice to the other parties, as in that case only the
population factor would have been taken into account and not the
other factors mentioned in the terms of reference.
13. P.P. Vol. VI, Report of Justice Din Mohammad, pp. 239-243
14. Idem.
PUNJAB BOUNDARY COMMISSION
83
Non-Muslim Case
In his report, Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan recommended
that the boundary line should be near the Ravi including Lahore
in the East Punjab and Justice Teja Singh advocated that the
boundary line should be near the Chenab, including parts of the
districts of Sheikhupura and Gujranwala, Montgomery and Lyall-
pur in the East Punjab. The Hindu-Sikh case rested on the
economic conditions as the non-Muslim had played a major part
in the development of the Central Punjab. The Bari Doab and
more particularly the districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Lahore
had been described by historians and settlement officers as the
“home land of the Sikhs* who owned more than two-thirds of the
ai ea and paid more than two-thirds of the land revenue of this
tract.^® This Sikh peasant proprietors’ tract had been developed
as a single unit along the Upper Bari Doab Canal which had
been dug, it was ingeneously claimed, to resettle the disbanded
Sikh soldiers after the Anglo-Sikh Wars. The districts of Lyall-
pur and Montgomery had been colonized by the sturdy Sikh Jats
of Ambala, Jullundur and Amritsar districts. In a tract known
as Shahidi-Bar, comprising a part of the districts of Gujranwala,
Sheikhupura and Lyallpur was mostly owned by the Sikh peasants
who paid more than twice the land revenue paid by the Muslims.^®
Historically, this was the most important tract for the Sikhs as
one of their most sacred shrines, Nanakana Sahib, was situated
in it.
The Hindus and the Sikhs had played a major role in the
development of industry, commerce and trade of Lahore the
metropolis of the Punjab. More than 75 per cent of commerce,
banks and commercial institutions were in the hands of the non-
Muslims. The survey of Lahore carried out by the Punjab
15. P,P, Vol, VI, p. 176. The total revenue of these districts was Rs.
55,23,439. The Sikhs paid Rs. 32,31,951 and Muslims Rs. 15,88,293
and others Rs. 7,02,555. The total acreage cultivated was 37,55,127
acres. Sikhs owned 20,12,783, Muslims 124804 acres and rest by
others. Report of Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan.
16. Idem.
84
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Government Board of Economic Enquiry indicated that 80 per
cent registered factories in Lahore belonged to the non-Muslims.
Of the total capital investment in Lahore, viz. Rs. 6.29 crores, the
non-Muslim’s share was Rs. 5.12 crores. Of the 90 bank branches,
only 3 belonged to the Muslims. Of the 80 offices of insurance
companies, only two belonged to the Muslims. Of the 36th
High Schools only four were run by the Muslims.^^
It was argued that about one-third of the Muslim population
was not rooted in the soil and was essentially of a floating chara¬
cter, consisting of faqirs, weavers, herdsmen, cobblers, potters,
carpenters, oilmen, bards, barbers, blacksmiths, washermen,
butchers and w/raj/5. According to the Census Report of 1931,
out of the total Muslim population of 14,929,896, this class of
persons numbered about 45 per cent and were divided as under :—
Faqirs
...
256,533
Jullaha (weavers)
. ■ • • • •
512.579
Cobblers
••« •••
464,218
Kumhars (potters)
• • • • • •
423,617
(Chamar converts)...
412,300
Carpenters
• • • • • •
346,948
Oilmen
• • • • • •
344,927
Bards
• • • • • •
244,320
Barbers
• • • • • •
196,104
Blacksmiths
• • • • • •
241,972
Washermen
• • • • • •
162,224
Butchers
• • • • • •
127,198
Mirasis
• • • • • •
243,330
Herdsmen
• • • • • •
421,347^8
In case the line of argument
followed by the Hindu and Sikh
members was accepted, the main
consideration would
have been
economic factors rather than the population factor.
It would
have been contrary to the spirit and terms of the settlement arrived
at between the two major political parties—the Congress and
17. Harnam Singh, 5/A:^ Memorandum to the Punjab Boundary Commission^
pp. 60-61
18. Census Report, Punjab 1931 Table XVII, Race, Tribe or Caste.
PUNJAB BOUNDARY COMMISSION
85
the Muslim League, viz. partitioning on the basis of contiguous
Muslim-majority areas. Justice Din Mohammad asserted that
the terms of reference followed the settled, course decided by the
major political parties, so much so that the terms of reference
were even included in the 3rd June Plan in para No. 9 and to
hold otherwise would shake the very foundation of the settlement,^®
Terms oj Reference
The terms of reference were very vague and, at places, inaccu-
rete phraseology had been used, and : raised much controversy. The
use of the word “demarcate” in the terms of reference, it was
claimed, was not only inaccurate but misleading also. It sugge¬
sted, it was asserted, surveying a line with theodolites and putting
in concrete posts, whereas the real object of the Commission was
to define the areas and fix the boundary line. Mr Setalvad,
while arguing his case, read the meaning of “contiguity” from
Murry’s Oxford Dictionary Vol. II and urged that the principal mean¬
ing of contiguity implied “actual contact in loose use of the term
and it was not essential ; mere close porximity without actual
contact would be enough.” On the other hand, it was argued that
“contiguity” meant “adjacency” and nothing else.^o The last sen¬
tence of the terms of reference was, “in doing so, it will take into
consideration other factors.” It was preceded by the verbs denoting
two different actions, viz. “demarcating” and “ascertaining”. The
counsels, for the Muslims contended that “in doing so” related “to
demarcation” and “nature of those factors would be only such as
might somehow or other be related to demarcation process”^^ The
counsels for the non-Muslims asserted that “in doing so” was related
to ascertaining the contiguous areas” because the main function of
the Commission was to determine the areas and not to demarcate
the actual line which was to be drawn by the subsequent govern-
19. P.P. Vol. VI, page 238. It was stated in para 9 of the 3rd June Plan,
“It will be instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of
the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of
Muslims and non-Muslims.”
20. Ibid p. 238, Report of Justice Din Mohammad.
21. Ibid, p. 238
86
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
ments. The word “areas” mentioned in the terms of referenca was
also the subject of a great legal controversy. The counsel for the
Muslims asserted that “contiguous majority areas” should be deter¬
mined on the basis of a tehsil, a sub-division of a district, wherc;as
the counsel for the non-Muslims vehemently opposed this assertion
and argued that a collection of villages of a community in a tehsil
was not necessarily contiguous in the whole of it because a tehsil
was an artificially demarcated area for purpose of collection of
revenue. All this controversy about the definition of “areas ‘ paved
the way for the Chairman of the Punjab Boundary Commission
feeling free to decide the term as the circumstances seemed to call
for. He awarded four police stations of Tehsil Kasur (District
Lahore) to the East Punjab and Tehsil Shakargarh of the District
Gurdaspur to the West Punjab.^^
The other factors, as mentioned in the terms of reference also
raised much controversy. According to Lloyd George the “other
factors”, as used in the reports of the Peace Conference, held after
the First World War to determine the boundaries of the States meant
“economic exigencies, historical association and vital strategicconsi-
deration.”^3 According to the Orissa Boundary Commission (1928),
“Language, race, the attitude of the people, geographical position,
economic interests and administrative convenience all are relevant
factors.”^^ The crux of problem lay in the extent to which the
population factor was to be allowed to be overridden by other consi¬
derations, like the location of the religious shrines of the Sikhs’ the
disruption of the irrigation system and economic factors.
The Sikh Shrines
The Sikhs had been agitating for the inclusion of Nankana
Sahib, the birth-place of Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, in
t e East Punjab. To stress their point of view, they observed the 8th
July as Nankana Sahib Day. The Maharaja of Patiala approached
the Viceroy to receive a deputation oftheSikh V.C.O’s and soldiers.
The Viceroy agreed and the date and time were fixed for this purpose.
22. Radciiffe Award, wide Appendix, Chapter VI
2L David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. II, p. 912
24. Harnam Singh, Sikh Memorandum to the Punjab Boundary Commission p. 4
PUNJAB BOUNDARY CCMMISSION
87
When Mr. Jinnah came to know of this he raised an objection to
the Viceroy’s meeting a Sikh deputation. He argued in the meeting
of the Partition Council held on the 10th July that the question of
demarcation of the Punjab boundary was being discussed by the
Punjab Boundary Commission and the Viceroy could not discuss
this question with the Sikh deputation. The Viceroy agreed and
said that in case he met the deputation a special communique would
be issued.25.
This had a very adverse effect on the Sikhs, because the Sikhs
thought that it was their right to represent their point of view to the
Viceroy who, they erroneously believed, could issue some instructions
to the Punjab Boundary Commission regarding the Sikh shrines.
Now, they realized the necessity ofaninterpreterwho could represent
their point of view to the Viceroy. Mr V.P. Menon, Constitutional
Adviser to the Governor-General, was in touch with Sardar Patel
and Lord Ismay, Chief of Staff of the Viceroy, with Mr Jinnah.
But Sardar Baldev Singh or the Sikh leaders had no such channel of
communication. Sardar Baldev Singh, therefore, requested the
Viceroy to recall and re-employ Major J.M. Short.
By 1947, Major J.M. Short had earned the reputation of being
an expert on Sikh affairs. He served the XI Sikhs and retired in
1931. He was re-employed in 1940 when the Sikh Squadron of
Central Indian Horse refused to embark for the Middle East. He
was successful in restoring the loyalty of the Sikh forces. During
the war, when the pro-Congress activities of the Akali Party were
likely to affect adversely the military recruitment, he successfully
persuaded the Akali leaders to have a favourable attitude towards
the recruitment of the Sikhs. He was able to effect an understand¬
ing between the Akalis and the Unionist Government in the Punjab,
which culminated in the Sir Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact.^* He
had explained to Professor Reginald Coupland and Sir Stafford
Cripps the Sikh point of view when they visited India in 1942.
In 1946, he had accompanied Sir Stafford Cripps when the
25. P.P., Vol IV, p, 186, vide Appendix
26. Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit, London, 1961, p. 32
88
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Cabinet Mission visited India, He was attached to Sardar Baldev
Singh when he visited London in December 1946 along with
Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru and Mr Jinnah.^’
Lord Mountbatten had interviewed Major J. M. Short while
selecting his staff before coming to India as Governor-General.
He had then found no use for him. As the Viceroy was keen to
pacify the Sikhs, he recommended Major Short’s re-employment
to the Secretary of State for India and instructed Lord Ismay,
who was then in England, to bring Major Short with him. Major
Short reached India on the 22nd July, 1947. As a matter of fact,
by then it had almost been settled that population was to be the
basis of partition, subject to the weight of other factors. Mean¬
while, the Shiromani Akali Dal, a representative body of the
Sikh’s continued to exert itself for the inclusion of the Sikhs
shrines in the East Punjab. One deputation was sent to England
to mobilize British public opinion in favour of the Sikhs. The local
Sikhs went in a procession to Downing Street to present a memora¬
ndum to the British Prime Minister regarding the Sikh demands.^s
On the 14ih July, Mr Arthur Henderson, the then Under
Secretary of State in a reply to a question said in the House of
Commons, “The provision that other factors will be taken into
account has been made primarily to enable the Commission to
have regard to the special circumstances of the Sikh community in
the Punjab where considerations such as location of their relgious
shrines can reasonably be taken into account up to a point.^*
Mr Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan were upset over this statement
and argued with the Viceroy that the accepted principle of parti¬
tion was “contiguous majority areas” and that the “question of
religious shrines of any community had never been discussed
before. The Viceroy agreed to convey their protest to the
27. Major Short’s talk with the writer.
28. Statement of S. Rawel Singh, President of Central Khalsa Jatha, Britain,
79, Sinclair Road, London (1964) who was one of the deputationists who
presented the memorandum.
29. Hansard Vol. 440, p. 74
30. “Freedom But Danger Ahead” Dawn's Leading Article on 20th July, 1947
PUNJAB BOUNDARY COMMISSION
89
Secretary of State. Subsequently, the copies of the statement and
the Muslim League's protest aloug with its acknowledgement by
the Secretary of State were sent to the Punjab Boundary Com¬
mission by telegram No. 2329-S, dated the 16th July, 1947.*^ It
is true that the question of the Sikh shrines had not been included
in the terras of reference nor had it been discussed at any stage
before, but it was a question of vital importance for the Sikhs.
In order to ease communal tension on this score, some sort of
arrangement was necessary. Justice Mahajan, who was a member
of Commission, writes, “Lord Radcliffe’s Secretary asked me
whether I would be willing to treat the town of Qadian as neutral
territory if the town of Nanakana was similarly treated. I had
personally no objection to this course. It was not, however,
acceptable to some of my colleagues.V.P. Menon made the
suggestion that Mr Jinnah should be approached and persuaded
to declare Nanakana Sahib, “a sort of Vatican.”®^ This concession
to the Sikhs might have had a wholesome effect on the Sikhs and
Mr Jinnah would not have lost much. But the ejection of such
a suggestion indicated the mutual tension which existed between
the Muslims and the Sikhs. Sir Evan Jenkins, Governor of the
Punjab, suggested to the Viceroy that the Montgomery District might
be allotted to the East Punjab to accommodate the Sikh colonist
from the West Punjab.^* It could not be acted upon due to the
31. P.P Vol. VI, p. 203. Report of Justice Teja Singh
32. Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan, Looking Back, Bombay, 1963, p. 115
33. Michael Edwardes, Last Years of British India, London, 1963, p. 212
34. Leonald Mosley, Last Days of the British Raj, p 212
Sir Evan Jenkins, Governor of the Punjab, wrote to the Viceroy “I
believe there is quite a lot in the claims of the Sikhs and for that matter
other residents of the East Punjab, for a share in the canal colonies of
the West and the Gianni’s (Giani Kartar Singh who had a long interview
with the Governor) idea that the Montgomery district should be allotted
to the East is by no means as ridiculous as it sounds. The district, if
so allotted to the East, could be recolonised so as to concentrate the
non-Muslims there and transfer Muslims to Lyallpur.” The contents of
this letter have been verified by the writer from Giani Kartar Singh.
(Conted on Page 90)
90
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Stiff attitude of the Muslim-League.
Joint Control of the Canal System
The States of Bikaner and Bahawalpur had a long-standing
water dispute over the canals taking off from the Ferozepur head-
works. Both the States put forward their rival claims to the
Governor-General who advised them to present their cases to the
Punjab Boundary Commission.^® Sir Cyril was of the view that
some sort of an agreement for the control of the irrigation system
in the Punjab was essential. He discussed this problem with his
colleagues on the Punjab Boundary Commission,®® but no agreement
was possible. Even if the joint control of the Punjab irrigation-
system had been forced, as has been suggested by some writers, it
was bound to fail. The necessary goodwill for running any joint
venture was lacking. Everything had been divided and joint control
would not have worked.
The Commission at Simla
After the 31st July, the Commission retired to Simla where
Sir Cyril who had gone to Calcutta to attend the meetings of the
Bengal Boundary Commission also joined it. Justice Mahajan has
given a very vivid description of the working of the Commission at
Simla : “Rather anxiously, the non-Muslim and Muslim members
never met together for consultation or discussion. Mr Justice Din
Mohammad frankly told me at the outset that so far as he was
concerned he would write the report conceding the demands of the
Muslim League and I could do what I liked. As a result of this.
(Canted, from Page 89)
In England, I learned from Sir Evan Jenkins as well as from Lord Ismay
that L. Mosley got access to some original records which appear to have
been quoted by him in his book Last Days of British Raj.
Now the records of this period are available and this forms a part of
the letter of Sir E. M. Jenkins addressed to Lord Mountbatten on 10
July, 1947. Vide Document, no 56. Transfer of Power V o\ edited,
N. Mansergh. Her Majesty’s Stationery oflBce, London 1983.
35. P.P. Vol. VI, p. 6
36. Lord RadcliflFe's talk with the writer. Sir Cyril was subequently made
Lord Radcliffe.
PUNJAB BOUNDARY COMMISSION 91
all four of us wrote separate reports.”^’
Justice Mahajan was the first to submit his report on August
3, 1947. While discussing various points, he suggested the follow¬
ing boundary line : ‘In my view the frontier of India and Pakistan
should be demarcated on the west of the Ravi and in the neighbour¬
hood of that river as, strategically speaking, this is the only workable
frontier. The frontier line will take the course of the Basantar
River as leaving the tract of Shakargarh Tehsil on the west side.
This line should join the River Ravi at the confluence of the
Basantar River with the River Ravi below Narowal. From there, it
should follow the course of the Ravi up to Shahdra. From Shahdra,
it should proceed via Sheikhupura to Nanakana Sahib, include that
town in the East Punjab and then it should join the Deg Nala up to
its confluence with the River Ravi near Syedwala. From there, the
course of the Ravi should be followed till Channu and then should
adopt the border of the Montgomery District with the Multan
District and join the River Sutlej some distance above the Islam
Headworks.”®®
Justice Teja Singh submitted his report on the next day, i.e.
August 4, 1947. While emphasizing the importance of the Sikhs,
Sikh shrines and the contribution of the Sikhs to the development
of the land, he suggested the following boundary line : “I would
draw the north-western boundary of the Eastern Punjab along the
River Chenab from where it enters the Punjab going right up to
Khanki and from there turn to the right bank of the Lower Chenab
Canal up to Nanwana, then follow the bank of the Rakh Branch up
to the place where it enters the Lyallpur District, go along the
present boundary between the districts of Sheikhupura and Lyallpur
right up to the point where Deg Nala joins the Ravi River, then
follow the Ravi River and the present boundaries between Lyallpur
and Montgomery districts, turn to Channu, then following first the
present western boundary of the Montgomery District and then up
to the banks of the River Sutlej and the present southern boundary
of the Montgomery District come to Sulemaiiki where the districts
37. Looking Back, cit. op., p. 115
38. P.P., Vol. VI, pp. 188-89
92
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
of Ferozepur and Montgomery and the Bahawalpur State join.”S9
Justice Din Mohammad and Justice Mohammad Munir sub¬
mitted their reports on August 5, and August 6 respectively. Justice
Din Mahammad mainly emphasized the importance of the popula¬
tion factor. Justice Mohammad Munir replied to the points raised
by the Counsel for the Sikhs. According to O.H.K. Spate, “The
Muslim case was much better presented technically. It presented a
beautiful and a very comprehensive series of maps, excellently
produced and covering all aspects of the problem,”4® thanks mainly
to Mr Spate. The counsel for the Muslims did not suggest any
specific line but both strongly supported the boundary line suggested
by the Muslim League. The boundary line proposed by the Muslim
League was to divide the Pathankot Tehsil in order to retain
Madhupur Headworks in the West Punjab. A few miles it ran
along the River Beas, then followed the crest of the Swalik for some
80 miles. The line ran south-east, but near Rupar Headworks on
the great bend of the Sutlej it turned west, and as far as the Raj-
putana boundary ran roughly parallel to .the Sutlej along the
Ludhiana-Ferozepur railway and the Bikaner canal both included
within the West Punjab.
The last meeting of the Commission was held in the premises
of the Services Club, Simla. Sir Cyril Radcliffe presided. Regard¬
ing the fixation of the boundary line, he said, “Gentlemen you have
disagreed and, therefore, the duty falls on me to give the award
which I will do later on. ’’^2
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V
(a) Deputation of Sikh V.C.O's. and Soldiers
Mr. Jinnah pointed out that although he was doing everything
in his power to retain a hold over the Muslim sections of the popu¬
lation concerned to honour the undertaking given that the findings
of the Boundary Commission, whatever they were, would be
39. P.P, Vol. VI, p. 214.
40. The Geographical Journal, Royal Geographical Society, London, April
1948, p. 209
41. Ibid. p. 209
42. Looking Back, cit. op. p. 115
PUNJAB BOUNDARY COMMISSION
93
accepted, he had noticed that the Sikh leaders were still reported to
be inciting their followers to offer active resistance to decisions
which they might regard as unfavourable. It was reported that
active preparations for resistance were being made and that oaths
to resist were being taken. The impression on the Muslim mind
was that the Sikhs were carrying on this agitation in order to
influence the decision of the Boundary Commission. In conseq¬
uence, any suggestion that a Sikh deputation was being received
to raise the question of boundaries would have a most undesirable
effect.
His Excellency reiterated that he had made abundantly clear
to His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala, Sardar Baldev Singh,
Master Tara Singh and all other Sikh leaders, with whom he had
had interviews, the consequences of any attempt to offer active
resistance. No responsible government would tolerate for a
moment such action, which would be met by the immediate
employment of the regular armed forces of India. In view of
the superiority in aeroplanes, tanks, artillery, etc. that the armed
forces enjoy, such action would inevitably result in very severe
losses being inflicted on those who would only be armed with
rifles and out-of-date weapons. He reaffirmed his hope, therefore,
that the Sikh leaders would be able to restrain their followers.
His Excellency said he had been assured by Sir Cyril Radcliffe
that he would be able to submit his reports by the 14th August.
In conclusion. His Excellency said that he would communicate with
H.H. the Maharaja of Patiala, and make it clear that if he rece¬
ived the deputation on questions regarding boundaries could be
brought up ; and if the deputations were received, this fact would
be made very clear in a press note.
Case No. PC/31/4/47
Minutes of the fourth meeting of the-
Partition Council held on July 10,1947,
Partition Proceedings Vol. IV, page 146.
{h) A Note by the Viceroy
1. I visited Lahore on Sunday, 20th July, and met the
Punjab Partition Committee.
94
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
2. I put before that Committee the views of the Partition
Council on the matters discussed at their meeting on 17th July, as
recorded in Case No. PC/56/6/47.
3. It was agreed that the Government of East Punjab should
in any case move all unessential personnel to Simla on 10th
August.
4. It was further agreed that, if the decision of the Boundary
Commission places Lahore in the West Punjab the remnants of
the East Punjab Government should leave Lahore by midnight
14/15th August; and that, if Lahore was placed in the East
Punjab, the Government of the West Punjab, should leave Lahore
by midnight 14/15th August—and that detailed plans should be
made for the contingency beforehand.
5. It was agreed that the posting of officers should continue
on the basis of the notional partition, except in the case of Deputy
Commissioners and Superintendens of Police in the districts of
Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Lahore.
6. In these three districts there happen now to be British
Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police. It was
agreed that these should remain in control until the 15th August;
but that each side should be entitled to nominate personnel ready
to take over from them, and that there would be no objection to
these personnel being attached to the districts in advance of the
15th August, though without any executive authority. On the
15th August, on the withdrawal of the British officials, and on or
before that date the personnel of the Government not entitled by
the award to assume control, will be withdrawn.
7. I am glad to be able to report that all the members of
the Punjab Partition Committee, and particularly the Sikh
member, Sardar Swaran Singh, declared that their parties would
accept and abide by the decision of the Boundary Commission.
8. I told them that the Central Partition Council had decided
to issue a statement, assuring minorities and warning against dis¬
turbances. I am glad to be able to report that the members of the
Punjab Partition Committee agreed to issue a similar statement
signed both themselves and by as many of the influential leaders
PUNJAB BOUNDARY COMMISSION 9f
in the Province as possible.
9. The Punjab Partition Committee was very keen that the
decisions of the Boundary Commission should be promulgated at the
earliest possible moment j and I am going to ask Sir Cyril Radcliffe
if he can produce them by 10th August.
10. The members of the Committee told me that, apart from
the two matters which they referred to the Central Partition Council,
they had at present no other major points of difference, and things
were going well.
Eighth meeting of Partition Council, July 22, 1947
Partition Proceedings Vol. IV, page 222.
CHAPFER VI
THE AWARD
The announcement of the Punjab Boundary Award raised a
good deal of controversy. Mr Jinnah, the Governor-General of
Pakistan, Publically condemned the Award in his broadcast speech
on the 31st August, 1947. He said, *‘We have been squeezed in as
much as it was possible and the latest blow that we have received
was the Award of the Boundary Commission. It is an unjust, in-
comprehensive and even a perverse award.^'* It is curious that he
took so long to discover its character. The Pakistan press was also
critical of the Award and the Pakistan Government later quoted the
following passage of the Pakistan Times Lahore, in its widely cir¬
culated booklet The Sikh Plan in Action : “The blow has been
hardest in the Gurdaspur District when the two Muslim tehsils of
Gurdaspur and Batala with a Muslim majority of 52.1 percent
and 55.06 per cent respectively have been thrown into Hindustan
along with Pathankot Tehsil taking away from Pakistan the rich
Muslim Industrial town of Batala. A part of Lahore District has
also been broken off. Radcliffe has taken the trouble of drawing a
village-to-village boundary but Ajnala Tehsil of Amritsar District
with 60 per cent Muslim majority and contiguous to the district of
Lahore has been completely forgotten. The tehsils of Zira and
Ferozepur with a clear majority have been dismissed with a talk of
disruption of communication.Recently, Field Marshal Moham¬
mad Ayub Khan wrote in an article, “Never had the destiny of so
many millions depended so helplessly on the arbitrary strokes of
one man’s pencil. It was because Mr Radcliffe happened to
make a small dent on the wrong side of the line that over 4,000,000
inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir have been locked in a life-and
- •
1. Sikh Plan in Action, Pakistan Government Publication, typed copy S.H.R.
1518, Page 5
THE AWARD
97
death struggle for self determination for 13 long years.”®
The Tehsils of Gurdaspur and Batala
According to Andrew Mellor, “In the award, a particular
cause of anger to the Muslims was that a large part of the Muslim-
majority area of Gurdaspur went to the East Punjab, thus giving
India an extended . frontier with Kashmir.”^ K. Sarwar Hassan
writes, “Included in the Punjab areas given by Radcliflfe to India
were two Muslim-majority tehsils (sub districts) of the Gurdaspur
district. We have it on the authority of Lord Birdwood, an Indian
Army Officer of a long experience, that it was Radcliffe’s award to
India of Gurdaspur and Batala Tehsils with Muslim majorities
which rendered possible the maintenance of an Indian force at
Jammu based on Pathankot as railhead and which enabled India
to consolidate for defences southwards all the way from Uri to the
Pakistan border.”® According to Brecher “Muslim League leaders
were dismayed for Gurdaspur was of vital significance, it was
then the only useable link between India and the princely State of
Jammu and Kashmir (for India). A few months later, when the
conflict over Kashmir arose Pakistan leaders blamed what they
considered to be manifestly an unjust decision on Gurdaspur.”®
Perhaps the demarcation of the boundary-line in the district
of Gurdaspur would not have aroused so much cries from Pakistan,
had there been no Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. It is,
therefore, important to examine in detail the position of the
Gurdaspur District. This consisted of four tehsils (sub-districts)
with the Muslim population percentage noted against each.
according to the census of 1941 :
1. Tehsil Batala ... 55.06%
2. Tehsil Shakargarh ... 51.3%
3. Tehsil Gurdaspur ... 51.1%
4. Tehsil Pathankot ... 38.8%
As a whole, the Gurdaspur district had a 50.4 per cent
3. ‘Pakistan Perspective’, Pakistan Anthology, 1961, pages 3-4
4. Andrew Mellor India Since Partition, London 1951, p. 38
5. K. Sarwar, Pakistan and United Nations, New York, 1960, p. 45
6. Michael Brecher, Nehru, A Political Biography, London 1959, p. 359
98
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Muslim population.
In the notional division appended to the 3rd June Flan, the
district of Gurdaspur was included in the Muslim-majority districts.
But the reasons for doing so were clearly stated by Lord Mount-
batten. He said in the Press Conference on the 3rd June, “I put
that in for the simple reason that in the district of Gurdaspur in
the Punjab, the population is 50.4 per cent Muslims, I think, and
49.6 per cent non-Muslims. With a difference of 0.8 per cent you
will see that it is unlikely the Boundary Commission will throw the
whole district into Muslim majority areas.The point is this :
We have adopted these districts for one purpose and one purpose
only. It is the only simple way which you can divide the mem¬
bers of the Legislative Assembly.” Lord Mountbatten further
elucidated this point when he said, “I won’t labour this point.
And I will be grateful for publicity by the press that it should not
be assumed that it is a foregone conclusion that they will be goin?
into the area within which their community is not in a majority.”’
It was, therefore, clear from the very beginning that the whole
of the district of Gurdaspur could not go to India or to Pakistan.
If a tehsil be considered as a unit for demarcation, as the Muslim
Counsel in the Boundary Commission stressed, Pakistan could
not claim Pathankot Tehsil which had a direct link with Jammu
and Kashmir and had the headworks of the Upper Bari Doab
Canal at Madhopur. It had an over-whelming majority of non-
Muslims viz. 61.2 per cent. It was contiguous to the non-Muslim
majority districts of Kangra and Jullundur. It would have been
a grave injustice to India, had this area been given to Pakistan.
Of the remaining three tehsils, one, which was situated beyond
the River Ravi towards the west, viz. Shakargarh, was given to
Pakistan by the Radcliffe Award.® Regarding the award of tehsils
of Batala and Gurdaspur to India, Brecher rightly observes, “The
Radcliffe Commission had been instructed to determine the
boundary on the criteria of communal composition and other
factors. Although unstated, there were acknowledged to be
7. Time Only To Look Forward, p. 30
8. Para 1, Annexure A, Radcliffe Award, vide Appendix
THE AWARD
99
economic considerations, particularly the effect of demarcation on
the canal irrigation systems and the rail and the road communi¬
cations. In this instance, Radcliffe adjudged these “other factors”
compelling and awarded Gurdaspur to the East Punjab.”®
According to Justice Din Mohammad, who was a member of the
Punjab Boundary Commission, the main leason for awarding
Batala and Gurdaspur Tehsils to India was that their award to
Pakistan would have isolated the important Amritsar District from
the surrounding Indian soiP®. This seems another factor which
could easily override percentage of population.
The case of Gurdaspur District was so clear that even two
Muslim members of the Punjab Boundary Commission were con¬
vinced that Gurdaspur would go to India. Justice Mohammad
Munir, a member of the Punjab Boundary Commission, who
subsequently became the Chief Justice of the Pakistan High Court,
said in his farewell address in Lahore in April 1960, “Today I
have no hesitation in disclosing.it was clear to both Mr. Din
Mohammed and myself from the very beginning of the discussions
with Mr Radcliffe that Gurdaspur was going to India and our
apprehensions were communicated at a very early stage to those
who had been deputed by the Muslim League to help us.”^' At
least it accepted an inevitability in the case of Amritsar going
to India.
The Tehsils of Ferozepur and Zira
The case of the Ferozepur District rendered the entire award
of Sir Cyril suspicious in the eyes of Pakistan. Justice Mohammad
Munir stated, “When I was replying to the Sikh case, I was told by
Mr Radcliffe in the most unequivocal terms that three tehsils of
Ferozepur, probably, Ferozepur, Zira and Fazilka, were coming
to Pakistan and that it was unnecessary for me to discuss that
part of the case with them. I still remember the description of
the terrain he gave me of their transfer of Pakistan and I com¬
municated my congratulation to the Nawab of Mamdot. (Lord
I
9. Nehru—A Political Biography, pp. 339
10. Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides, London 1955, p. 36
11. The Tribune, Ambala Cantt, April 26, 1960
100
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Radcliffe told the writer that his private talk always leaked out
to the Muslim press). He was jubilant, but was disappointed a
few days later, when by the award which came three days after
the scheduled time, these tehsils went to India”.^^
The district of Ferozepur had five tehsils of which the follow¬
ing two had Muslim-majority population :
Ferozepur Tehsil ... 55.2%
Zira Tehsil ... 65.2%
The Muslims in the Ferozepur District, as a whole, formed
44.6 per cent of the population.
It is clear that, if the Muslim population on a tehsil basis
were considered for demarcating the boundary line, as demanded
by the counsel for the Muslims and no other factor taken into
account, then Pakistan could have had tehsils of Zira and Feroze¬
pur and not the tehsil of Fazilka as afterwards claimed by the
Justice Mohammad Munir. The Fazilka Tehsil was a non-Muslim-
majority area, with about 57 per cent non-Muslims. Sir Cyril
Radcliffe gave the following reasons in his award for this transfer,
“I have hesitated long over those not inconsiderable areas east
of the Sutlej River and in the angle of the Beas and Sutlej Rivers
in which Muslim majorities are found. But on the whole, I have
come to the conclusion that would be in the true interests of
neither state to extend the West Punjab to a strip on the far side
of Sutlej and there are factors such as the disruption of railway
communication and water systems that ought in this instance to
displace the primary claim of contiguous majorities.’’^®
But it did not convince the Pakistan leaders as K. Sarwar
Hassan writes, “Disruption of railway line is not irrepairable for
these could be re-aligned. But so far as the water systems were
concernd, the effect of the Award was not to save them from dis¬
ruption but, as we shall see, to disrupt them with disasterous con¬
sequences. Radcliffe as a trained lawyer could not but have
known what he was doing.Sir Zafar-ullah, Pakistan’s first
12. The Tribune, Ambala Cantt, April 26, 1960
13. Para 10, Radcliffe Award, vide Appendix
14. Sarwar U^ssan—Pakistan and United Nations, New York, 1960, page 42
THE AWARD
101
Foreign Minister, told the writer that had the tehsils of Ferozepur
and Zira been given to Pakistan with the Ferozepur Headworks
controlling the Gang Canal irrigating the Bikaner State, the ruler
of Bikaner would have acceded to Pakistan. This contingency
might have prompted the award as given. It is doubtful, however,
whether the ruler of Bikaner, with an overwhelming majority of
the Hindu subjects, would have joined Pakistan. He was one
of first group of the princes to join the Constituent Assembly of
India. Muslim leaders might have fondly hoped that the State
of Bikaner would have joined Pakistan on account of the Feroze¬
pur Headworks going to them. It is unfortunate that the Pakistan
statesmen have started imputing motives, rather than seeing the
force of the arguments advanced by Sir Cyril for awarding the
tehsils of Ferozepur and Zira to India.
The Sketch-Map Incident
Before the publication of the Award, Sir Evan Jenkins, the
Governor of the Punjab, contacted the Viceroy’s Secretary and
asked for advance information about the Punjab Boundary Award.
He probably pleaded that it had been the previous practice of the
British administrators to give advance information to the govern¬
ments concerned regarding administrative decision likely to affect
them so that they might make necessary arrangements. But Sir Evan
Jenkins, while asking for advance information, forgot that the infor¬
mation required was relating to an international boundary and it was
no longer an internal problem of the province of which he was the
head.
The Viceroy’s Secretary, whom Sir Evan Jenkins contacted on
telephone, was Sir George Abell, one of the seniormost members of
the British I.C.S. in India. As Secretary to the Viceroy, he corres¬
ponded with the Governors. In the Viceroy’s staff he had succeed¬
ed Sir Evan Jenkins with whom he had friendly relations. Sir
George, therefore, contacted the Secretariat of the Boundary
Commission. According to Brecher, “Abell got in touch with the
Secretary of the Radclifife Commission and on the basis of a tele¬
phonic conversation drew a sketch map which was sent to Jenkins.”^®
15. Nehru—A Political Biographyt page 360
1
102 PARTITION OF PUNJAB
This telephonic convrsation might refer to the description of the
boundary which was produced before the Security Council.
About the sketch map it appears certain that it was not prepared at
Lahore or at Simla, it was sent from Delhi. Sir Francis Mudie, the
Governor of the West Punjab, who succeeded Jenkins, informed the
writer that the sketch map left by Jenkins among the confidential
papers could not have been prepared on the basis of a telephonic
conversation. Sir Cyril Radcliffe appears to have been aware of a
map being sent to Abell. It appears almost certain that the sketch
map was sent to Abell from the Secretariat of the Boundary
Commission. Sir Zafarullah told the writer that the Pakistan
Government sent him the photo copies of three documents to be
presented before the Security Council while discussing the Kashmir
case (1) :—the forwarding letter in which Abell had stated that the
map he was sending, was supplied to him by Mr Beaumont,
Secretary of Sir Cyril Radcliffe. (2) the sketch map which indicated
the Punjab boundary line, and (3) the description of the boundary
line like which tallied with the Radcliffe Award. Sir Francis Mudie
denied the knowledge of the forwarding letter or the description of
the boundary line indicated in the sketch map. He only saw the
map which was left by Jenkins. The forwarding letter and the des¬
cription might have been detached by Jenkins orhis Secretary before
the map was placed in the confidential box of the Governor. The
map was subsequently shown to Mr Jinnah, Governor-General and
Mr Liqat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan.
The map would have gone unnoticed, had there been no
difference between what it depicted and the subsequent award. In
this map, the tehsils of Ferozepur and Zira were shown in Pakistan,
whereas the Award put the tehsils in India. Sir Francis Mudie, the
Governor of the West Punjab, was the first to note this change and
has asserted that Sir Cyril Radcliffe had changed his original Award.
Pakistan leaders hold that the Award had been tampered with in
order to make it favourable to India. The Pakistan leaders accused
Lord Mountbatten, using his personal influence to alter the Punjab
Boundary Award. Commenting on this episode. Lord Mountbatten
declared that he considered it beneath his dignity to issue a formal
THE AWARD
103
denial of such a charge.^®
There is no evidence of the Viceroy’s interference in the work¬
ing of the Boundary Commission. On the contrary, Alan Compbell
Johnson writes, “Mountbatten from the outset had given his staff
the most explicit directions that they were to have no contact what¬
ever with Radcliffe while he was engaged on his difficult and delicate
arbitral task and has himself kept clear of him after the first wel¬
come.”^’ Similarly, Brecher writes, “The author has been told by
various persons that there was no communication between Mount-
batten and Radcliffe throughout the labour of the Commission.”^®
The Akali leaders, Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh, told
the writer that Major Short’s pleading for the Sikhs has brought a
favourable award to India. This does not, however, appear to be
correct, because Major Short was not so high-ranking a personality to
influence the course of events as he himself admitted in a statement
to the writer. In the third week of July 1947, he was attached as
Personal Assistant to Lord Ismay, Chief of Staff of Lord Mount-
batten, who kept contact with Mr Jinnah.
A close scrutiny of the Partition Proceedings will convince any
impartial observer that the Punjab Boundary Award was in accord¬
ance with the decisions of the Partition Council. The question of the
boundary line in the Punjab was discussed there frequently. Unlike
the Bengal and Assam Partition Committees, the work of the Punjab
Partition Committee was held up on account of extraordinary condi¬
tions prevailing here. One of the major problems was the trasnfer
of the officers who had opted either for the East Punjab or for the
West Punjab. Out of the twenty-nine districts, as many as fourteen
districts had been declared disputed districts^* by the Partition
Council. These fourteen districts were to be under the control of
the Punjab Boundary Force. On July 10, Jenkins, Governor of
the Punjab, had reported that “The Sikhs and the Hindus are reluc¬
tant to the set up of any Government at all, until August 15, except
16. Ibid. p. 361
17. Mission with Lord Mountbatten, p. 251-52
18. Nehru, A Political Biography, p. 361 foot-note
19. For details vide Chapter Punjab Boundary Force
104
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
in Lahore. They consider that a move from Lahore will prejudice
their claim to the city.” 2 ® The issue was discussed in the meeting
of the Partition Council held on the 17th July. It was decided
that the notional boundary was to be followed, except with regard
to three districts, viz., Gurdaspur, Lahore and Amritsar. It may
be noted here that Ferozepur was not counted as a disputed
district in the meeting of the Partition Council where Mr Jinnah
was present.It was also decided that the East Punjab Govern¬
ment should be asked to move to Simla before the 15th August,
1947. This statesman-like decision of the Governor-General
killed two birds with one stone. By bringing Lahore among the
disputed districts, he tried to pecify the growing demand of the
non-Muslims to include Lahore in the East Punjab, while by
instructing the East Punjab Government to move from Lahore
before the 15th August he satisfied the Muslim point of view.
Lord Mountbatten personally visited Lahore on July 20, 1947,
to pursuade the East Punjab Government to move to Simla .22
A separate decision appears to have been taken regarding the
three districts of Gurdaspur, Lahore and Amritsar. As already
stated, the Governor-General had declared on the 3rd June, “In
the district of Gurdaspur in the Punjab, the population ratio is
50.4 per cent Muslims and 49 6 per cent non-Muslims. The
difference is 0.8 per cent. You will see at once that it is unlikely
that the Boundary Commission will place the whole district in
the Muslim majority area.” This implied a division of the Gur¬
daspur district which was actually made in the Award.
In the case of Lahore and Calcutta, the provincial capitals of
the Punjab and Bengal, the decision in respect of the provinces to
be partitioned appears to have been made much earlier. Accord¬
ing to Justice Mahajan, who was a member of the Punjab
Boundary Commission, once Sir Cyril Radcliffe remarked, “How
can you have both Calcutta and Lahore. What can I give to
20. Last Days of British Raj, p. 205
21. P.P. Vol. IV, pp. 187 and 237
22. For details, see Chapter IV, Partition Machinery
THE AWARD
105
Pakistan.”23 Regarding Calcutta, Arthur Henderson had said in
the House of Commons that “Calcutta is to be found within that
section of existing Bengal which contains the majority of Hindu
population.”24 Similarly, on the majority population basis, the
district of Lahore had been allocated to the West Punjab in the
notional division. The question “would the Government of the
East Punjab be permitted to administer the East Punjab from
Lahore as headquarters”^'\ had been discussed in the Partition
Council meeting held on the 17th July, 1947, where the Governor-
General had said that he would secure the agreement of the
Punjab Partition Committee to (a) the Government of East
Punjab moving to Simla before the 15th August and (b) making
the postings on the basis of notional division.^* The Hindus
and the Sikhs of the Punjab were greatly upset with these
decisions. As a last resort, they “tried hard to persuade the
Congress to make an issue of Lahore, because iheir political and
economic life had been centred in Lahore. ”27 But the Congress
did not move in the matter, as obviously it saw no grounds on
which it could make the claim.
Professor R. Coupland had pointed out earlier that in the case
of the division of Punjab, both the prominent cities of the Punjab,
viz. Lahore and Amritsar could not go to a single state.^*
Moreover, Amritsar being the sacred city of the Sikhs with
numerous historical shrines in it, had a great significance, especi¬
ally in view of the Under Secretary of State’s statement that ‘other
factors’ meant location of the Sikh shrines. Amritsar had been
in the East Punjab according to the notional division.
Pakistan’s suspicion regarding the boundary line in the
Ferozepur District is part of a political move. The Nawab of
23. Mehar Chand Mahajan, Looking Back, p. 115
24. Hansard\o\,AA0,^. 74
25. D.P.P. P.C. p. 12
26. P.P. Vol. IV, p. 186
27. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Indian Wins Freedom, p. 200
28. Prof R. Coupland, Report on Constitutional Problem of India, Vol. Ill,
. P. 86
106
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Mumdot who was the President of the Punjab Muslim League in
1947, belonged to the Ferozepur District. He had been assured
by some MusliYn lawyers, as is clear from the statement of Justice
Mohammad Munir, quoted above, that his estate would remain in
Pakistan. Actually, when this did not happen, they cooked up the
sketch map story to account for its going to India. Lord RadclifFe
explained to the writer that he had drawn several lines of demarca¬
tion before reaching the final conclusion. While the Award was in
the process of finalization, one such sketch map appears to have
been conveyed to the Governor of the Punjab. But that could not
be the final one. The line incorporated into the Punjab Boundary
Award was the final one. No suspicion regarding the sketch map
would have risen, had the map supplied to Jenkins been marked
as “provisional” or “tentative” or “not final”. It would have
been equally effective had Sir George Abell emphasized this point
while conveying the map to Jenkins. He could likewise have done
the same with Sir Francis Mudie. Minor omissions here there on
the part of one officer or another created a permanent suspicion.
One of the major factors which confirmed the doubts of the
leaders of Pakistan was the delay in the announcement of the Punjab
Boundary Award. The Punjab Boundary Award was released to
the leaders of India and Pakistan on the 16th August in the after¬
noon and announced on the 17th morning. The awards of Bengal
and Assam were announced on the 14th August, i he demarcation
of the boundary line in the Punjab was more contested than that
in Bengal and when the award came, it was more precise in its
description of the boundary than the Bengal Award.
The entire plan of transfer of power would have failed if
the parties had not accepted the Award in the Punjab. The
frequent references to the boundary line in the Punjab in the
Partition Council were clear indications of its contested nature. Lord
Mountbatten, therefore, had on July 22, 1947 taken assurances
form the representatives of India and Pakistan that they would
accept the award of the Commission whatever it might be.^*
29. V.P. Menon, Transfer of Po.ver in India, Calcutta, 1957, p. 409
THE AWARD
107
The Viceroy seems to have decided to release the award relating
to the Punjab on the 16th August, just as he had done in the
case of the 3rd June Plan. This procedure was not considered
essential for the awards relating to Bengal and Assam.
The meeting of the representatives of India and Pakistan
could not be held on the 14th August, as it had been declared
as Pakistan’s Independence Day. The Viceroy spent the whole
day in Karachi. The next day, i e. the 15th August, was India’s
Independence Day. Since Lord Mountbatten did not want to
mar the independence celebrations, he preferred to postpone the
Punjab Boundary Award by a couple of days. Alan Campbell
Johnson notes the reaction to the release of the Punjab Boundary
Award in the meeting of the representatives of India and Pakistan
on the 16th August afternoon : “But the rejoicings of the morning
were too soon tempered by the depression of the leaders this
afternoon. When Mountbatten handed over to them the Radcliffe
Award,.Liaqat was there.I was present at this sober and
sullen gathering where the only unanimity was in denunciation
of this or that communal ‘injustice’. The field was thus left clear
for Mountbatten to point with well-timed emphasis the moral
that in so as far as it was impossible for all parties to be eqully
satisfied with Radcliffe’s verdict, the best evidence of its fairness
to rest in the undoubted equality of their displeasure”.^®
Assessment of the Award
Sir Cyril Radcliffe himself has rightly assessed the Punjab
Boundary Award when he wrote “.the Award cannot go far
towards satisfying sentiments and aspirations deeply held on
either side but directly in conflict as to their bearing on the
placings of the boundary.“Whatever had been the Award,
it would not have satisfied both parties as the claims of the
respective parties ranged over a wide field of territory.
The Punjab Boundary Award was bitterly resented in both
the East Punjab and the West Punjab. The West Punjab resented
30. Mission with Lord Mountbatten, page 167; Vide also Epilogue
31. Para 12, Radcliffe Award, vide Appendix
32. Para 9, Ibid
108
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
the Award for the loss of Gurdaspur District and the Ferozepur
canal headworks and the East Punjab resented it for the loss of
Lahore and the canal colonies of Sheikhupura (including Nanakana
Sahib), Lyallpur and Montgomery Districts.
The Radcliffe Award made only minor changes in the notional
division provided in the 3rd June Plan and subsequently included in
the Indian Independence Act. Four police stations of the Tehsil
Kasur in the Lahore District were given to the East Punjab in order
“to mitigate the consequences of the severance®^ of tiie Upper Bari
Doab Canal.” The only exception was in the case of the district
of Gurdaspur which was in the West Punjab according to the
notional division. The Award gave its Shakargarh Tehsil to the
West Punjab and its three remaining tehsils to the East Punjab.
For the rest, notional division was confirmed.
The Award allocated to the East Punjab thirteen districts
comprising the whole of the Jullunder and Ambala Divisions. In
addition, the East Punjab had the whole of Amritsar district, three
tehsils of Gurdaspur District and a portion of the Lahore District
from the Lahore Division. The Award granted to the West Punjab
sixteen districts comprising the whole of the Multan and Rawal¬
pindi Divisions and the major portion of the Lahore Division, viz.
the districts of Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, Sialkot and Lahore. In
addition the West Punjab had the Shakargarh Tehsil of the Gurdas¬
pur District. On the whole, the West Punjab received about 62 per
cent and the East Punjab about 38 per cent of the area of the erst¬
while united Punjab.®*
The Award split the canal irrigation system which was so
vital to agriculture in the Punjab. Perhaps, it was not possible to
preserve the integrity of this system. Sir Cyril Radcliffe himself
admitted this fact when he stated “I have not found it possible to
preserve undivided the irrigation system of the Upper Bari Doab
which extends from Madhopur (in Gurdaspur District) to the
western borders of the district of Lahore although I have made
33. Para ll. Ibid
.34. Vide Chapter IV, Partition Machinery
Map showing the Boundary Line between the East Punjab
and the West Punjab.
S 30 N t
THE AWARD
109
small adjustments of the Lahore-Amritsar district boundary to miti¬
gate some of the consequences.”^® Similarly, the head of the Dep^j.'
pur Canal, which irrigated the West Punjab, was left in the £ 351 ;
Punjab. Sir Cyril wrote “I must call attention to the fact that the
Depalpur Canal which serves areas in the West Puq’ab takes off
from the Ferozepur headworks and I find it di^cult to envisage a
satisfactory demarcation at this point.”®®
The Award could not keep intact tl:fe Mandi Hydro-Electric
Scheme either. It supplied electric powers to the districts ’ of
Kangra, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lt^ore, Jullundur, Ludhina,Sheikhu-
pura and Lyallpur. In antlcpation of the dislocation and disruption
of the system, .the Governor of the Punjab, under the special
powers gr^jted to him by Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act
1947, issuf(4f‘The Punjab Partition (Mandi Hydro Electric System
Opera ion) Order 1947”, by which this system '^vas to continue to
serve ad the districts in the East Punjab and-*ibe West Punjab till
Novenber 15, 1947 without any financiaii obligation on the part
of eitier Government.®’
The district or tehsil bound^aries, which had been demarcated
by the Htlement officers, were r uade the inter-national boundaries
between^ndia and Pakistan. Rt-egarding the boundary line in the
Gurdaspu District, it was stat ed : “The boundary shall follow the
line of that iver down the ^estern boundary of the Pathankot
Tehsil to thcqpint wher^w'Pathankot, Shakargarh and Gurdaspur
Tehsils meet. The tehsil boundary and not the actual course of the
Ujh River shall constitute the boundary between the East and West
Punjab.”®® At another place, it was stated : “It (the boundary)
continues along the boundary between the districts of Ferozepur and
Montgomery to the point where the boundary meets the Bahawalpur
State. The district boundaries and not be actual course of the
Sutlej River shall in each case constitute the boundary between the
35. Para 11, Radcliffe Award
36. Para 10, Ibid, vide Chapter X After Effects"
yi. Vide Chapter IV, Partition Machinery
38. Para 1, Annexure A of Schedule attached with the Radcliffe Award, vide
Appendix.
no
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
East and the West Punjab.”39 Making the district boundary lines
the international boundary was perhaps the only solution as the
rivers of the Punjab were not suitable to form the international
boundaries.'*®
APPENDIX CHAPTER VI
Sir Cyril Radcliffe*s Award
To His Excellency the Governor-General,
1 . I have the honour to present the decision and award of
the Punjab Boundary Commission which, by virme of Section 4
of the Indian Independence Act 1947, h represented by my
decision as Chairman of that Com*f.-iision.
2 , The Punjab Boundary Commission constituted by the
announcement of the Governor-Ger era], dated (he'^h of June
1947, referen-.e No. D50/7/47R. Tne members of the C mission
thereby appointed were :
Mr Justice Din Mohammad,
Mr Justice Muhammad Munir,
Mr Justice Mehr Cbnnd Mahajan, and
Mr Justice Teja Singh.
I was subsequently appointed Chairman of this Commissior<.
3. The terms of reference of tie Commission, as set. out in
the announcement, were as follows
“The Boundary Conmission is iootructed to
demarcate the boundaries of tin two parts of the Punjab
on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous "majority areas
of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also
take into account other factors.”
We were desired to arrive at a decision as soon as possible before
the 15th of August.
4. After preliminary meetings, the Commission invited the
submission of memoranda and representations by interested parties.
Numerous memoranda and representation were received.
5. The public sittings of the Commission took place at
39. Para 4, Ibid.
40. The Geographical Journal, London, April 1948, p. 203
THE AWARD
111
Lahore, and extended from Monday the 21st of July, 1947, to
Thursday the 31 St of July, 1947, inclusive, with the exception of
Sunday, the 27th of July. The main arguments were conducted by
counsel on behalf of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim
League, and the Sikh members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly;
but a number of other interested parties appeared and argued
before the Commission. In view of the fact that I was acting also
as Chairman of the Bengal Boundary Commission, whose
proceedings were taking place simultaneously with the proceedings
of the Punjab Boundary Commission, I did not attend the public
sittings in person, but made arrangements to study daily the record
of the proceedings and of all material submitted for our
consideration.
6 . After the close of the public sittings, the Commission
adjourned to Simla where I joined my colleagues, and we entered
upon discussions in the hope of being to present an agreed
decision as to the demarcation of the boundaries. I am greatly
indebted to my colleagues for indispensable assistance in the clari¬
fication of the issues and the marshalling of the arguments for
different views, but it became evident in the course of our
discussions that the divergence of opinon between my colleagues
was so wide that an agreed solution of the boundary problem was
not to be obtained. I do not intend to convey by this that there were
not large areas of the Punjab on the West and on the East
respectively which provoked no controversy as to which State they
should be assigned ; but when it came to the extensive but
disputed areas in which the boundary must be drawn, differences
of opinion as to the significance of the term “other factors”, which
we were directed by our terms of reference to take into account,
and as to the weight and value to be attached to those factors,
made it impossible to arrive at any agreed line. In those
circumstances, my colleagues, at the close of our discussion,
assented to the conclusion that I must proceed to give my own
decision.
7. This I now proceed to do. The demarcation of the boun¬
dary line is described in detail in the schedule which forms
112
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Annexure A to this award, and in the map attached thereto,
Annexure B. The map is annexed for purposes of illustration, •
and if there should be any divergence between the boundary as
described in Annexure A and as delineated on the map in Annexure
B, the description in Annexure A is to prevail.
8 . Certain representations were addressed to the Commission
on behalf of the States of Bikaner and Bahawalpur, both of
which States interested in canals whose headworks situated
in the Punjab Province. I have taken the view that an
interest of this sort cannot weigh directly in the question before us
as to the division of the Punjab between the Indian Union and
Pakistan, since the territorial division of the province does not
affect rights of private property, and I think that I am entitled to
assume with confidence that any agreement that either o f these
States has made with the Provincial Government as to the
sharing of water from these canals or otherwise will be respected
by whatever Government hereafter assumes jurisdiction over the
headworks concerned. I wish also to make it plain that no
decision that is made by this Commission is intended to affect
whatever territorial claim the State of Bahawalpur may have in
respect of a number of villages lying between Sulemanke Weir and
Gurka Ferry.
9. The task of delimiting a boundary in the Punjab is
difficult one. The claims of the respective parties ranged over a
wide field of territory, but in my judgment the truly debatable
ground in the end proved to lie in and around the area between the
Beas and Sutlej Rivers on the one hand and the River Ravi on the
other. The fixing of a boundary in this area was further
complicated by the existence of canal systems, so vital to the life
of the Punjab but developed only under the conception of a single
administration, and of systems of road and rail communication,
which have been planned in the same way. There was also the
stubborn geographical fact of the respective situations of Lahore
and Amritsar, and the claims to each or both of these cities which
each side vigorously maintained. After weighing to the best of
my ability such other factors as appeared to me relevant as
THE AWARD
113
affecting the fundamental basis of contiguous majority areas. I
have come to the decision set out in the Schedule which thus be¬
comes award of the Commission. I am conscious that there are
legitimate criticisms to be made of it ; as there are, I think, of any
other line that might be chosen.
10. I have hesitated long over those not inconsiderable areas
East of the Sutlej River and in the angle of the Beas and the Sutlej
Rivers in which Muslim majorities are found. But on the whole I
have come to the conclusion that it would be in the true interests
of neither State to extend the West Punjab to a strip on the far side
of the Sutlej and that there are factors such as the disruption of
railway communications and water systems that ought in this ins¬
tance to displace the primary claims of contiguous majorities. But I
must call attention to the fact that the Depalpur Canal, which serves
areas in the West Punjab, takes off from the Ferozepore headworks
and I find it difficult to envisage a satisfactory demarcation of
boundary at this point that is not accompanied by some arrange¬
ment for joint control of the intake of the different canals
dependent on these headworks.
11 . T have not found it possible to preserve undivided the
irrigation system of the Upper Bari Doab Canal, which extends
from Madhopur in the Pathankot Tehsil to the western border of
the district of Lahore, although I have made small adjustments of
the Lahore—Amritsar district boundary to mitigate some of the
consequences of this severance; nor can I see any means of pre¬
serving under one territorial jurisdiction the Mandi Hydro-electric
Scheme which supplies power in the districts of Kangra, Gurdaspur,
Amritsar, Lahore, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepore, Sheikhupura
and Layallpur. I think it only right to express the hope that,
where the drawing of a boundary line cannot avoid disrupting such
unitary services as canal irrigation, railways, and electric-power
transmission, a solution may be found by agreement between the
two States for some joint control of what has hitherto been a
valuable common service.
12 . T am conscious too that the award cannot go far towards
satisfying sentiments and aspirations deeply held on either side but
directly in conflict as to their bearing on the placing of the boundary.
114
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
If means to be found to gratify to the full these sentiments and as¬
pirations, I think that they must be found in political arrangements
with which I am not concerned, and not in the decision of a boun¬
dary line drawn under the terms of reference of this Commission.
New Delhi.
The 12th August, 1947 CYRIL RADCLIFFE
THE SCHEDULE
Annexure A
1. The boundary between the East and West Punjab shall
commence on the north at the point where the west branch of the
Ujh River enters the Punjab Province from the State of Kashmir.
The boundary shall follow the line of that river down the western
boundary of the Pathankot Tehsil to the point where the Pathankot,
Shakargarh and Gurdaspur Tehsils meet. The tehsils boundaiy and
not the actual course of the Ujh River shall constitute the boundary
between the East and the West Punjab.
2. From the point of meeting of the three tehsils above men¬
tioned, the boundary (line) between the East and the West Punjab
shall follow the line of the Ujh River to its junction with the River
Ravi and thereafter the line of the River Ravi along the boundary
between the tehsils of Gurdaspur and Shakargarh, the boundary
between the tehsils of Batala and Narowal, the boundary between
the tehsils of Ajnala and Shadara, to the point on the River Ravi
where the district of Amritsar is divided from the district of
Lahore. The tehsil boundaries referred to, and the actual course
of the River Ujh or the River Ravi, shall constitute the boundary
between the East and the West Punjab.
3. From the point on the River Ravi where the district is
divided from the district of Lahore, the boundary between the
East and the West Punjab shall turn southwards following the
boundary between the tehsils of Ajnala and Lahore and then the
tehsils of Tarn Taran and Lahore, to the point where the tehsils
of Kasur, Lahore and Tarn Taran meet. The line will then turn
south westward along the boundary between the tehsils of Lahore
and Kasur to the point where that boundary meets the north-east
corner of village Theh Jharollian. It will then run along the
THE AWARD
115
eastern boundary of that village to its junction with village Cathia-
nwala, turn along the northern boundary of village, and then run
down its eastern boundary to its junction with Waigal. It will then
run along the eastern boundary of village Waigal to its junction
with village Klia, and then along the southern boundary of village
Waigal to its junction with village Panjhuwan. The line will then
run down the eastern boundary of village Panjhuwan to its junction
within village Gaddoke* The line will then run down the eastern
border of village Gaddoke toils junction with villageNurwala.lt
will then turn along the southern boundary of village Gaddoke to its
junction withvillage Katluni Kalan. The line will then run down the
eastern boundary of village Katluni Kalan to its junction with
villages Kals and Mastgarh. It will then run along the southern
boundary of village and Katluni Kalan to the north-west corner of
village Kals. It will then run along the western boundary of village
Kals to its junction with village Khem Karan. The line will then
run along the western and southern boundaries of village Khem
Karan to its junction with village Maewala. It will then run
down the western and southern boundaries of village Maewala,
proceeding eastward along the boundaries between village
Mahaidepur on the north and village Sheikhupura Kuhna,
Kamalpuran, Fatehwala and Mahewala. The line will then turn
northward along the western boundary of village Sahjra to its
junction with villages Mahidepur and Machhike. It will then
turn north-eastward along the boundaries between village Mach¬
hike and Sahjra and then proceed along the boundary between
villages Rattoke and Sahjra to the junction between villages
Rattoke, Sahjra and Mabbuke. The line will then run north¬
east between the villages Rattoke and Mabbuke to the junction
of villages Rattoke, Mabbuke and Gajjal. From that point the
line will along the boundary between villages Mabbuke and Gajjal,
and then turn south along the eastern boundary of village Mabbuke
to its junction with village Nagar Aimanpur. It will then turn
along the north-eastern boundary of village Nagar Aimanpur, and
run along its eastern boundary to its junction with village Masteke.
From there it will run along the eastern boundary of village Masteke
116
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
to where it meets the boundary between the tehsils of Kasur and
Ferozepore.
For the purpose of identifying the villages referred to in this
paragraph, I attach a map authorised by the then Settlement
Officer, Lahore District, which was supplied to the Commission
by the Provincial Government.
4. The line will then run in a south-westerly direction down
the Sutlej River on the boundary between the districts of Lahore
and Feiozepore to the point where the districts of Ferozepore,
Lahore and Montgomery meet. It continues along the boundary
between the districts of Ferozepore and Montgomery to the point
where this boundary meets the border of Bahawalpur State. The
district boundaries, and not the actual course of the Sutlej River,
shall in each case constitute the boundary between the East and
the West Punjab.
5. It is my intention that this boundary line should ensure
that the canal headworks at Sulemanke will fall within the territo¬
rial jurisdiction of the West Punjab. If the existing delimitation
of the boundaries of Montgomery District does not ensure this, I
award to the West Punjab so much of the territory concerned as
covers the headworks and the boundary shall be adjusted accord¬
ingly.
7. So much of the Punjab as lies to the west of the line
demarcated in the preceding paragraphs shall be the territory of
the West Punjab. So much of the territory of the Punjab Province
as lies to the east of that line shall be the territory of the East
Punjab.
K.V.K. SUNDARAM
Officer on Special Duty
CHAPTER VII
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
The communal riots in the Punjab have been differently des¬
cribed by various persons. Stephens gives them the name of civil
war and writes, “If non-military carnage and commotion estimated
to have caused about 500,000 deaths.cannot- be called a civil
war, it is hard to guess what it could be.”^ Brecher terms them
“the war of succession” and explains in a footnote, “The term was
coined by Sir Evan Jenkins, the last Governor of the undivided
Punjab, to designate the communal riots in the Punjab.”^ Accord¬
ing to Tinker, a large number of people were involved in these
riots and he terms these riots as a “people's war.”^ Whatever we
may call these civil disturbances, no one can deny that the Punjab
was caught in the grip of communal riots in March 1947. The
Punjab Disturbed Area Act and the Punjab Public Safety Ordinance
were promulgated to meet the evil.'* The military had been called
out several times to quell the disturbances.® The Home Secretary
of the Punjab Government gave the following figures of casualties
in the districts of Multan and Rawalpindi in his communication
No. 9418 dated 25th July 1947 :
District No. of persons killed or burnt alive
Hindus Sikhs Muslims Other Total
Multan 171 1 14 — 186
Rawalpindi 2263 — 38 — 2301
Multan
Rawalpindi
No. of persons injured
87 2 59 19 167
234 — 126 — 360
1. Ian Stephens, Pakistan, London 1963, p. 80
2. Brecher, Nehru, A. Political Biography, London 1959, Foot Note pp. 318-19.
3. Hugh Tinker, Indian and Pakistan, London 1962, p. 107.
4. Punjab Government communique dated March 19, 1947. The Tribune,
dated 20th March 1947.
5. Northern Command Communique, The Tribune, 23rd March 1947.
118
partition of PUNJAB
Value of property burnt
Multan Rs. 20,00,000 (Hindu property approx.)
Rawalpindi Rs. 14,00,006 —do—
Regarding these figures the Deputy Commissioner of Rawalpindi
stated, “greater accuracy is not possible owing to the wide-spread
nature of the disturbances and the breakdown of the normal
administrative machinery. The figures of lives lost are believed to
be the minimum and information has been obtained from the cases
registered with the police. The figures of property destroyed are
also the minimum and are based on claims for compensation
received so far. They did not include losses inflicted where the
population was wiped out and no claims were made.”’
Before August 15, 1947, the communal riots in the Punjab
took the worst turn in some of the districts where there were British
Deputy Commissioners. These districts were Rawalpindi, Multan,
Lahore and Amritsar. Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru, therefore,
stated, “In the Punjab where there was cent per cent British rule,
despite the efforts of certain senior officers murder and arson
continued. The trouble was prevalent most where there were
British officers in charge and the divisions under the control of
either Hindu or Muslim officers, were comparatively quiet.”®
Again, he said, ‘The British were no longer interested because
they are leaving. This probably explains why some officers asked
the victims who came to them for help to go to me or Sardar
Patel for help. They are not desirous of shouldering any further
responsibility and may have become callous.”® According to
Frank Moreas “a few British officials had their hearts fully in the
primary job of maintaining law and order. In the minds of some
of them the prospects of civil chaos in India on the eve of Indep¬
endence was not without its allurement. What better testimony
to the inability of Indian rulers and administrators to control the
6. The Heme Secretary of Punjab’s letter to Secretaries of the Punjab
Boundary Commission, Appendix J., P.P. Vol. VI, p. 228,
7. P.P. Vol. VI, p. 228
8. D.R. Bose, New India Speaks, 1947 (Speeches of Pandit Nehru), p. 162
9. Ibid., p. 165
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
119
communal situation once the strong arms of British authority was
withdrawn.”^®
Ever sirce the outbreak of the communal disturbances in the
districts of Rawalpindi and Multan during the month of March
1947, the communal situation had not improved. Sir George
Abell, Private Secretary of the Viceroy, visited Lahore in the last
week of April and reported that the situation was serious. Accor¬
ding to Sir Evan Jenkins, there was “a grave danger of civil war..^^
Sir Malcolm Darling who had served in the Punjab for a number
of years also visited Lahore in April and noticed that there was
extreme tension and “the province was a smouldering valcano.”^^
When the Partition Plan was announced, the situation in the
Punjab had not improved. Simultaneously with the announcement
of the Partition Plan. “Firm Action to be taken” orders were
issued. Major General J.C. Bruce, the Commander of the Lahore
Area, issued a special order in which he declared on the 3rd June,
“if unfortunately disturbances do arise from the forthcoming
announcement on the future constitution of India we are well
placed in dealing with them.”^^
The Punjab was now divided into three military divisions.
The civil divison of Rawalpindi was put under the command of
Major General Lovett. The civil divisions of Lahore and Multan •
plus districts of Kangra and Ferozepur were placed under the
command of Major-General Bruce. The civil divisions ofJullun-
dur and Ambala minus Gurgaon District were under the command
of General Rees, G.O.C., Northern Command. Lieut-General
Sir Frank Messervy was in overall charge of these commands.
He was to have his tactical headquarters at Lahore. At Lahore,
Amritsar Jullundur and Multan, that substantial forces with tanks
10. Frank Moreas, Jawahar Lai Nehru, New York 1956, p. 329
Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab sent a note to Lord Mount-
batten on 4th August, WAl defending the British Officers vide Document
No 337, Transfer of Power \o\\xvatX\\,Lon6ox\ 1983.
11. Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, page 73
12. The Punjab Disorders, The Hindu, Madras, dated Oct. 11. 1947
13. C. &M., Lahore. 3rd June, 1947
120
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
and artillery had been stationed and in other important towns
like Ferozepur and Lyallpur adequate forces had been in readiness.
The total strength of the military in these places was approximately
three regiments of armoured corps, six regiments of artillery,
27 battalions cf infantry with due proportion of engineers, signals,
medical supply and transport units.All these arrangements
had been made in close consultation with the civil authorities.
The Governor of the Punjab, Sir Evan Jenkins, formed a
Security Council in order to maintain law and order in the
province. It comprised three party leaders in the Legislative
Assembly, viz. Khan Iftikhar Hussain of Mamdot, the leader of
the Muslim League Assembly Party, Bhim Sen Sacher, leader
of the Congress Party, and Sardar Swarar Singh, leader of the Akali
Party. It met daily to review the law-and-order situation in the'Pun-
jab and more particularly in Lahore.^’’ But this Security Council
could not work, as the Muslim League withdrew its representative
from this body.^« It had been openly asserted that the Muslim
League was responsible for the worsening of the situation. Its
representative obviously did not like to take the responsibility for
the stern measures which were likely to emanate from this body
or which came for implementation to it. Moreover, the Viceroy
wanted the Punjab leaders to issue a statement assuring minorities
of fair treatment. Sardar Swaran Singh reported to the Partition
Council that he “had been unable to persuade any of the Sikh
leaders to sign the statement and it was embarrassing for him to
sign it without their support and in such a case it would have
little practical value.Thus the Sikhs had also practically pulled
out of the new machinery.
The authorities in New Delhi were not unaware of the mount¬
ing tension in the Punjab. Lord Ismay writes, “Nevertheless, I
was worried at the prevalence of the idea that it was all now going
14. The Press Communique issued by J.C. Bruce of Lahore Command, C. &
M., 3rd June, 1947 *
15. Ibid, dated June 28, 1947
16. P.P. Vol. IV, page 186
17. Ibid, page 431
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
121
to be plain sailing. I thought that there were still many fearful
obstacles to be overcome and [ was particularly v^orried about
the Sikhs. This warrior sect, which provided many thousands of
splendid recruits for the Indian Army, had every cause to feel
aggrieved. Out of their total population in India of some five
and a half million, no less than four millions were domiciled in
the Punjab. It was, therefore, certain that wherever the boundary
line was drawn roughly two millions Sikhs would soon find them¬
selves citizens of Pakistan, and that many of their holy places
would be under the domination of men of an alien-and to them
a repugnant, faith.One of the measures which was adopted
to deal with the Sikhs was to appoint Major. J M. Shurt on the
staff of Lord Ismay Though the idea was originally moved by
Sardar Baldev Singh, Defence Member of the Interim Govern¬
ment, the Viceroy readily agreed to it, because Major Short had
worked among the Sikhs for recruitment to the Array during the
war and he had some influence with the Akali leaders. He was
brought to India on the 22fid July, 1947, by Lord Israay to work
as his personal assistant. Major Short lived at the residence of
Sardar Raldev Singh. His impression was that the Sikhs were
not satisfied with the 3rd June Plan.^®
Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab wrote several letters
to Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General relating to the poli¬
tical situation in Punjab. One letter relates to his interview he
had with Giani Kartar Singh, an influential Sikh leader. Jenkins
wrote to the viceroy
“He said that he had come to see me about the India
Independence Bill and the Boundary Commission. The Bill made
it clear that if orders were not passed on the recommendations
of the Boundary Commission by 15th August, two new Govern¬
ments would be set up on the basis of the “notional*’ Boundary.
The Sikhs did not believe that fresh orders about the Boundary
would be enforced after 15th August, and wanted to know what
the enforcement arrangements would be. The Sikhs would not
18. Memoirs of Lord Ismay, London, 1962, page 420
19. Statement, Major J.M. Short sent to the writer.
122
partition of PUNJAB
accept the “notional” boundary even provisionally.‘Proceeding,
the Giani said that there must be an exchange of population on
a large scale. Were the British ready to enforce this ? He doubted
if they were, and if no regard was paid to Sikh solidarity, a fight
was inevitable. The British had said for years that they intended
to protect the minorities, and what had happened now was a clear
breach of faith by the British.The Giani at once countered
with an account of S. Baldev Singh’s attitude during the negotia¬
tions. He said that he had urged S. Baldev Singh to publish the
letter in which he had communicated his acceptance of the Plan to
the Viceroy. Sardar Baldev Singh had made it perfectly clear on
behalf of the Sikhs that he was merely accepting the principle of
the Plan, and that there could be no partition based on popula¬
tion alone. The Sikhs were entitled to a homeland just as much
as the Muslims and the Hindus.
“The Giani then elaborated the Sikh claim. He said that
they must have at least one canal system; they must also have
Narkana Sahib; finally the arragements must be such as to bring
three-quarters of at least two-thirds of the Sikh population into
the Eastern Punjab. An exchange of population on a large scale
was essential-he thought that at least 400,000 Sikhs should be
moved to the East and 400,000 Muslims to the West (later in the
conversation he said that the number of Sikhs would be 500,000 or
600,000 and the number of Muslims about one million. Property
as well as population should be taken into account in the ex¬
change, and the Sikhs are on the whole better off than the
Muslims). The Giani asserted that unless it was recognised by
H.M.G the Viceroy and the Party Leaders that the fate of the Sikhs
was a vital issue in the proceedings for the transfer of power,
there would be trouble. I asked how the Giani proposed to effect
his large transfer of population, and what he meant by “one
canal system”. Did he mean in concrete terms that if the Sikhs
got a part of the Montgomery district, from which Muslims could
be transferred to Lyallpur and to which Sikhs could be transferred
from Lyallpur, the Sikhs would be content? The Giani said that
the Sikhs would be content with the whole of the Montgomery
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
123
district and Nankaua Sahib, and that if this could be effected,
the exchange of population would be more or less automatic. On
my pointing out that the inclusion of Nankana Sahib in the
Eastern Punjab would be an extremely difficult operation, he gave
me a long and rather involved account of the communal distri¬
bution of population in parts of the Lyallpur and Sheikhupura
districts, and said that the transfer of Nankana Sahib to the
Eastern Punjab was practicable.
“I then reverted to the somewhat minatory remarks of the
Giani about the attitude of the Sikhs should the new Governments
be established on the basis of the “notional” boundary I asked
exactly what he meant by “other measures”. The Giani replied
that the Sikhs would be obliged to fight. I retorted that this would
be very foolish and enquired how they expected to fight against
trained troops. The Giani said in quite a matter of fact way that
the Sikhs realised that they would be in a bad position and would
have to fight on revolutionary lines-by murdering officials, cutting
railway lines and telegraph lines, destroying canal headworks,
and so on. I reiterated that this seemed to me a very foolish
policy, to which the Giani retorted that if Britain were invaded,
he had no doubt that my feelings would be much the same as
his.
“The Giani was matter of fact and quiet throughout our
conversation, but wept when he made his final appeal. This is the
nearest thing to an ultimatum yet given on behalf of the Sikhs.
They are undoubtedly very puzzled and unhappy, but I see no
reason to suppose that they have lost the nuisance value which
they have possessed through the centuries.”^®
It may be pointed out that it was not possible for the Viceroy
at that time to change the basis of partition which had been agreed
to by the major parties. Had the Viceroy included Sikhs solidarity
or Sikh shrines or even Sikh lands as one of the factors for deter-
ming the boundary line in the Punjab, Mr Jinnah would have
rejected the 3rd June Plan and would have created a deadlock. It
20. Document No. 56 Transfer of Power, Vol XII Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office, London 1983.
124
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
was, therefore, not possible for the Viceroy to change the basis of
partition and risk the entire settlement based on the 3rd June Plan
which was being implemented.
The political pressure exerted by the Sikh leaders by means of
resolution, etc. on the 8th of July, which they celebrated as
Nankana Sahib Day have had a very adverse effect on Mr Jinnah,
who at the very outset said in the meeting of the Partition Council
held on the 10th July, “Although he was doing everything in his
power to retain a hold over the Muslim sections of the population
concerned to honour the undertaking given that the findings of the
Boundary Commission, whatever they were, would be accepted, he
had noticed that the Sikh leaders were still reported to be inciting
their followers to offer active resistance to the decisions which they
might regard as unfavourable. It was reported that active pre¬
parations were being made and oaths to resist were being taken.”
The Viceroy said in reply to Mr Jinnah's remarks, “he had made it
abundantly clear to His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala, S. Baldev
Singh, Master Tara Singh and all other Sikh leaders, with whom he
had interviews, the consequences of any attempt to offer active resis¬
tance. No responsible government would tolerate for a moment
such action which would be met by the immediate employment of
the regular armed forces of India. In view of superiority in aero¬
planes, tanks, artillery, etc. that the armed forces enjoy, such action
would inevitably result in very severe losses being inflicted on those
who would only be armed with rifles and out-of date weapons.”^^
The Viceroy had also assured Maulana Azad “At least on this one
question I shall give you complete assurance. I shall see to it that
there is no bloodshed and riot. I am a soldier not a civilian. Once
partition is accepted in principle, I shall issue orders to see that there
are no communal disturbances, anywhere in the country. If there
should be the slightest agitation, I shall adopt the sternest measures
to nip the trouble in the bud. I shall not use even the armed police.
I will order the Army and Air Force to act and I will use tanks and
aeroplanes to suppress any body who wants to create trouble.^^’*
21. P.P. Vol. IV, page 146
22. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Calcutta, 1959, page 190
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
125
Commander’in-Chief's Proposal for Boundary Force
Lord Mountbatten was very keen to maintain law and order
for the implementation of the 3rd June Plan. He, therefore, asked the
Commander-in-Chief on the lOth July to prepare a plan of action
in the event of possible clashes or disturbances in the neighbour¬
hood of boundaries between the two Dominions. The Com-
mander-in-Chief wrote to the Viceroy :
“Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I was asked by Your Excellency at a recent meeting of the
Partition Council to prepare a plan in case of possible clashes or
disturbances in the neighbourhood of the boundaries between the
two Dominions after the 15th August.
I recommend that the Joint Defence Council should have the
authority of both India and Pakistan Governments to declare any
affected districts to be ‘disturbed area*.
When this has been done, the Supreme Commander acting
on the request of the Joint Defence Council will specially appoint
a British Commander with an adequate who will have
military control over the area and of such troops and air force as
are considered by him to be necessary. These troops etc. should
be allotted by the Commander-In-Chiefs’ of the two Dominions
at the request of the Joint Defence Council.
The British Commander, so appointed, will be responsible to
the Joint Defence Council through the Supreme Commander who,
for this purpose, will temporarily have operational control.
The above procedure would be similar to arrangements I
would make for disturbances on the boundary before the 15th
23. It was decided on the 30th June to establish a Joint Defence Council
under the then Commander-in-Chief The Joint Defence Council was
to consist of Governors-General of India and Pakistan and the Defence
Ministers and other representatives of both the Dominions. Para No 7,
Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Partition Council, dated 30th
June, 1947.
P.P., Vol. IV, page 98
The Governor-General issued the Joint Defence Council Order on August
11, 1947. This order was subsequently amended after the 15th August
by the Joint Defence Council (Amendment) Order 1947.
126
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
August and will apply both in the Punjab and Bengal.
Yours sincerely,
C.J. Auchinleck.”^^
Punjab Boundary Force
The proposals of the Commander-in-Chief were discussed on
the 17th July in the meeting of the Partition Council to which the
Commander-in-Chief had been specially invited. During the
course of discussion, it was made clear that there was no need of
establishing any special military force in Bengal. Such force was
required only in the Punjab where the situation was reported to
be tense. As this force was especially to be established to check
border clashes in the Punjab, it subsequently came to be known
as “Punjab Boundary Force.” The following decisions were
made regarding this force :—
1. “that action to deal with disturbances in the neighbour¬
hood of the boundaries between the two Dominions on
or after the 15ih August should be on the lines suggested
by the Commandcr-in-Chief.
2. “that Major-General Rees, Commander of the 4th
Division, should be appointed Joint Commander on
behalf of both Dominions to control all troops operating
in the defined areas in the Punjab and that the chain of
control from the two Dominion Governments to Major-
General Rees should be through the Joint Defence
Council and Supreme Commander.
3. “that the troops should be in position by the 7th or 8th
of August at the latest.
4. that there should be no change in the law governing the
use of troops in aid of civil power after the 15th August
for such period as these forces were employed on this
work. ”2“
Disputed Districts
The Comraander-in-Chief’s recommendation that “the Joint
Defence Council should have the authority of both India and
24. Sixth Meeting of the Partition Council, P.P., Vol. IV, page 169
Document 102, Transfer of Power, Vol XII,
25. P.P., Vol. IV, p. 181, Case No. PC/47/6/47
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
127
Pakistan Governments to declare any “affected districts” to be dis¬
turbed area could not be accepted because, according to the
Government of India Act of 1935, law and order was a provincial
subject and the Central Government was not empowered to
declare any area of British India as a “disturbed area”. Fortun¬
ately, the Punjab Government had its own Punjab Disturbed
Areas Act 1947, which was already in force in certain districts of
the Punjab. Since this Act was to be effective in the East Punjab
and the West Punjab separately after the 15th August, it was
decided that the Viceroy’s staff in consultation with the represent¬
atives of the East Punjab and the West Punjab Governments and
the Governor of the Punjab should decide the areas which were
to be declard as “disturbed areas.”^®
After discussing the matter with the Governor of the Punjab,
Commander-in*Chief, and the Punjab Partition Committee, it was
recommended to the Partition Council that the following districts
should be declared as disturbed areas and included in the zone
where the Punjab Boundary Force was to operate: Sialkot,
Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery,Lahore, Amritsar,
Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Ferozepur.^’ On the 24th July,
the Viceroy added the Ludhiana District to the list given above on
the ground that “all parties concerned had agreed to it.”2®
Regarding the personnel of the Punjab Boundary Force, it was
decided by the Partition Council on the 17th July that the
Commander-in-Chief would nominate a Muslim and a non-Muslim
officer of suitable seniority as advisers on Major-General Ree’s
stafif.29 24th July, the Viceroy nominated Colonel Ayub
Khan, who later on became the President of Pakistan, as an adviser
to General Rees, Commander of the Punjab Boundary Force.
Brigadier Digamber Singh was nominated from the Indian side.®®
26. Item No. 3, Partition Council’s proceedings dated 22nd July, 1947, P./*.,
Vol. IV, p. 233
27. P.P., Vol. IV, page 233
28. Ibid, pages 247
29. Ibid, pages 181-182
30. P.p, Vol. IV, page 247
128
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
After taking over charge of his specified districts, Major-General
Rees declared in a press conference at T.ahore on August 4, 1947
that the Punjab Boundary Force was responsible for maintaining
law and order, working in collaboration with the civil authorities.-*!
The Communal Riots
In the beginning of August 1947, rioting broke out all over the
Punjab and the situation worsened as the date of the transfer of
power drew nearer. The Pakistan Government subsequently brought
out a number of brochures to prove that the Sikhs were mainly
responsible for these riots. It was argued that in order to carve out
their state, the Sikhs had planned to kill the Muslims in an organized
manner. The Sikh States of Patiala, Nabha, Jind and Faridkot
provided them with ammunition with the result that there started
wide-spread communal riots in the beginning of August.’*^ A
separate booklet was issued relating to the Rashtrya Swayam Sewak
Sangh, a Hindu organization, and it was stated that they had joined
the Sikhs in order to kill Muslims in the East Punjab, In the
meetings of the Security Council, Sir Mohammad Zafarullah, the
Pakistan Government representative, linked the tribal invasion of
Kashmir with the communal riots in the East Punjab resulting in
the mass-killing of the Muslims,®^ The East Punjab Government
and the Indian Government issued a number of pamphlets stating
that the August riots in the East Punjab were a repercussion of riots
in the West Punjab®^ since March 1947. Several books published
in India concur with this view.®® Mr Seetalvad, Indian representa-
31. C <6 M , August 5, 1947
32. Pakistan Government’s Publications regarding the Punjab riots are
A Note on the Sikh Plan ; Sikh Plan in Action , Rashtrya Swayam Sewak
Sang; Tribal Repercussions.
33. United Nations Security Council's Official Record 3rd Year 226th-240 meet¬
ing 1948, page 46
34. East Punjab and Indian Government’s Publications :—
1. Orphans of the Storm
2. Millions on the Move
3. After Partition
35. Some of the books published in India regarding communal riots are :—
Contd. Page 129
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
129
live in the Security Council, in reply to Sir Mohammad Zafarullah
Khan dealt with this point at great length.^*
No Pakistan publication makes mention of the riots in March
1947 in which the Hindus and the Sikhs had been entirely wiped out
in several villages. Whatever be the genesis, the technique and
subsequent development of the pre-partition and the post-partition
communal riots in the Punjab, the following facts can hardly be
denied by any party :
1. In the Punjab, the communal riots first started in the
Muslim*majority areas in the West Punjab in March 1947
and not in August 1947.
2. The Hindus and the Sikhs, who had been victims of
communal riots in the districts of Rawalpindi, Multan,
Attock, etc. migrated to the eastern districts of the Punjab.
This created tension and communal hatred wherever they
settled.
3. From March to August 1947, there had been communal
rioting in the Punjab at short or long intervals.
4. If it is to be taken as true that the Sikhs received ammuni¬
tion from the Sikh States, it was equally true and, in fact,
it had been proved in the Mamdot Enquiry in a Lahore
Court in 1949 that the Punjab Muslim League leaders
purchased in 1946 hand granades, jeeps and other war
material.^’
Contd. from Page 128
1. Muslim Leaguers Attack on the Sikhs and Hindus by Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar
2. Stern Reckoning by G.D. Khosla, New Delhi
3. Inside Pakistan by K.L. Gauba, Bombay
4. Now it can be told by A.N. BaW, }u\\m6ur
36. United Nations Security Council's Official Record,hd year 226th.240 meetir g
1948 page 174
Mr. Seetalved said, “The refugees brought with them tales of horror and
woe...gave rise to a desire to exact retribution and retaliate on the
Muslim population.”
37. Richard Symonds, Making of Pakistan, London 1949, page 82.
130
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
The “Punjab’s virile hot-headed people”^® began now to work
in a spirit of vengeance. The retired Sikh army men along with the
Sikh soldiers of the disbanded Indian National Army organised
small squads to kill the Muslims.®® The Muslims retaliated. Attacks
by the Muslims in the West Punjab were followed by counter-attacks
by the Sikhs and the Hindus in the East Punjab. Reprisal followed
retaliation till the whole province was a seething cauldron of hate
and bestial passions. The poison affected the unlettered and the
ignorant masses as well as the educated middle classes. It spread to
the officials, police and army. The Muslims and the nor-Muslims
vied with each other in degrading themselves to lowest level of
barbarity. The grim sport of murder and repine flourished on both
side of the Punjab with equal ferocity. It is impossible to ascertain
the actual number of casualties as there was a complete breakdown
of the civil administration in both the Punjabs after the 15th August.
However, a popular estimate of casualties is about half a million.
According to Khosla ..“the loss of non-Muslim life has been esti¬
mated at a figure between 200,000 and 250,000. It is believed that
an equal number of Muslims perished’’**® The First Year oj
Pakistan** mentions “the massacre of half a million men, women
and children.”^* Ian Stephens and Michael Edwardes give the
casualty figures to be 500,000 and 600.000 respectively.^® But the
estimate of those Britishers who were actually amidst that holocaust
are more reliable. Lord Mountbatten intimated to Sir Francis
Mudie the following districtwise figures of casualties in the various
38. Sir Malcolm Darling, At Freedom's Door, London 1949, page XII.
39. In the first session of East Punjab Assembly Armed Bands (arrest and
detention). Bill was introduced on the 3rd November. Sardar Swaran
Singh while introducing the Bill said, “During the last two months oir
.certain elements in our society.have taken to arms and formed
themselves into bands and have been committing offences,”
East Punjab Assembly Debates (From 1st November to 8th November,
1947). Vol. I, page 48
40. G.D. Khosla, Stern Reckoning, page 299
41. First hear of Pa'cistan, Pakistan Govt, publication, page 131
Ian Stephens, Pakistun, London 1963, page 80 and Last Years of the British
India, London 1963, page 223
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
districts of the West Punjab after August 15, 1947 :
1 .
Dera Ghazi Khan
250
2.
Muzafargarh
500
3.
Multan
2,500
4.
Montgomery
2,000
5.
Ly all pur
500
6.
Sheikhupura
10,000
7.
Jhang
1,500
8.
Mianwali
4,500
9.
Lahore
10,000
10.
Gujranwala
4,000
11.
Sialkot
3,500
12.
Gujrat
3,000
13.
Jhelum
3,000
14.
Sargodha
3,500
15.
Attock
3,000
16.
Rawalpindi
4,500
17.
Bahawalpur
3,000«
Total
59,250
Lord Mountbatten’s estimate coincides with the figure of
casualties calculated by Sir Penderal Moon who writes, In
December 1947, 1 made some calculations regarding the number of
persons killed in the West Punjab and Bahawalpur. I had pretty
accurate knowledge of the casualties both in Bahawalpur State itself
and in the immediate adjacent West Punjab districts. Regarding
several other districts, I had good information from old
subordinates, especially among the magistracy and police with
whom I was in touch. I was thus able to reach fairly precise figures
for about half the districs of West Punjab and on the basis of those
to make intelligent guesses regarding the remainder. These calcula¬
tion led me to certain figures for the total casualties from August
onwards in the West Punjab and Bahawalpur. The figure was
43. Lord Mounbatten’s letter to Sir Francis Mudie dated July 25, 1962.
The writer noted these figures from the original letter.
132
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
60,000.”^'* According to Moon, the casualties in East Punjab and
the East Punjab States had been heavier than in the West Punjab.
“But these were not twice as high.” According to Moon, the total
casualties were near about 200,000.'^®
Work of the Punjab Boundary Force
The area entrusted to the Punjab Boundary Force constituted
twelve districts and that area excluding Sheikhupura District was
larger than the area of Scotland and Wales combined. It included
26 towns and nearly 17,000 villages with an area of about 37,500
square miles.^« It was found to be too big an area for the two
Divisions of the Punjab Boundary Force to control. The Civil and
Military Gazette, an Anglo-Indian paper of Lahore, commented
that the situation had been so grave that had the entire force of
India and Pakistan been employed, it could not have brought
the situation under control. Under these circumstances, the
Punjab Boundary Force could not work efficiently.^’ It was,
therefore, decided in the Joint Defence Council’s meeting held on
the 25th August in New Delhi that the area covered by the Punjab
Boundary Force should be reduced as rapidly as practicable.^®
The Punjab Boundary Force did its best to quell the ever-
increasing lawlessness but with little success Some of the most
gruesome tragedies were enacted in the area- entrusted to it by its
own units. The Baluch Regiment, a Muslim force, worked havoc
in the town of Sheikhupura in the West Punjab where hundreds
of Hindus and the Sikhs were massacred. Consequently, the Officer
Incharge of this regiment vas arrested, pending court martial
and the troops were confined to barracks and the C.O. was
suspended.^® The Inspector-General of Police, East Punjab,
prepared a report based on daily information issued from the
Punjab Boundary Force from the 15th to the 31st August, 1947
44. Penderal Moon, Divide and Quit, London 1961, page 293
45. Ibid, page 283
46. John Connel, Auchinleck, page 803
47. C. & M. 27th August, 1947
48. Ibid.
49. Sir Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves, page 491
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
133
indicating the number of casualties in the West Punjab districts
under the Punjab Boundary Force. In the East Punjab districts
placed under this force, disorders were not less alarming. In
the Gurdaspur District, troops were reported to have shot dead
over 600 Sikhs, while quelling the disturbances.®® The Punjab
Boundary Force’s communique published on August 30 rightly
summed up the situation when it stated that “The overall situation
in the areas of the Punjab Boundary Force can nowhere be
described as satisfactory.”®* The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore
described the situation as “veritable civil war” and quoted the
instances of communal riots at Sialkot and Sheikhupura. It
commented editorially on the 30th August “when the full story of
Sheikhupura is known, it will stagger the world.”
Abolition of the Punjab Boundary Force
The troops of the Punjab Boundary Force played havoc in
the East Punjab in several towns. The Chief Minister of the
East Punjab wrote to Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru, the Prime
Minister of India, “I have received complaints of atrocities and
excesses committed by Muslim military, both in Jullundur and
Gurdaspur Districts. Kartarpur, Adampur, Thindaur Police
Stations are affected. A Magistrate in Gurdaspur has been
reported to be killed and the military helps these excesses. I
would, therefore, suggest that you wire General Rees as well as
Commander-in-Chief to withdraw this military.”®^
Sir Francis Mudie, the Governor of the West Punjab, was
not at all satisfied with the working of the Punjab Boundary
Force. He told the writer that he wrote a very strong letter to
Lord Mountbatten urging him to abolish this force and entrust the
responsibility of law and order to the governments concerned.
In order to take immediate steps to stem the tide of disorders,
a ecial meeting of the Joint Defence Council was held on the
29th August. It was attended by the Governors-General of India
50. P.B.R. Inspector-General of Police East Punjab’s Report, dated Sept. 8,
1947. File No. C.F. 679—ER—48
51. C. & M., 30th August, 1947
52. P.B.R., C.F. 677-ER-48, page 4
134
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
and Pakistan and was presided over by Lord Mountbatten. The
Prime Minister of India (Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru), the Prime
Minister arid the Defence Minister of Pakistan (Mr. Liaqat Ali
Khan), the Defence Minister of India, (Sardar Baldev Singh) the
Communication Minister, Pakistan (Mr. Abdur Rab Nishtar) the
Governor, East Punjab (Sir Chandu Lai Trivedi), the Governor
West Punjab (Sir Francis Mudie), the Commander-in-Chief, Paki¬
stan Army (General Sir Frank Messervy), Supreme Commander
(Sir Claude Auchinleck); the Commander-in-Chief Indian Army
(General Sir Rob Lockhart) and the Commander of the Punjab
Boundary Force (Major-General Rees) were present. It was
decided that as the task allotted to the Punjab Boundary Force
for helping to maintain law and order in the disturbed areas has
now grown out of all proportion to the responsibilities originally
placed upon it, this force should be abolished with effect from
the midnight 31st August/1st September.s^ It was also decided
that India and Pakistan would each set up a new military head¬
quarters to control the areas which form part of the boundary
area. In the case of India, the 4th Divisional Headquarters would
take over the area on the Indian side of the frontier, comprising
the civil districts of Gurdaspur (as reconstituted), Hoshiarpur,
Jullundur, Ferozepur, Amritsar, the separated part of Lahore
District and Ludhiana. This area was to be directly under Indian
Army Headquarters. In the case of Pakistan, the Lahore Area
Headquarters was to control the boundary area which included
the Shakargarh Tehsil, Gujranwala, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Lyall-
pur and Montgomery Districts. Regarding the forces which
constituted the Punjab Boundary Force, it was decided that all
the units of the Punjab Boundary Force belonging to the Army
of India to be located on the Indian side of the frontier and all
units of the Pakistan Army on the Pakistan side. The mixed
units were to be split up and the Muslims were located on the
Pakistan side and the non-Muslims on the Indian side.^^
regarding Joint Defence Council’s meeting held on
29th August, No. C.F. 679-ER.48
54. Ibid.
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
135
The abolition of the Punjab Boundary Force was a bold and
wise step. It ended the joint control and placed the responsibility
of maintaining law and order in their respective areas on the
Indian and Pakistan Governments. Since communal rioting was
not confined to the districts under the control of the Punjab
Boundary Force, it enabled both the East Punjab and the West
Punjab Governments to deal with the situation as a whole.
Moreover, after the 15th August, the Punjab Boundary Force was
the only force left which had Muslim, non-Muslim and mixed
units. In that vitiating atmosphere of communal rioting, this
force could not remain immune from communal frenzy and act
according to the traditions of impartiality. Alan Compbell John¬
son has said, “Steady and experienced troops began to feel the
tug of communal loyalties deeper even than their military
discipline.55”
The Punjab Boundary Force was organized out of the nucleus
of the 4th Division and was increased to a strength of five infantry
brigades plus local troops of units and formations of the equivalent
of about two divisions. But the strength of many of these units
was far below their proper establishment.®® Thus General Rees
never had the full strength of his command while dealing with the
grave situation prevailing.
When the Punjab Boundary Force took up its duties, the
situation had already deteriorated. General Ree’s description of
it is ; “Communal bitterness was at peak and the masses were
egged on and inflamed by shock groups of resolute and well
armed men determined to fight.’’®’ Evidently, from the very
outset the Punjab Boundary Force had to engage itself to put down
“a large-scale continuous and relentless civil war.”®® According
to John Connel, the biographer of Auchinleck, “Appeals for
military protection were multiplying. The whole refugee probltm
was rapidly assuming the proportions of a major eruption, to cope
55. Mission with Moimtbatten, page 176
56. John Connel, Auchinleck, page 902.
57. Ibid, page 903
58. Ibid, page 903
136
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
with which the civil administration had no more rcsources’'59
except to call the army. The Punjab Boundary Force was a sort
of a “neutral force to assist the civil power to maintain law and
order in the disputed area.”®® But there existed practically no
civil authority to be assised by or to assist the Punjab Boundary
Force. The police and civil intelligence services on which it was
essential to rely in that extraordinary crisis had broken down.®^
It is estimated that it would have been very difficult even for a
strong provincial administration working at a high peak of effici-
ncey to curb the communal riots in August 1947. Field Marshal
Auchinleck rightly assessed the situation, when he wrote to General
Rees : “The complete breakdown of civil administration on both
sides of the border to carry out their most ordinary duties placed
a burden on you and the troops which was quite beyond their
power.”®’
APPENDIX CHAPTER VII
Plan of action in the event of possible clashes or disturbances
in the neighbourhood of the boundaries between the two
dominions after 15th August.
“His Excellency said that he had not had an opportunity to
discuss the note before the Council with the Commander-in-Chief.
He felt if the procedure suggested by the C.-in-C. were agreed
to, it would be essential that the two Dominions should make it
clear that they took full responsibility for the association of British
officers who would be employed on this work and that these officers
were acting under instructions from the Dominion Governments. He
would have a draft statement prepared for the approval of both
sides covering this point, conveying their earnest and sincere assu¬
rance to the minorities that their right would be protected and
ffiat both Governments would adopt a no reprisals policy, and warn¬
ing all concerned that in the event of trouble the full weight of the
proposed machinery would be brought to bear for its suppression.
_ f
59. Ibid, page 905
60. Ibid, Page 901
61. Ibid, page 903
62. Ibid, page 911
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
129
live in the Security Council, in reply to Sir Mohammad Zafarullah
Khan dealt with this point at great length.^*
No Pakistan publication makes mention of the riots in March
1947 in which the Hindus and the Sikhs had been entirely wiped out
in several villages. Whatever be the genesis, the technique and
subsequent development of the pre-partition and the post-partition
communal riots in the Punjab, the following facts can hardly be
denied by any party :
1. In the Punjab, the communal riots first started in the
Muslim-majority areas in the West Punjab in March 1947
and not in August 1947.
2. The Hindus and the Sikhs, who had been victims of
communal riots in the districts of Rawalpindi, Multan,
Attock, etc. migrated to the eastern districts of the Punjab.
This created tension and communal hatred wherever they
settled.
3. From March to August 1947, there had been communal
rioting in the Punjab at short or long intervals.
4. If it is to be taken as true that the Sikhs received ammuni¬
tion from the Sikh States, it was equally true and, in fact,
it had been proved in the Mamdot Enquiry in a Lahore
Court in 1949 that the Punjab Muslim League leaders
purchased in 1946 hand granades, jeeps and other war
material.®’
Contd. from Page 128
1. Muslim League’s Attack on the Sikhs and Hindus by Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar
2. Stern Reckoning by G.D. Khosla, New Delhi
3. Inside Pakistan by K.L. Gauba, Bombay
4. Now it can be told by A.N. Bali, Jullundur
36. United Nations Security Council’s Official Record,3t<i year 226th-240 meetirg
1948 page 174
Mr. Seetalved said, “The refugees brought with them tales of horror and
woe...gave rise to a desire to exact retribution and retaliate on the
Muslim population.”
37. Richard Symonds, Making of Pakistan, London 1949, page S2,
130
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
The “Punjab’s virile hot-headed people”^® began now to work
in a spirit of vengeance. The retired Sikh army men along with the
Sikh soldiers of the disbanded Indian National Army organised
small squads to kill the Muslims.“» The Muslims retaliated. Attacks
by the Muslims in the West unjab were followed by counter-attacks
by the Sikhs and the Hindus in the East Punjab. Reprisal followed
retaliation till the whole province was a seething cauldron of hate
and bestial passions. The poison affected the unlettered and the
ignorant masses as well as the educated middle classes. It spread to
the officials, police and army. The Muslims and the nor-Muslims
vied with each other in degrading themselves to lowest level of
barbarity. The grim sport of murder and repine flourished on both
side of the Punjab with equal ferocity. It is impossible to ascertain
the actual number of casualties as there was a complete breakdown
of the civil administration in both the Punjabs after the 15th August.
However, a popular estimate of casualties is about half a million.
According to Khosla ..“the loss of non-Muslim life has been esti¬
mated at a figure between 200,000 and 250,000. It is believed that
an equal number of Muslims perished’’^® The First Year oj
Pakistan’^ mentions “the massacre of half a million men, women
and children.Ian Stephens and Michael Edwardes give the
casualty figures to be 500,000 and 600.000 respectively.^^ But the
estimate of those Britishers who were actually amidst that holocaust
are more reliable. Lord Mountbatten intimated to Sir Francis
Mudie the following district wise figures of casualties in the various
38. Sir Malcolm Darling, At Freedom's Door, London 1949, page XII.
39. In the first session of East Punjab Assembly Armed Bands (arrest and
detention). Bill was introduced on the 3rd November. Sardar Swaran
Singh while introducing the Bill said, “During the last two months or
so.certain elements in our society.have taken to arms and formed
themselves into bands and have been committing offences,*’
East Punjab Assembly Debates (From 1st November to 8th November,
1947), Vol. I, page 48
40. G.D. Khosla, Stern Reckoning, page 299
41. First Year of Pa'cistan, Pakistan Govt, publication, page 131
42. Ian Stephens, Pakistan, London 1963, page 80 and Last Years of the British
India, London 1963, page 223
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
districts of the West Punjab after August 15,
1947 :
1.
Dera Ghazi Khan
• • •
250
2.
Muzafargarh
• • •
500
3.
Multan
...
2,500
4.
Montgomery
• • •
2,000
5.
Lyallpur
...
500
6.
Sheikhupura
10,000
• 7.
Jhang
1,500
8.
Mianwali
...
4,500
9.
Lahore
• • •
10,000
10.
Gujranwala
•. *
4,000
11.
Sialkot
• « .
3,500
12.
Gujrat
3,000
13.
Jhelum
• • •
3,000
14.
Sargodha
3,500
15.
Attock
• • •
3,000
16.
Rawalpindi
• . •
4,500
17.
Bahawalpur
• a •
3,00043
Total
59,250
Lord Mountbatten’s estimate coincides with the figure of
casualties calculated by Sir Penderal Moon who writes, “In
December 1947, I made some calculations regarding the number of
persons killed in the West Punjab and Bahawalpur. I had pretty
accurate knowledge of the casualties both in Bahawalpur State itself
and in the immediate adjacent West Punjab districts. Regarding
several other districts, I had good information from old
subordinates, especially among the magistracy and police with
whom I was in touch. I was thus able to reach fairly precise figures
for about half the districs of West Punjab and on the basis of those
to make intelligent guesses regarding the remainder. These calcula¬
tion led me to certain figures for the total casualties from August
onwards in the West Punjab and Bahawalpur. The figure was
43. Lord Mounbatten’s letter to Sir Francis Mudie dated July 25, 1962.
The writer noted these figures from the original letter.
132
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
60,000-”^'* According to Moon, the casualties in East Punjab and
the East Punjab States had been heavier than in the West Punjab.
“But these were not twice as high.” According to Moon, the total
casualties were near about 200,000.^®
Work of the Punjab Boundary Force
The area entrusted to the Punjab Boundary Force constituted
twelve districts and that area excluding Sheikhupura District was
lirger than the area of Scotland and Wales combined. It included
26 towns and nearly 17,000 villages with an area of about 37,500
square miles.'’* It was found to be too big an area for the two
Divisions of the Punjab Boundary Force to control. The Civil and
Military Gazette, an Anglo-Indian paper of Lahore, commented
that the situation had been so grave that had the entire force of
India and Pakistan been employed, it could not have brought
the situation under control. Under these circumstances, the
Punjab Boundary Force could not work efficiently.^’ It was,
therefore, decided in the Joint Defence Council’s meeting held on
the 25th August in New Delhi that the area covered by the Punjab
Boundary Force should be reduced as rapidly as practicable.^*
The Punjab Boundary Force did its best to quell the ever-
increasing lawlessness but with little success Some of the most
gruesome tragedies were enacted in the area entrusted to it by its
own units. The Baluch Regiment, a Muslim force, worked havoc
in the town of Sheikhupura in the West Punjab where hundreds
of Hindus and the Sikhs were massacred. Consequently, the Officer
Incharge of this regiment vas arrested, pending court martial
and the troops were confined to barracks and the C.O. was
suspended.^ The Inspector-General of Police, East Punjab,
prepared a report based on daily information issued from the
Punjab Boundary Force from the 15th to the 31st August, 1947
44. Penderal Moon, Divide and Quit, London 1961, page 293
45. Ibid, page 283
46. John Connel, Auchirileck, page 803
47. C. & M. 27th August, 1947
48. Ibid.
49. Sir Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves, page 491
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
133
indicating the number of casualties in the West Punjab districts
under the Punjab Boundary Force. In the East Punjab districts
placed under this force, disorders were not less alarming. In
the Gurdaspur District, troops were reported to have shot dead
over 600 Sikhs, while quelling the disturbances.^® The Punjab
Boundary Force’s communique published on August 30 rightly
summed up the situation when it stated that “The overall situation
in the areas of the Punjab Boundary Force can nowhere be
described as satisfactory The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore
described the situation as “veritable civil war” and quoted the
instances of communal riots at Sialkot and Sheikhupura. It
commented editorially on the 30ih August “when the full story of
Sheikhupura is known, it will stagger the world.”
Abolition of the Punjab Boundary Force
The troops of the Punjab Boundary Force played havoc in
the East Punjab in several towns. The Chief Minister of the
East Punjab wrote to Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru, the Prime
Minister of India, “I have received complaints of atrocities and
excesses committed by Muslim military, both in Jullundur and
Gurdaspur Districts. Kartarpur, Adampur, Thindaur Police
Stations are affected. A Magistrate in Gurdaspur has been
reported to be killed and the military helps these excesses. I
would, therefore, suggest that you wire General Rees as well as
Commander-in-Chief to withdraw this military.”®^
Sir Francis Mudie, the Governor of the West Punjab, was
not at all satisfied with the working of the Punjab Boundary
Force. He told the writer that he wrote a very strong letter to
Lord Mountbatten urging him to abolish this force and entrust the
responsibility of law and order to the governments concerned.
In order to take immediate steps to stem the tide of disorders,
a ecial meeting of the Joint Defence Council was held on the
29th August. It was attended by the Governors-General of India
50. P.B.R. Inspector-General of Police East Punjab’s Report, dated Sept. 8,
1947. File No. C.F. 679—ER—48
51. C. & M., 30th August, 1947
52. P.B.R., C.F. 677-ER-48, page 4
134
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
and Pakistan and was presided over by Lord Mountbatten. The
Prime Minister of India (Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru), the Prime
Minister and the Defence Minister of Pakistan (Mr. Liaqat Ali
Khan), the Defence Minister of India, (Sardar Baldev Singh) the
Communication Minister, Pakistan (Mr. Abdur Rab Nishtar) the
Governor, East Punj'ab (Sir Chandu Lai Trivedi), the Governor
West Punjab (Sir Francis Mudie), the Commander-in-Chief, Paki¬
stan Army (General Sir Frank Messervy), Supreme Commander
(Sir Claude Auchinleck) ; the Commander-in-Chief Indian Army
(General Sir Rob Lockhart) and the Commander of the Punjab
Boundary Force (Major-General Rees) were present. It was
decided that as the task allotted to the Punjab Boundary Force
for helping to maintain law and order in the disturbed areas has
now grown out of all proportion to the responsibilities originally
placed upon it, this force should be abolished with effect from
the midnight 31st August/Ist September.^^ It was also decided
that India and Pakistan would each set up a new military head¬
quarters to control the areas which form part of the boundary I
area. In the case of India, the 4th Divisional Headquarters would c
take over the area on the Indian side of the frontier, comprising ^
the civil districts of Gurdaspur (as reconstituted), Hoshiarpur, d
Jullundur, Ferozepur, Amritsar, the separated part of Lahore g
District and Ludhiana. This area was to be directly under Indian
Army Headquarters. In the case of Pakistan, the Lahore Area si'
Headquarters was to control the boundary area which included it
the Shakargarh Tehsil, Gujranwala, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Lyall- fg
pur and Montgomery Districts. Regarding the forces which ar
constituted the Punjab Boundary Force, it was decided that all ou
the units of the Punjab Boundary Force belonging to the Army “a
of India to be located on the Indian side of the frontier and all to
units of the Pakistan Army on the Pakistan side. The mixed ®il
units were to be split up and the Muslims were located on the wa
Pakistan side and the non-Muslims on the Indian side.®-*
-;- 5r
53. P.B.R. Communique regarding Joint Defence Council's meeting held on 36 .
29th August, No. C.F. 679-ER-48 5?.
54. Ibid. «
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
135
The abolition of the Punjab Boundary Force was a bold and
wise step. It ended the joint control and placed the responsibility
of maintaining law and order in their respective areas on the
Indian and Pakistan Governments. Since communal rioting was
not confined to the districts under the control of the Punjab
Boundary Force, it enabled both the East Punjab and the West
Punjab Governments to deal with the situation as a whole.
Moreover, after the 15th August, the Punjab Boundary Force was
the only force left which had Muslim, non-Muslim and mixed
units. In that vitiating atmosphere of communal rioting, this
force could not remain immune from communal frenzy and act
according to the traditions of impartiality. Alan Compbell John¬
son has said, “Steady and experienced troops began to feel the
tug of communal loyalties deeper even than their military
discipline.®^”
The Punjab Boundary Force was organized out of the nucleus
of the 4th Division and was increased to a strength of five infantry
brigades plus local troops of units and formations of the equivalent
of about two divisions. But the strength of many of these units
was far below their proper establishment.®® Thus General Rees
never had the full strength of his command while dealing with the
grave situation prevailing.
When the Punjab Boundary Force took up its duties, the
situation had already deteriorated. General Ree’s description of
it is ; “Communal bitterness was at peak and the masses were
egged on and inflamed by shock groups of resolute and well
armed men determined to fight.”®’ Evidently, from the very
outset the Punjab Boundary Force had to engage itself to put down
“a large-scale continuous and relentless civil war.”®® According
to John Connel, the biographer of Auchinleck, “Appeals for
military protection were multiplying. The whole refugee problem
was rapidly assuming the proportions of a major eruption, to cope
55. Mission with Mountbatten, page 176
56. John Connel, Auchinleck, page 902.
57. Ibid, page 903
58. Ibid, page 903
136
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
with which the civil administration had no more resources”^
except to call the army. The Punjab Boundary Force was a sort ,|,
of a “neutral force to assist the civil power to maintain law and „
order in the disputed area.”** But there existed practically no
civil authority to be assised by or to assist the Punjab Boundary
Force The police and civil intelligence services on which it was „
essential to rely in that extraordinary crisis had broken down.** ,,
It is estimated that it would have been very difficult even for a
strong provincial administration -working at a high peak of effici- ^
ncey to curb the communal riots in August 1947. Field Marshal ^
Auchinleck rightly assessed the situation, when he wrote to General ^
Rees " ^*The complete breakdown of civil administration on both
sides of the border to carry out their most ordinary duties placed ^
a burden on you and the troops which was quite beyond their ^
power.”®’ St
appendix chapter VII
Plan of action in the event of possible clashes or disturbances s
in the neighbourhood of the boundaries between the two v
dominions after 15th August. 2
“His Excellency said that he had not had an opportunity to
discuss the note before the Council with the Commander-in-Chief.
He felt if the procedure suggested by the C.-in-C. were agreed
to, it would be essential that the two Dominions should make it
clear that they took full responsibility for the association of British
officers who would be employed on this work and that these officers
were acting under instructions from the Dominion Governments. He
would have a draft statement prepared for the approval of both
sides covering this point, conveying their earnest and sincere assu¬
rance to the minorities that their right would be protected and
that both Governments would adopt a no reprisals policy, and warn¬
ing all concerned that in the event of trouble the full weight of the
proposed machinery would be brought to bear for its suppression.
59. Ibid, page 905
60. Ibid, page 901
61. Ibid, page 903
62. Ibid, page 911
f-
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
137
“The Commander- n-Chief said that the disturbed areas in
which this machinery would be brought into operation would have
to be defined, preferably to correspond with civil districts, by the
two Governments or the Partition Council. The troops employed
would be Indian, but there would be a number of British officers in
command. His staff was working out details of the possible areas
which might be involved and the numberof troops required based on
past experience. It was important to employ units of mixed class
composition as a recent experience had shown that where a battalion
composed entirely of one class of soldiers was used, there were
likely to be charges of partiality. So far as the Punjab was con¬
cerned it was his intention to use the 4th Indian Division command¬
ed by Major-General Rees which was already in the area. He would
attach to Major-General Rees’ staff a senior Muslim Officer and a
senior non-Muslim officer as advisers.
“Continuing, the Commander-in-Chi.f emphasized that for the
sake of avoiding confusion in the minds of officers and men who
were conversant with the existing law governing the use of troop in
aid of civil power, there would be no change after the 15th August in
that law for such period as these forces were employed on this work.
“In the course of subsequent discussion, the following points
were made :
(fl) It was not anticipated that there would be very serious
trouble in Bengal with the possible exception of the city
of Calcutta. If, however, the necessity arose, the same
principles should apply in that province. His Excellency
said that he had asked the Governor of Bengal to give
him an appreciation of his ability to maintain law and
order in Calcutta and Bengal generally on the date the
decision of the Boundary Commission was announced.
{b) The troops in the disturbed districts of the Punjab should
be in a position by about the 7th or 8th of August.
(c) The Joint Defence Council should be constituted in suffi¬
cient time to meet in a preliminary way by the first week
of August. In the event of the Defence Member of Pakis¬
tan not being able to attend meetings summoned urgently
to take decisions on operational question as opposed
138
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
to policy questions, the Pakistan High Commissioner in
Delhi might be nominated as his ,representative.
(d) The High Commissioner would be at a disadvantage for
this purpose, as he would be without expert advice. In
cases of urgency, it would be preferable for the two
Governors-General to discuss the matter over the secra-
phone, and to agree upon a line of a action.
(e) Generally speaking, 3 days’ notice of an intended meeting
of the Joint Defence Council should be given.
(/) The legal authority of the Joint Defence Council to de¬
clare martial law in an area should be examined. The
whole question of the composition, powers, responsibility,
etc., of the Joint Defence Council would have to be consi¬
dered separately.
DECISIONS
The Council agreed—
(1) That action to deal with disturbances in the neighbour¬
hood of the boundaries between the two Dominions on or after the
15th August should be on the lines indicated in the Commader-in-
Cheief’s note.
(2) that Major-General Rees, Commander of the 4th Division,
should be appointed Joint Commander on behalf of both Dominions
to control all troops operating in the defined areas in the Punjab,
and that the chain of control from the two Dominion Governments
to Major-General Rees should be through the Joint Defence Council
and the Supreme Commander. The Council noted that the
Commander-in-Chief would nominate a Muslim and a Sikh officer
of suitable seniority as advisers on Major-General Ree’s staff.
(3) that the zones in which the troops would have to operate
should be defined by H. E’s staff in consultation with the
Commander-in-Chief and submitted to the Partition Council for
approval.
(4) that troops should be in position by the 7th or 8th of
August at the latest.
(5) that there should be no change in the law governing the
use of troops in aid of the civil power after the 15th August, for
such period as these forces were employed on this work.
THE PUNJAB BOUNDARY FORCE
139
(6) that details of the organization and the formal resolution
of both Governments in the case of trouble should be incorporated
into the statement which H.E. was having prepared for issue over
the signatures of the members of the Partition Council regarding
protection of minorities’ rights, assurances of ‘no reprisal’ and the
fact that such British officers as would be engaged in this work were
acting under express instructions from and were directly responsible
to the two Dominion Governments.
(7) that a paper should be prepared on the composition,
powers and responsibility of the Joint Defence Council for consi¬
deration by the Partition Council.
Partition Proceeding, Vol. IV, pages 181-183
Document, 148, Transfer of Power, Vol XU,
Her Majestys Stationery Office, London 1983
CHAPTER VIII
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION
The partition of the Punjab “enforced movements of the
people on a scale absolutely unparalleled in the history of the
world.”* “There must be many examples in the bloody history of
mankind where the extent of violence has been as great or even
greater but it is probably true that there has never been such a
huge exchange of population,”* says Horace Alexander. According
to Stephen P. Landas, the Convention of Neviely 1929 between
Bulgaria and Greece and the Convention of La-Usanne 1923,
between Greece and Turkey both “caused the up-rooting of two
million people.”* But in the case of the East Punjab and the West
Punjab, more than eight million people crossed the border.* The
exchange of population between Turkey and Greece, hitherto
known as the biggest of its kind was accomplished in a year or so,
whereas in the East Punjab and the West Punjab the transfer
of eight million people was completed in three months.* In Bulgaria
and Greece, the national minorities had the “right of leaving the
country of origin and emigrating to the other country under condi¬
tions which would guarantee them full value of properties left
behind,”* whereas in the East Punjab and the West Punjab, the
minorities were made to quit their hearths and homes in the most
adverse circumstances, created by communal riots and they had to
reach the country of their destination very often as paupers. Accor¬
ding to Andrus “The massive exchange of population that attended
the partition of the Subcontinent and the conditions under which
1. O.H.K. Spate India And Pakistan, London 1954, page 110
2. Horace Alexander, New Citizens of India, Oxford University Press, page 7
3. Stephen. P. Landas, The Exchange of Minorities, New York 1932 page 3
4. Millions on the Move, Publication Division Govt, of India, page 10
5. Idem
■ 6 The Exchange of Minorities, cit, op. page 3
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION
141
it took place are almost unprecedented in history.-’’
Unlike the transfer of population in the European countries,
the mass migration in the East Punjab and the West Punjab did not
result from any settled Governmental policy. The Congress was
against the principle of exchange of minorities from the very
beginning. Dr Syed Abdul Latif wrote to Nehru in 1939 that
“one of the objects of transitional Constitution is to facilitate and
prepare the ground for the migration of the Muslims and the
Hindus into the zones specified for them so as to develop them
into culturally homogenous States.”* No wonder Nehru rejected it
outright and he was not taken seriously. The partition of the coun¬
try was as yet a spectre that was being fought against tooth and
nail. Latif’s proposal seemed to call for the exchange of population
and areas in the same country. Nehru replied “Your scheme of
redistribution of population and areas in India seems to me
somewhat fantastic from the practical point of view.”® Dr
Rajendra Prasad, the then President of All-India Congress Comm¬
ittee, went a little deeper and put the following questions to Dr
Abdul Latif:
1. “After exchange of population when it is completed, what
do you contemplate to be the area and population of each block
whether Hindu and Muslim ? I am of course assuming that there
would be no Muslim in any Hindu area or no Hindu or Sikh in
any Muslim area.
2. “Is the emigrant to be paid anything beyond the cost of
transport ? It is assumed that he will carry with him all his move¬
ables and will be provided with land in the block to which he is
transferred. Will he be compensated for the immoveables which
he will leave behind ?
3. “Who will pay the cost, the block to which he is trans¬
ferred or the block from which he goes or both and if the last, in
7. J Russel Andrus and Aziz F. Mohammad, Economy of Pakistan^ London
1958, p. 463
8. Nawab Nazir Jang Bahadur, Pakistan Issue, Lahore, 1945, p. 22
9. Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru’s letter, dated 25th December, 1939, Ibid,
p. 22
142
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
what proportion.”^®
Evidently, Latif had never applied his mind to the practical
side of his fantastic proposal and kept silent. No question as to
the exchange of population arose even after the announcement of
the 3rd June Plan. Hindus and Sikhs, who had been living in
N.W.F. and Kabul, were not frightened by the prospect of their
living in a new State, even if it was called Pakistan. NJdhatma
Gandhi during his visit to Lahore said on the 7th August, 1947,
“I am grieved to learn that people are running away from the
West Punjab and 1 am told that Lahore is being evacuated by
non-Muslims. I must say that this is what it should not be.”‘i
Even the terrible communal riots in the Punjab, leading to mass-
migration on both sides, did not shake his faith and it wai at his
instance that the All-India Congress Committee passed the follo¬
wing resolution in November 1947 ; “While it is impossible to
undo all that has been done, every effort should be made to
enable evacuees an 1 refugees from either Dominion ultimately
to return to their homes and to their original occupation urder
the conditions of safety and security
Chowdhury Rehmat Ali, who claimed to be the author of
Pakistan, wrote in h\s **Millat and Mission” in 1942,‘Minorityism’
means the problem created by those religious, social and political
minorities which possess an active consciousness of their own
nationality and consequently oppose their inclusion in or assimil¬
ation by another nation or state. It is a notorious fact that since
the rise of “Nationalism” such minorities have done greater harm
to the nations concerned than ever before and, therefore, most
of the nations for their own safety are trying to get rid of them
by exchange, expulsion or segregation.And these nations see
to it that, whatever the situation, the minorities live rather as
“fifth columnists than as loyal citizens.”^® Again he wrote, “We
10. Dr Rajendra Prasad’s letter dated January 2, 1940. Ibid, page 17-18
11. The Tribune, Lahore, dated 8th August, 1947
12. Pyare Lai, Mahatma Gandhi, Last Phaseyo\ II Ahmedabad, 1958, page519
13. Chowdhury Rehmat Ali, The Millat and the Mission, Lahore, 1944,
pp. 8-9
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION
143
must not have our minorities in Hindoo lands....Not must we keep
Hindoo and/or Sikh minorities in our own lands even if they
themselves were willing to remain with or without any special
safeguards. For they will retard our national reconstruction and
in the times of crisis they will betray us and bring about our
destruction.But Mr Jinnah had on several occasions expressed
his views that the exchange of population was essential along with
the partition of India. On December 10, 1945, he said, “there
will have to be exchange of population if it can be done on purely
voluntary basis.On November 15, 1946, he said, “the exchange
of population will have to be considered seriously as far as possible
especially after this Bihar tragedy.”^® Ten days thereafter at
Karachi, he went further when he declared that “the authorities,
both Central and Provincial should take up immediately the
question of exchange of population.”^’—But neither the Muslim
members in the Central Government nor the Government of
Bengal under the Muslim League moved in the matter. Again
only a few months before the transfer of power and the establish¬
ment of Pakistan, Mr Jinnah declared on the 30th April, 1947 :
“Sooner or later exchange of population will have to take place
and the Constituent Assemblies of Pakistan and Hindustan will
have to take up this matter.”^® It was obviously not an immediate
problem for him Khan Iftikhar Hussain of Mamdot, the
President of Punjab Muslim League had declared earlier that the
“exchange of population offered a most practical solution of the
multifarious problems of the Muslims.” He asserted, “We are
not going to ask Sardar Patel or Dr Khare for it but we will get
it by our inherent strength. The exchange of population will
wipe out the most important argument against Pakistan which
has been persistently fired from the Congress armoury.”^* This
14. Ibid., p, 9
15. Speeches and Writings of Jinnah, Vol. II, edited by Mohammad Ashraf,
Lahore, p. 62
16. Ibid., p. 475
17. Ibid., p. 483
18. The Tribune, Lahore, dated May 1, 1947
19. The Dawn, Delhi, dated Dec., 3, 1946
144
partition of PUNJAB
was obviously a proposal for the exchange of population and
contained a plea for the holocaust that shook the Punjab soon
after. It was a prelude to March 1947 riots in the Muslim
majority districts.
The communal riots of March 1947 unnerved the Sikhs and
Hindus because ihe Sikh and the Hindu population of several vill¬
ages had been wiped out. This convinced the Sikhs that it would
be impossible for them to live safely in the Muslim-majority areas
likely to be included in Pakistan. It was on this account that a
joint meeting of the Panthic Assembly Party, the Working Comm¬
ittee of the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Panthic Pratinidhi Board
passed a resolution on the Nth June, 1947, at New Delhi to the
effect that “the Punjab Boundary Commission should be given
express directions to make recommendations for the transfer of
the Hindu and the Sikh population and property from the western
part of the Punjab to the eastern part after the partition has been
effected on an equitable basis. This conference apprehends that
in the absence of provision of transfer of population and property
the very purpose of partition would be defeated.’ This envis¬
aged action after the partition of India had been accomplished.
As events proved this was a difficult proposition. As Alan Camp¬
bell Johnson, declares : Economically such an exodus seemed to
run counter to the interests of the two new Governments and the
Congress and Muslim League must not be blamed for being averse
to putting it into effect in advance of events.’^*
The Causes of the Mass Migration
There is a controversy regarding the basic causes which led to
the mass migrations on the both sides. Some writers are of the
view that the Sikhs and the Hindus organized their mass exodus in
order to cripple Pakistan economically as they held important
positions in the economic structure of the West Punjab. L.F
Rushbrook William writes, “In Lahore and Lyallpur, they say,
there was an exodus which looked concerted not only of men of
substance in the business and professional life but also of clerks.
20. C. & M. Gazette, dated June 15, 1947
21. “Reflection on the Transfer of Power”, Asiatic Review, July 1952, p. 167
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION
145
minor officials in every Department of Government, nurses,
orderlies, schoolmasters and medical staff. Even prosperous Sikh
farmers are said to have left their land on the assurance that
they would be able to return in six weeks when Pakistan
collapsed.This is a misleading statement. All Government
servants had been asked to choose the place where they would
like to serve.. All over India, Hindus and Muslims, including
the Defence Services, had indicated their option. The public
servants in the Punjab behaved similarly. Whether the rich far¬
mers left in the hope of returning to claim their land after six
months, they could not have taken those lands with them. They
had to leave after what had happened to non-Muslims in some
Muslim-majority districts in the Punjab. Mudie’s letter quoted
below proves that Sikhs of Lyallpur were loath to go, but the
West Punjab Government was determined to drive them out.
Sir Francis Mudie, Goven.or of the West Punjab in 194', told
the writer that Giani Kartar Singh met him at Lyallpur and req¬
uested him to give necessary facilitiis to the Sikhs for going to
India, as they had decided to leave Pakistan. Mudie had assumed
office after partition. Naturally, this meeting took place when
ihings had already started going wrong. Giani Kartar Singh stated
to the writer that he made this request only after he had definite
information that Mr Jinnah had instructed the Governor of the
West Punjab to expel all the Sikhs from Pakistan. Subsequently,
this was confirmed by a letter of Sir Francis addressed to Mr
Jirinah and intercepted by the East Puiijab Police. Sir Francis
Mudie frankly declared, “1 am telling everyone that I do not care
how the Sikhs get across the border, the great thing is to gei rid oj
them as soon as possible. There is still little sign of 3 lakh Sikhs
in Lyallpur moving, but in the end they too will have to go.”^*
22. L.F. Rushbrook William, State of Pakistan, London 1962, p. 45
23. G.D, Khosla, New Delhi page 315—1 wrote to Justice
G.D. Khosla enquiring the authenticity of this letter and was informed
that the photographic copy of this letter was supplied to him by the
East Punjab Government. The text of the letter quoted in '•'Stern
(Contd. at Page 146)
146
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Alan Campbel Johnfon is right when he declared that only the
compulsion of mass-killing and the fear of reprisals could have
brought about mass-migration.
Another significant factor leading to the forced migration
of the non-Muslims from the West Punjab was the “Economic
Rehabilitation Ordinance”. Contrary to the very spirit
of agreement and the statements of the 3rd September where¬
in both the Government of the East Punjab and the West Punjab
had agreed “not to recognize illegal seizure of property belonging
to the refugees,”*® the West Punjab Government issued this
Ordinance. Under it, it authorised the Rehabilitation Commis¬
sioner, West Punjab to assume possession-and control of the
abandoned lands and business undertakings and to grant their
temporary lease for the period of one year. He was also empo¬
wered to permit the occupation of any abandoned building by
the refugees or other persons According to Clause 4 of the
“Economic Rehabilitation Ordinance”, the following powers were
given to Rehabilitiation Commissioner :
(a) To assume possession and control of abandoned lands,
business undertakings
(b) To grant temporary leases of abandoned agricultural
holdings in his possession to refugees for a term not
(Contd. from Page 145)
Reckoning” has got more details than similar letters quoted in other
books Subsequently the writer learnt from Sardar Sant Parkash Singh
Inspector-General of Police 1947 that this letter was intercepted by the
East Punjab Police. This letter was addressed to M.A. Jinnah, Gover¬
nor General of Pakistan. Sir Francis Mudie confirmed to the writer
that It was his letter. He wrote several such letters the copies of which
are now available in India Office Library, London. He stated in this
letter “At Chuharkana in Sheikhupura District I saw between a lakh
and a half of Sikhs collected in the town and round it, in the houses and
roofs and every where. It was exactly like the Magh Mela at Allahabad.
It will take 45 trains to move them at 4000 people per train or if they
arc to stay there they will have to be given 50 tons of ata a day.”
24. Asiatic Review, }\}\y 1952, p. 167
25. C. <6 M. September 4. 1947
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION
147
exceeding one year.
(c) To arrange for the reopening and carrying on of any
abandoned business or undertaking.
{d) To permit the occupation of any abandoned buildings
in his possession by refugees or other persons
Consequently, not only the houses and shops of the Hindus
and the Sikhs of Lahore who had left their homes in panic were
allotted to the Muslim refugees but the forcible occupation by
the Muslim refugees of the properties left by the Hindus and the
Sikhs was also legalized. Even before the issue of this ordinance,
the authorities in Lahore were responsible for the forcible occu¬
pation of shops and houses belonging to the non-Muslims.'*^’ The
Civil and Military Lahore, editorially pointed out on 4th
September, 1947, “It is a n oot point legally if the authorities
are empowered to remove locks and occupy premises without first
ascertaining if the owners are dead or unwilling to return.it
is open to question if the authorities can refuse to allow the
owners when they return to re-occupy their houses. The Hindu
businessmen who had left their homes in Lahore in panic on
returning to the city found their houses occupied by the Muslims.
In one case the Hindu owner of the house was not only refused
permission to make an inventory of his furniture that he had left
behind but was actually assaulted.’’ The disposal of the Hindu
and Sikh properties in this way without knowledge or consent ot
their owners was “another form of confiscation,”’® which com¬
pelled the Hindus and the Sikhs to leave Pakis*^an for good. The
Muslim refugees, in order to avail themselves of the houses and
business of the non-Muslims, created panic and disorder to turn
out the Hindus and the Sikhs. Sir Geoffrey Prior, Agent to the
Governor-General in Baluchistan analysed the causes of migra¬
tions. He wrote, “the reason appears simply to drive out the
minority community and enjoy the fruits of business which they
have built through many years. The attitude of these persons
26. West Punjab Ordinance No. IV, 1947, vide Appendix
27. C. & M. dated Sept. 10, 1947
28. The Indian News Chronicle, New Delhi, dated Oct II, 1947
148
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
to my mind is like that of a loathsome vulture who sits by a dying
animal waiting to pick up its bones.’'**
The following were some of the general causes which led to
the mass migrations in the East Punjab and the West Punjab.
Role of Refugees
The exodus of refugees from the West Punjab was mostly
responsible for the trouble in the East Punjab.®® The non-Muslim
refugees had been migrating ever since the disturbances in the
districts of Rawalpindi, Multan and other areas. A camp for
non-Muslim refugees had already been started at Wah, District
Attock, because “the population” in these areas often with the
convenience and even with the encouragement of the Government
officials committed atrocities on the non-Muslims.”** Wherever
these refugees went, they carried with them their tales of woe and
sufferings, creating tension and panic. The Muslim leaders
seldom, if even, expressed any regret or condemned these attacks
on the non-Muslims. There had been many instances where the
Muslim ruffians had killed individual Sikhs,®* and Hindus. Accor¬
ding to Master Tara Singh, it was in this atmosphere of frustration
that the Sikhs and Hindus in the East Punjab resorted to retalia¬
tion.®* Following the disturbances, at Amritsar, and the Hosh-
iarpur rioting, arson and murder broke out in other districts.
As the refugees progressed eastwards, communal troubles also
spread, causing the migration of the Muslims from the East
Punjab. What had happened in the West Punjab was re-enacted
in the East Punjab in August and September on a large scale,
even with more ferocity.**
Over large areas in the East Punjab, the Sikh mobs attacked
29. C.&M Sept. 12, 1947
30. After Partition, Publication Division, Govt, of India, p. 40
31. Ibid.
32. Farrukh Amritsari, AT/ioa/i Ki Holt (.Urdu). Transcribed copy S.H.R.
1963, page 38
33. Master Tara Singh’s letter to Sardar Patel, Deputy Prime Minister of
India dated the 14 August, 1947, S.H.R. 1815
34. Ibid.
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION
149
almost every Muslim village, killed a large number of Muslims and
harried the columns of Muslim refugees. At places, like Dasua,
District Hoshiarpur, where the Muslims were in a majority, they
accommodated a large number of the Muslim refugees and armed
themselves with firearms, swords, spears, etc. There were open
fights between the hostile mobs. One Jamadar, who was on leave
in his village in District of Jullunder, wrote to a Major in the
Eastern Command on the 23rd August : “This country has become
a battlefield since the 16th August. One village attacks another
village and one community another community. Nobody could
sleep for a week. Villages are being destroyed and thousands are
being killed or wounded. Smoke-fires are seen everywhere all
around my village. Everyday too many casualties take place in
this country.”®®
This was further followed by counter retaliation with attacks
on minorities in the West Punjab. “A reliable British Lieutenant
Colonel in the Pakistan Army stated on the 13th of September,
1947 that some 250 armed Pathans from the Frontier have drifted
into Lahore and the surrounding villages.”®* The same brutalities
of death and fire were again perpetrated on the Hindus and Sikhs
who were still in Lahore and its surrounding areas. The Muslims
in the West Punjab saw that by attacking the Sikhs and Hindus
who owned property and land, they could acquire their properties.
Exactly the same thing happened in the East Punjab where the
Sikhs and tha Hindus attacked the Muslims to drive them out in
order to acquire their lands.
Transfer of Civil and Public Officers
One of the most important factors which paved the way for
the law of nemesis to work in the East Punjab and the West
Punjab was the exchange of Deputy Commissioners, the
Magistracy and other high officials belonging to the minority
community in the opting out process provided by the Punjab
Partition Committee. Their departure from amidst the minorities
35. Sir Francis Taker, While Memory Serves^ London, 1950, p. 431
36. Ibid., page 479
150
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
to whom they belonged undermined their sense of security in that
tense atmosphere of communal rioting.’^’ The very presence
of a strong officer belonging to a minority had a sufficient deterrent
effect on the majority community. The District Liaison Officer,
Gujranwala wrote that “it is a fact admitted even by the Muslims
that the non-Muslim Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala
controlled the situation with a strong hand even though trouble
had been brewing for a long time and tension grew from day
today. His departure was a signal to the Muslim Officers of the
district who openly became hostile to the non-Muslims.’’^® One of
the most conspicuous exceptions was that of a Muslim Deputy
Commissoner of Shahpur. According to the District Liaison
Officer, Shahpur, “it was due to his presence that the district had
been much quieter than many districts.”®*®
The officers, who had been recently transferred as a result of
the partition, were themselves affected by communal rioting.
After taking charge of their new posts, they incited retaliation, as
in the case at Bhakkar, District Mianwali, West Punjab. The
District Liaison Officer, Mianwali wrote, “on the afternoon of the
2nd September the Muslim Zamindars went to pay their respects to
the newly arrived Subdivisional Officer, who had been relieved
from Gurdaspur. Some of the leading Hindus of the town were
also there. In the presence of all these persons the Sub divisional
Officer said that he was simply astonished to find that so far
nothing had taken place at Bhakkar whereas in the Gurdaspur
District the Sikhs had raped and abducted Muslim girls and
murdered and looted innumerable innocent Muslims. On the 3rd
September, there was a beat of drum and a mob, two or three
thousand strong, entered the bazaar and set fire to the shops of
the non-Muslims.”*®
* Infection* of Police
The police officers can hardly escape the responsibility for the
37. L.A.R, Report o/D.L.O,, Muzafargarh
38. Ibid., File No. LIX/2 Report of D.L.O.t Gujranwala
39. Ibid., File No. LIX/7, Report of D.L.O., Shahpur
40. Ibid. File No. LIX/8, Report of D.L.O., Mianwali
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION
151
expulsion of the minorities both in the West Punjab and the East
Punjab. In the united Punjab, 74.1 per cent of the regular police
force was Muslim and 78.2 per cent of the additional police was
Muslim.41 The East Punjab Government could hardly be expected
to depend on the Muslim police helping them in keeping law and
order. Almost all the Museim constables had opted for the West
Punjab. As some of the Muslim constables fled to Pakistan with
equipment, etc. in the border districts of the East Punjab, the
East Punjab Government decided to relieve the Muslim constables
at once.42 Consequently, they were relieved at Amritsar on the
10th August. This greatly unnerved the Muslims and undermined
their sense of security. At places, police officials in the West
Punjab did every thing to turn out Hindus and the Sikhs. The
District Liaison Officer, Gujranwala, reported that a police officer
of Nawshera Virkan (District Gujranwala) “proclaimed with a beat
of drum that the Kafirs should accept Islam or be massacred. He
collected Muslims at a bridge on the canal and told them that
they should kill and loot the non-Muslims.” The worst instance
of such conduct was that of a police officer at Kamoke (District
Gujranwala) where non-Muslim girls were distributed among
police officers, their friends and relatives after the massacre of the
passengers of a refugee train there.^®
In the East Punjab, new policemen had to be recruited because
out of about 20,672 strong police force of the united Punjab, East
Punjab had been left with only 7,185.^^ The policemen who had
been transferred from the West Punjab had seen communal rioting
and were themselves affected. In the new recruitment, most of the
policemen were refugees from the West Punjab. In this way, the
newly organized police force in the East Punjab was infected with
the commnual virus. When trouble started in the East Punjab,
instead of controlling it, these policemen abetted the wrong doers.
“We must also confess that there was a regrettable lack of honesty
41. G.D. Khosla, Stern Reckoning, Foot note, p. 278
42. Document No 432, Transfer of Power Vol XII, London., 1983.
43. L.A.R,, Report of D.L.O., Gujranwala
44. Punjab on the March., 1957 p. 2
152
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
of purpose on the part of the police and certain other agendas in
charge of the maintenance of law and order. This was found
especially marked in the railway police in Ambala and a number
of their men had to be arrested on the charges of looting and
murder in other districts also.”<® It had been rightly stated by
one of the staff officers of the G.O.C. Eastern Command : “There
is no doubt whatsoever that the police of both the East Punjab and
the West Punjab joined in the slaughter and looting of the
minority communities.”^*
Indifference of Dominion Governments
A decision in favour of the exchange of minorities by the
Dominion Governments would have uprooted the entire Muslim
population in India and non-Muslim population in Pakistan.
It would have created a gigantic problem for both newly born
States. Neither all Muslims were willing to leave India nor were
all the non-Muslims anxious to leave Pakistan. A compulsory
exchange of population was impossible ; all that could be attemp¬
ted could have been confined to driving the Muslims from India
and the non-Muslims from Pakistan. This would have raised the
further question of evaluating their immoveable properties. It
was on this account that the two Governments did not favour the
idea of the exchange of population. On the other hand, the
ever-deteriorating situation in the East Punjab and the West Punjab
demanded firm action and a clear-cut policy. When the problem
of the Hindu and Sikh refugees in Pakistan was discussed, in the
Partition Council’s meeting held on the 5th August, Mr Liaqat
Ali Khan said, “This item may be taken up at the next meeting
of the Council, as he had not had sufficient time to study the
papers” and at the same he said, ‘refugees from the States should
also be considered. There had recently been serious trouble
in the Alwar State and 200 refugees, men, women and children
from that place had arrived in Delhi yesterday.”*^ Sardar Patel,
the Deputy Prime Minister of India, asserted in a note “The
45. G.D.Khosla Stem Reckonings page 280
46. While Memory Serves, page 491
47. P.P. Vol. IV, page392
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION 153
Indian Railways in the circumstances consider it most inadvisable
to run special trains from India to Karachi unless arrangements
are made at the other end to run an equal number of trains for
transporting men wishing to come over to India.”*® Both the
Indian and Pakistan Governments could not agree on a compre¬
hensive plan to meet the everdeteriorating situation in the East
Punjab and the West Punjab. The riots, arson, murders, loot
and abduction of women were spreading like wild fire, setting a
chain of retaliation and counter-retaliation, uprooting the minorit¬
ies on both sides of the border. The people belonging to the
minority community were fleeing. Under these conditions of a
grave nature, the representatives of India and Pakistan agreed
on the 17th August, 1947 : “The Governments of the East Punjab
and the West Punjab will give maximum assistance towards eva¬
cuation of refugees from one province to another and will make
necessary arrangements for refugees prior to evacuation. The
Central Governments will give whatever assistance may be needed
for maintaining services and communication.”*®
Vague Decision
As is evident from the wording, this decision was vague and
of a negative character. Normally, the term refugee is used for
persons taking or seeking refuge in another country. Whether
the members of the minority communities who were encircled by
hostile mobs in their own houses and streets were covered by that
term was not clear. The most unfortunate aspects of this decision
was that the Prime Minister of Pakistan asserted that the purpose
of this decision was to evacuate those persons who wished to
migrate and were afraid of remaining in their homes and this
decision was to be applied only to the Muslims of the Jullundur
Division. He said in a statement, “We had indeed hoped that
the evacuation of Muslims from East Punjab would not extend
to Ambala Division.”®® The Deputy Prime Minister of India
48. Ibid, page 478
49. Concerning Evacuee Property Government of India Publication, psge 8
50. Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan’s statement, C. & M. Gazette^ October 10, 1947
154
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
was of the view that if the Hindus and Sikhs could not live in
peace and honour in the West Punjab and the Government of
India have no means of ensuring this primary condition, it is
better to allow migration, which is going on to find its natural
termination by a complete exchange of population between the
two Punjabs”.®^
Mutual Differences
The leaders of Pakistan who had recently taken the reins
of Government in their hands were afraid of the Indian leaders
visiting Pakistan in order to help and alleviate the sufferings of
Hindus and Sikhs stranded in Pakistan. Sir Francis Mudie,
the newly appointed Governor of West Punjab wrote to the
Governor-General of Pakistan on the 5th September : “We had
from our points of view a successful meeting with Nehru, Patel
and Company on Wednesday (3rd September). The main fight
was over certain proposals of the East Punjab by which their
troops of officials would be allowed to enter West Punjab on
various pretexts. Finally, I had it conveyed to Nehru that the
Conference would break down unless they gave way which they
did. I hope that we have now seen the end of visits to this
province of Nehru and his fellow politicians.”®" It may be
pointed out that only on the previous day (2nd September) the
Sikhs and the Hindus of Lyallpur had requested Pandit Jawahar
Lai Nehru to pay them a visit every now and then and Pandit
Nehru with the consent of Mr Liaqat Ali Khan had agreed to
this request. But the very next day, this possibility was ruled out.
It had a very adverse effect on the minorities in the West Punjab.
False Rumours and Resultant Panic
Flow false and baseless rumours spread by the refugees
wrought havoc can be estimated from the Sheikhupura massacre
of non-Muslims which has often been quoted as an example of
the expulsion of the non-Muslim minorities from the West Punjab.
51. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 6, 1947
52. G.D. Khosle Stern Reckoning, page 315
53. C. & M. September 3, 1947
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION
155
The Muslim refugees reached Sheikhupura on the 21st August.^*
Soon after, the Additional District Magisterate received a telegram
that the Sikhs had attacked Joyoanwala Canal Colony and the
Muslims living there. This telegram had been sent by the
Subdivisional Officer, Canals. A curfew order was promulgated
on the town from 6 p.ra. to 6 a.m, during which the houses of the
Hindus the Sikhs were set on fire. On the following day, the Baluch
Regiment of the Punjab Boundary Force fired indiscriminately
on the Hindus and the Sikhs, with the result that hundreds of men,
women and children were massacred. It was subsequently found
out that the story of the attack by the Sikhs was entirely baseless.'®
The District Liaison Officer Montgomery, wrote “On the
auspicious day of Id-ul-Fittar on the 18th August at 3 p.m. a
rumour was set afloat in the town that a batch of Sikhs had
attacked iMuslim women who had gone to celebrate Id-ul-Fittar
in the Partap Garden. The Muslim National Guard volunteers
ran to the spot with naked sword shouting provocative slogans
and inciting the Muslim masses to rise and slaughter Sikhs,”
Wherever the trouble was started,” he concludes “the attackers
had always taken shelter behind the false plea that the Sikhs
intended to attack and had taken the initiative. Shouts were
raised to collect Muslims and to provoke them to attack the non-
Muslims. As a result of these attacks, non-Muslims inhabiting
the countryside were forced to migrate.”®® The D.L.O., Gujrat
wrote, ‘’On the 11th August false and wild rumours were set afloat
that the Sikhs were going to attack the Muslims, whereupon the
Muslim Goondas (ruffians) took the law into their own hands and
with the help of Muslim gangsters of the neighbouring village made
54. C. & M. dated 3rd September, 1947
55. C. & M. dated 27th August, 1947. Soon after Pt. Jawahar Lai Nehru
visited Sheikhupura and he held Sheikhupura administration responsible
for this tragedy. The Governor of the West Punjab wrote to the
Governor General of Pakistan “Pt. Nehru by his hectoring manner did
considerable damage to the morale of the district administration of
Sheikhupura” Stern Reckoning, p. 316
56. L.A.R., D.L.O. Montgomery, File No. LIX/2
156
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
concerted attack on peaceful and anxious non-Muslims citizens of
Gujrat”/’
The minorities in the East Punjab and the West Punjab were
faced with hostile mobs, communally infected militarys® and police
forces and infuriated refugees who wanted the possession of their
houses, lands and business undertakings. Loot, murder, arson
and the abduction of women and children perpetrated at other
places left them with no opinion but to migrate and leave the
areas in which they and their ancestors lived for centuries.
APPENDIX CHAPTER VIII
The West Punjab Ordinance No. IV, September 9. 1947.
(An ordinance to provide for Economic Rehabilitation in
West Punjab.)
WHEREAS the Governor of West Punjab is satisfied that
circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take
immediate action to restore and maintain the economic life of
the Province and to ensure the orderly settlement of persons who
have taken refuge in the Province on account of the late distur¬
bances in the adjoining territory of East Punjab ;
NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred
by section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Gover¬
nor of West Punjab is pleased to make and promulgate the
following Ordinance, namely :
1. (1) This Ordinance may be called the West Punjab
Economic Rehabilitation Ordinance, 1947.
(2) It shall extend to the whole of the West Punjab.
(3) It shall come into force at once.
2. (1) The Provincial GDvernmeiit may, by notification
in the official Gazette, appoint a Rehabilitation
Commissioner for the Province, and Assistant
Rehabilitation Commissioners for such local areas
as may be specified in the notification.
(2) The Director of Industries, West Punjab, shall be
Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner for the
57. Ibid, D.L.O. Gujarat, File No. LIX/11
58. Vide Chapter VII, The Punjab Boundary Force
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION
157
Province, and may exercise all the powers of the
Rehabilitation Commissioner in respect of industrial
undertakings dealt with under this Ordinance ;
provided that in the discharge of his functions
under this Ordinance, the Director of Industries
shall be subject to the control of the Rehabilitation
Commissioner, and shall comply with all instructions,
whether special or general, issued by the Rehabilita¬
tion Commissioner.
Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, the
powers and duties of the Rehabilitation Commissio¬
ner shall extend to the following matters, namely :
(a) to repair the dislocation in the economic life ol the
Province caused by the abandonment of property
and the closing down of business undertakings, on
account of the owners, or, as the case may be, the
tenants, employees or workmen having left the
Province in consequence of the late disturbances:
and
(b) to secure the orderly absorption into the economic
structure of the Province of persons who have sought
refuge in the Province on account of the late dis¬
turbances in the adjoining territories.
(1) The Rehabilitation Commissioner may make such
general or special orders, not inconsistent with this
ordinance or any other law for the time being in force,
as may be necessary for the discharge of his
functions ; provided that no order of a general
nature shall be made without the previous approval
of the Provincial Government.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality
of the powers conferred by the preceding subsection,
the Rehabilitation Commission may
(a) assume possession and control of abadoned lands,
business and undertakings;
(b) grant temporary leases of abandoned agricultural
158
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
holdings in his possession to refugees, for a term not
exceeding one year ;
(c) arrange for the reopening and carrying on of any
abandoned business or undertaking ;
(d) permit the occupation of any abandoned building in
his possession by refugees or other persons ;
(e) require the owner or manager of any business or
undertaking to give employment to refugees ;
(f) require the letting of storage and residential accom- .
modation to refugees, or to any other persons ;
(g) requisition any moveable property ; and
(h) summon, by notice, any person who, in his belief,
possesses any relevant information or document
concerning any evacuee property, business or under¬
taking to make and sign a statement or to produce
such document and permit copies to be taken of
any part thereof.
5. Whenever possession or control is assumed by any
authority empowered by or under this Ordinance of any abandoned
land, building, business or undertaking, such authority shall send
a copy of its proceedings, containing all available particulars of
the location and the ownership of the property, business or under¬
taking, to the Custodian of Evacuee Property for record in his office.
6. The Rehabilitation Commissioner shall not grant a lease
of any immoveable property, if in respect thereof there is an exist¬
ing lease and the lessee is ready, able and willing to carry out the
conditions thereof, and any such lease granted by the Rehabilitation
Commissioner shall take effect according to its tenor, notwith¬
standing anything contained in any instrument of lease, grant
or other demise whatsoever, which may be inexistence in relation to
the same land.
7. Whenever any property is requisitioned under the pro¬
visions of this Ordinance, the owner thereof shall be paid such
compensation as the Rehabilitation Commissioner may determine.
8. If in the opinion of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, it
is necessary for the discharge of his functions that he should assume
NATURE AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION
159
possession or control of any abandoned property, business or under¬
taking which is in the possession or under the control of a Cus¬
todian of Evacuee Property, or any other persons authorised by
any law for the time being in force, the Rehabilitation Commissi¬
oner may by order in writing require such Custodian or other
person to deliver possession or control of such abandoned property,
business or undertaking lo him, and such Custodian or other
person shall forthwith comply with such order.
9. No suit, prosecution, or other legal proceeding shall lie
against the Provincial Government, the Rehabilitation Comm¬
issioner, or any person acting under his direction, for anything
which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance
of this Ordinance.
10. The Provincial Government may, by notification in the
official Gazette, make rules providing for :
(a) the delegation of powers by the Rehabilitation
Commissioner to the Deputy Rehabilitation Commi¬
ssioner, or an Assistant Rehabilitation Commiss¬
ioner ;
(b) the respective powers of the Deputy Rehabilitation
Commissioner and the Assistant Rehabilitation
Commissioners ;
(c) the manner in which general orders made by the
Rehabilitation Commissioner shall be published ;
(d) the procedure to be adopted by authorities empowe¬
red under this Ordinance; and
(e) generally for carrying out the purposes of this
Ordinance.
11. In this Ordinance, unless the context otherwise requires :
(a) the expression “abandoned”, in any reference to a
business or undertaking, means such a business or
undertaking as has ceased wholly or partially to
operate owing to the flight of its owner, or any of
the employees (including workmen) from the Province
in consequence of the late disturbances, and in any
reference to any land or building, means any such
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
property as has been left unoccupied owing to the
flight of the owner, tenant or occupier, for the afore¬
said reasons;
(b) the expression “evacuee” means any person who,
being a resident of the Province, has gone away to
some place outside the Province since the 1st January
1947, on account of the late disturbance, or who
cannot, by the exercise of due diligence, be traced
at his usual place of residence or business in the
Province.
(c) the expression “refugee” means a person who has
taken refuge in the Province on account of the late
disturbance in the territory of East Punjab;
(d) the expression “Custodian of Evacuee Property”
means the Custodian of Evacuee Property appointed
under the West Punjab Evacuee Property (Preserva¬
tion) Ordinance, 1947, but does not include a Deputy
Custodian or an Assistant Custodian of Evacuee
Property appointed under that Ordinance;
(e) the expressions “business” and “undertaking” do
not include any business in the nature of banking;
(f) the expression “the Province” means the Province
of West Punjab.
R.F. MUDIE
Governor of West Punjab
M.R. KAYANI
Secretary to Government. West Punjab
Legislative Department.
CHAPTER IX
MIGRATION
The partition of the Punjab was not intended to, and did not,
solve the minority problem. More than four million Muslims
were left in the East Punjab,^ and about four million Hindus
and Sikhs in the West Punjab.^ On account of continual commu¬
nal riots since March 1947, the Sikhs and the Hindus had been
migrating to the districts subsequently included in the East Punjab,
and the Muslims, after the August riots, to the Muslim-majority
districts included in the West Punjab The stream of displaced
Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims got swollen into a big torrent just after
the transfer of power and the announcement of Punjab Boundary
Award, The minorities of the Central districts of the erstwhile
united Punjab had lost every hope of being included in the newly
created province of their choice. Both the East Punjab and the
1. Muslim in Ambala Division, according to the Census of 1941 13,18,136
... do ... Jullundur Division 18,77,742
... do ... Gurdaspur (minus Tehsil)
Shakargarh 4,40,323
... do ... Amritsar District 6,57,695
Tctal 42,93,896
2. According to the Census of 1941, Hindu, Sikh, Adharmis,
Scheduled Castes and Jainis, etc., in
Rawalpindi Division 6,61,762
Multan Division 14,72,394
Lahore Division (minus Amritsar District Tehsils of Batala,
Gurdaspur and Pathankot of Gurdaspur District). 15,67,240
Total 37,01.396
It is generally believed that in 1947, about six million Hindus and Sikhs
migrated to India from West Pakistan including the West Punjab, North
West Frontier Province, Sind and Bahawalpur State, etc. and about six
million Muslims migrated from India including the East Punjab, the East
Punjab States, Delhi, etc. to West Pakistan.
162
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
West Punjab Governments, therefore, decided “to give maximum
assistance for the evacuation of refugees from one province to
the other.”® But a large-scale exodus of the minorities was not
expected and no specific machinery was set up to implement this
decision. On the 25th August, the newly appointed Governor
of the East Punjab wrote to the Commander of the Punjab Boun¬
dary Force to effect the evacuation of the refugees from West
Punjab : “My Ministry and general public in East Punjab are greatly
concerned over reports of large numbers of non-Muslims being
stranded in places like Chichawatni, Montgomery, Okara, Arifwala
and Pakpattan (in Montgomery District), Pattoki, Chunia, Raiwind
(in the Lahore District), Sialkot, Narowal and Pasrur in the Sialkot
District and Sheikhupura and Gujranwala. I shall be grateful,
if effective military protection could be ensured for these refugees.'*
1 realize, however, that this may not be possible and many refugees
would like to evacuate. In that case, I would earnestly request
you to arrange for evacuation by road of the refugees from Mont¬
gomery and Lahore Districts to Ferozepur and from the Sialkot
District to Amritsar or to Dera Baba Nanak and from Sheikhupura
and Gujranwala to Amritsar. If it is not possible for you to
evacuate refugees from Sialkot to Amritsar or to Dera Baba Nanak
by road, we would endeavour to arrange for a special train.”®
The Punjab Boundary Force was already facing a grave situation
in the performance of its own specified task of maintaining law
and order. It seems to have been felt that to arrange for evacuation
was a cognate, though probably not a heavy task. To suggest
that a special train could bring over all the refugees indicated that
the East Punjab Government did not expect the transfer of the
minorities in their entirety from the West Punjab. But more
vigorous arrangements were to follow soon.
3. Vide Chapter VIII Nature and Causes of Migration".
4. In Europe the term “refugee” is commonly used for aliens seeking refuge
whereas a “displaced person” means one who has been driven out owing
to the changes in the frontrier.
5. L A.R. File No. LXVI/9/92.
MIGRATION
163
Establishment of Military Evacuee Organisation
On account of the communal riots spreading in a chain reaction,
there were a large number of displaced non-Muslims and the Mus¬
lims to be evacuated in the East Punjab and the West Punjab. To
begin with, a hundred trucks were placed at the disposal of the
Deputy High Commissioner of India in Lahore.® The East Punjab
Government supplemented this arrangement with the appointment
of a Liaison Officer at Lahore, and a Transport Controller at Amrit¬
sar who was provided with one hundred trucks. The latter was to
plan out convoys in consultation with the former. But soon, it was
found that this arrangement afforded no protection to the refugees,
because there was no machinery to prevent attacks from hostile
mobs on the convoys in the West Punjab. It was, therefore, decided
to entrust this work of evacuation of refugees to the military. The
East Punjab Area Head Quarters at Lahore was converted into the
Advance Military Evacuee Organization and a separate command,
known as Military Evacuee Organization was established at
Amritsar on the 4th September, 1947.’ A similar organization
was established by the Pakistan Government to evacuate Muslim
refugees from the East Punjab, a little earlier.®
Evacuation by Motor Transport
In order to facilitate the speedy clearance of r^^fugees on both
sides, the East Punjab Government and the West Punjab Govern¬
ment entered into an agreement by vs/hich no train or motor vehicle
was to cross the border without refugees. It implied that no Indian
motor vehicle or train could enter Pakistan without Muslim refugees,
nor could any Pakistan motor vehicle or train enter Indian territory
without Hindu and Sikh refugees. This naturally implied the
6. C. <Sc M. Gazette, dated the 25th August, 1947.
7. According to the author of Economic Consequences of Divided India (page
79) the Military Evacuee Organization was established in addition to the
Punjab Boundary Force which does not appear to be correct. The Punjab
Boundary Force was abolished from the 1st September, 1947 and the
M.E.O. started working on the 4th September. 1947.
8. The author of Chronology of Pakistan states that the Pakistan Government
established the Military Evacuee Organization on the 28th August, 1947.
164
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
control and checking of such vehicles. The Indian motor convey
commandant complained that “the convoys from the East Punjab
with Muslim refugees first go to the Walton Training School. There
they are made to wait for a considerable time and are asked to
carry other Muslim refugees to the districts where they might be
going. In this way, about six hours are spent at the Walton
Training School. Again at the bridge of River Ravi, they
are not allowed to cross unless every truck is full to the maximum
capacity and if any vehicle is found to carry a smaller number of
refugees than the expected number, the passengers of those vehicles
are transhipped to other vehicles and empty vehicles are sent back.
This procedure is repeated at many places on the way.”*
The Military E\racuee Organization on the Indian side also
adopted similar measures and it was decided that Civil authorities
should establish two police posts on the Grand Trunk Road one
at a distance of about five or seven miles towards the east of
Amritsar and the other at a similar distance to the West of
Amritsar. These police posts should not allow any vehicle of
the Pakistan Government to proceed unless it was full to the
maximum capacity with non-Muslim refugees or it had a certificate
from the Chief Liaison Officer that the vehicle could go empty”.!®
Sometimes the drivers of the other community conspired
against their passengers. The D.L.O. Sialkot wrote : ‘On the 25th i
August a convey of 25 trucks, the drivers of which were all Muslims, ^
was sent from the refugee camp, Sialkot Cantonment to Amritsar. a
When the convoy reached the bridge of the Ravi near Shahdra, it t
halted on the plea that the drivers wanted to take tea and they r
went into the town, wherefrom a mob of Muslims attacked the o
convoy.”!’ o
Evacuation by Train ^
The agreement that no train should be allowed to go without
taking refugees did not work well, when the crew of the train and 12
9. P.B.R. File No. C F.-386. 13
Meeting of M.E.O.held on 23rd September, 1947. 14
10. Ibid. 15,
11. L. 1 R File Nj. LVII/2/8-B.
MIGRATION
165
the passengers belonged to different communities. The Muslim
and non-Muslim crew sometimes frightened or sometimes in a spirit
of retaliation stopped the trains on the appearance of mobs belonging
to their community and thus caused the deaths and destruction of
the refugees travelling by their trains. This arrangement brought
havoc among the refugees as the Deputy High Commissioner
of India in Lahore wrote: ^‘Some 3000 to 4000 Muslims had
collected there and surrounded a non-Muslim train which had
arrived from Find Dadan Khan. This wretched train was attacked
soon after it left Find Dadan Khan on the 19th then again at
Mughalpura this morning where there were 80 casualties of which
3 were killed and more than 12 seriously injured.” The train
could not proceed to Amritsar, as the Muslim engine driver had
run away .^2 similarly, the Commanding Officer of the 2/1 Gurkhas
wrote : “The Battalion arrived at Ambah Cantonment station at
12-30 p.m. on the 1st September, 1947. The Adjutant reported to
the Commanding Officer that a train containing dead bodies was
lying on the line next to ours. Holes caused by Bren-guo bursts
were visible on all coaches. The driver of the engine evidently
intended to let massacre continue by driving his train into the open
country and only disconnected his engine at the pistol point
It was pointed out to the East Funjab Government that trains
had been sent to Karnal which was already flooded with refugees
when the trains could have been easily received at Ludhiana where
accommodation had been kept spare for the purpose.”*^ It seemed
that the despatching government decided the destination. This
resulted in untold miseries to the refugees who were denied even
ordinary facilities, like drinking-water on the way. Many deaths
occurred on account of starvation or shortage of water.”^® In a
spate of religious fury, trains were held up and their passengers
12. L/ 4 .i?., Telegram No. 21, dated September 21, 1947 from Deputy High
Commissioner for India, Lahore.
13. While Memory Serves, cit. op., pp. 436-37.
14. L.A.R. File No. LVII/22/8-B.
15. P.B.R. A note of the refugee situation in East Punjab File No. CFClOl)-
(a)E-49.
a?
166
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
killed, houses burned down over their owner’s heads, women raped
and abducted, forcible conversions made from one religion to
another and every kind of physical atrocity practised.”^®
* Infection* of Railway Officials
Like police, military and other government personnel, the
railway staff in both the Punjabs got infected with the spirit of
retaliation. They could not act impartially in the discharge of their
duties and did their best to the detriment of the refugees belonging
to the other community. Almost all major train accidents were the
result of their vindictiveness. The court-martial inquiry undertaken
by an Indian military officer and a Pakistan military officer and
presided over by a British Officer regarding the Jassar (District
Sialkot) train accident established the fact that the inefficiency of
the railway staff in the West Punjab had led to so many deaths and
abduction of women^’. According to the inquiries of the court
martial, the Indian M.E.O. represented to the Pakistan M.E.O. that
the train was to go via Wazirabad—Lahore on the evening of the
22nd October. Orders were issued to that effect. But these orders
failed to reach Sialkot’®. Consequently, there was a huge massacre
of non-Muslims at Jassar where the railway track was broken on
account of floods.
Sometimes, the routes of the non-Muslim refugee trains were
changed to the deieriment of the passengers. The station staff acted
under the spirit of vendetta, A train which started from Bannu
was scheduled to reach Amritsar via Mari Indus, Lyallpur and
Lahore. From Khushab, contrary to its previous scheduled
route, it was diverted to Gujrat where Pathans attacked it on
16 Andrew Miller, India Since Partition, Government of India Publication,
p. 44
17 L./l/?. File No. LVII/13/2-E. The Report of the D.L.O., Sialkot stated
that 1300 persons had been killed and almost two hundred women abducted
According to a court Martial enquiry the number of killed or injured and
missing is 53 and 479 respectively. But at the same time it concluded that
“no accurate figure could be produced as by the majority of attackers
casualities were taken away and buried or treated by their relatives.
.18. L /4./2. The Chief Secretary West Punjab (Pakistan Government comm¬
unication No. 692-HR-47/2486, dated the I9th Jan. 1948.
$
MIGRATION
167
January 12, 1948. The engine-driver fled. There was a regular
fight between the Hindu escort and the Pathans who had surrounded
the platform. The Sikhs in the refugee train were particularly sing¬
led out and killed. A large number of women were abducted'^.
Similarly a non-Muslim refugee train which had started from Wah
(District Attock) was detained for two days, 24th and 25th Septem¬
ber, 1947, at Wazirabad (District Gujranwala) where the train was
thrice attacked inflicting heavy casualties*®. The attack on the non-
Muslim refugee train at Kamoke (District Gujranwala) on the 23rd
September, 1947 was, according to Brigadier Stevens (M.E.O.
Pakistan), the result of an unauthorized movement of the train to
that station.This attack resulted in heavy casualties and the
abduction of a very large number of non-Muslim women. The same
spirit was at work among the railway employees in the East Punjab.
A Muslim refugee train which left Ambala on the 25th November,
1947 was diverted to a line with deadend, instead of the main line at
the Shambu railway station. Consequently, the train was derailed
resulting in heavy casualties^^^
The railway trains carried the largest number of refugees. It
is estimated that more than two million people crossed the border
by trains within two months or so^®. About five or six trains crossed
the border every day and every train was full to capacity. The
roofs, footboards, buffer spaces and even the undersides of the
carriages were fully utilized. • The evacuation operation by trains
would have proved more successful, had there been co-operation
between the East Punjab and the West Punjab governments and had
the railway staff on both sides not been infected with the communal
venom.
Foot Convoys
Of all the modes of evacuation, the organization of the refugee
19. Ibid., D.O. No. 7678/CLO dated 14-1-48 File No. LVIlI/5/94.
20. Ibid,, File No. LVII/I3/2-E(Part II).
21. Ibid.
22. P,B.R. File No. CF-711-ER-48.
23. Millions on Move, Indian Government Publication, p. 5. About 673 refugee
trains were run from August 27th to November 6, 1947.
168
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
foot convoys proved to be the most effective for the pesssnts of the
Punjab who were tough and hardy by nature. A foot convoy enabled
ten thousand of refugees to be collectively moved out in either direc¬
tion alongwith their bullocks, carts, household goods and cattle.
A strong foot convoy could defend itself with the help of military
against any hostile mob. It is estimated that about one million
human beings crossed into Indian territory on foot, within a month
up till the 3rd week of September 1947.2* The biggest refugee
caravan consisting of three lakhs of people came into India from
the districts of Lyallpur and Montgomery later on.
Establishment of Liaison Agency
On account of the suddenness of the forced migration of the
members of the minority communities, there were left dififerent cate¬
gories of people to be evacuated. A large number of persons had
been forcibly converted. Owing to the continuance of disturbed
conditions and communal riots, a very large number of women and
children had been abducted on both sides of the border. The refugees
in the East Punjab and the West Punjab who had recently migrated
wanted to recover their relations, movable properties, bank lockers,
etc. It was, therefore, felt necessary that there must be some organi¬
zation which should be entrusted with such work. The East Punjab
Government and the West Punjab Government, therefore, establis¬
hed Liaison Agencies for their respective provinces. Under a Chief
Liaison Officer in each State, there were appointed District Liaison
Officers and each District Liaison Officer was to work in a district
placed under him. The East Punjab Liaison Agency had its head¬
quarters at Lahore and it worked for more than a year .25
Forcible Conversions
The most urgent and immediate task before the East Punjab
Liaison Agency was to evacuate the persons who had been forcibly
converted in the West Punjab. “More than two lakhs of people
had become converts in order to save their skins, their property and
Millions Live Again, p. 3-4.
L.A R. East Punjab Liaison Agency was finally withdrawn on 30th
Nov. 48.
24.
25.
MIGRATION
169
their girls from abduction’’^® According to the District Liaison
Officer, Gujranwala, “the non-Muslims had embraced Islam as a
matter of expediency in the hope that some day the Hindus
would come back to Pakistan and the old order would be re-
established.”27 Multan, “thousands of non-Muslims became
converts to Islam in order to save their lives and the honour of
their females. The assessed estimate of converts was 5000.”2« In
the District of Mianwali, about 6000 persons were forcibly conver¬
ted.^® In Dera Ghazi Khan, ‘ All the converted men had very
sad tales to tell. Even men as old as forty had to undergo the
pain of the conversion ceremony, resulting in profuse bleeding”
due to circumcision.’®
Recovery of Abducted Women
The Governments of India and Pakistan in their meeting held
on the 6th December, 1947 took the following decisions regarding
the recovery of abducted women and children :
1. Conversion of persons abducted after the 1st March, 1947
was not to be recognized and all such persons were to be
restored to their respective Dominions even against the
wishes of the persons concerned.
2. The primary responsibility for the recovery of abducted
persons was to rest with the local police.
3. Social workers were to be associated actively with the
scheme. The D.L Os. were to supply information regard¬
ing abducted persons to be recovered.^^
The decisions to alleviate the sufferings of women folk, who
had suffered most during the partition of the Punjab were, however,
indifferently acted upon. A very large volume of the correspon¬
dence between the high officials of the East Punjab and the West
Punjab indicates that the police offiicers in both the Punjab acted
26. L.A.R., File No. LIX/2 Report of D.L.O. Montgomery.
27. Ibid., File No. LIX/3 Report of D.L.O. Gujranwala.
28. Ibid., File No. LIX/4 Report of D.L.O. Multan.
29. Ibid., File No. LIX/8 Report of D L.O. Mianwali.
30. Ibid., File No. LIX/9 Report of D.L.O. D.G. Khan.
31. P.B.R. File No. C.F. 119-ER-49.
170
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
partially in favour of their own community while recovering
the abducted women. The Deputy High Commissioner for Pakistan
wrote to the Chief Secretary, East Punjab : “One... has written
to say that his daugnter... aged 13 years has been kept by one...
son of... Jat of village Bhoraa District Amritsar. In reply to his
request for the recovery of the girl he was informed by the
Indian Military authorities (copy attached) that his daughter
did not wish to leave her husband.“The District Liaison Officer,
Campbellpur reported that the Deputy Commissioner of Campbell-
pur and Rawalpindi districts were not handing over the recovered
abducted women and girls because they had been handed over to
the Azad Kashmir Government.”^^ In some cases, the police officers
in various districts had openly declared that it was their duty to
see that proper regard was paid to public opinion. When recovered,
the statements of the recovered women and girls were recorded
and they were returned to their abductors by the district autho¬
rities,as it was said that they did not wish to leave their
abductors.
Hurdles in the way of Recovery
On account of the fear of disturbance, the local authorities
purposely avoided taking any action against the Pathans who
had abducted the girls. Five non-Muslim girls were recovered by
the sub Inspector of Phularwan, District Shahpur. The girls were
brought from Phularwan to Sargodha and handed over to the
District Liaison Offlicer. During the night, a large number of
Pathans surrounded the house of the Inspector and on the follow¬
ing day they surrounded the offices of the Superintendent of Police
and created a lot of commotion in the city. The Deputy Comm¬
issioner and Superintendent of Police prevailed upon the District
Liaison Officer to hand over the girls to the Deputy Superintendent
Police. The Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, and Deputy
32. P.B R. Letter No. D.H.C. 115/47 dated 11-3-48.
File No. C.F, 321-ER-48.
33. L.A.R. D.O. No. 8312/CLA dated 23-1-48.
File No. LXVIII/5.
34. Ibid.
MIGRATION
171
Inspector-General of Police reached Sargodha and with great
difficulties these five girls were removed to India at dead of night.®®
The police officers who were appointed to protect the women,
themselves committed the worst crimes. Two Assistant Sub-
Inspectors of Police went to recover a non-Muslim woman form a
village in the West Punjab and the unfortunate woman was raped
and ravished by those very police officers during the nights on the
way.“* In the meeting of the officers of the East Punjab Liaison
Agency, it was brought to light that one Sub-lnspcctor of Police
at Kamoke (District Gujranwala) had collected all the non-Muslim
girls at the time of the Kamoke train attack and distributed them
to his accomplices. That Sub-Inspector’s brother who was in the
Pakistan Army was also in possession of the abducted girls When
the latter was contacted by the District Liaison Officer, he said that
he had sent about 22 non-Muslim abducted girls to his brother.®’
Some of the officials in Pakistan kept the non-Muslim abdu¬
cted girls with them in spite of the open appeals of the East
Punjab and West Punjab Governments, as is clear from the follo¬
wing letter of the District Liaison Officer of Montgomery :
“Shrimati.was recovered from the custody of.Naib
Tehsildar, Dipalpur. The Naib Tehsildar has been keeping the
girl for the last eight months. Hand bills signed by the Deputy
Commissioner regarding the recovery of abducted girls were
distributed among the masses through the Tehsildar, meetings were
arranged in the Tehsil for making appeals to the people to return
the abducted girls.”®®
Legislation for the Recovery of the Abducted Persons
The East Punjab Liaison Agency was closed on the 30th
35. L.A.R. Proceedings of meeting of Officers,
File No. L-VIII/14/171 (PT-II)
36. P.B.R, File No. C.F. 463-ER-49.
37. L.A.R. File No. L-VIII/14/171 (Pt. II). Similar statement regarding
this Sub-Inspector at Kamoke has also been given in the P.B.R.
38. L.A.R. Letter No. LN 229/249 dated 4-6-48 from D.L.O., Montgomery
to C.L.O.
172
PARTirrON OF PUNJAB
November 1948 alongwith the Women Recovery Organization
which was associated with it. The work of the recovery of
abducted women was brought under the Ministry of External
Affairs in India and Pakistan. So far, there had been no special
legislation for the recovery of abducted women. The Indian
Government, however, established elaborate machinery for the
recovery of the abducted persons An ordinance called “Abducted
Persons Recovery and Restoration Ordinance” was promulgated
on January 31, 1949, and was subsequently replaced by the
Abducted Persons Recovery and Restoration Act 1949. One of the
principal features of this Act was that it adopted a more compre¬
hensive definition of the term “abducted” than the one already
provided in the Indian Penal Code^® Another important aspect of
this legislation was the provision for setting up of an Indo-Pakistan
Tribunal to decide the disputed cases of the abducted women.
Camps for the stay of the recovered persons were to be established.
This Act applied only to the ‘ affected areas”, viz. U.P., East
Punjab, Delhi, Patiala and East Punjab States Union and the
United States of Rajasthan. A special provision was made to
enable the recovery of the abducted women from the other States
in India. The coordinative officers and staff were appointed to
assist the police in the recovery of the abducted persons. Social
workers were also associated with this work.'*® There was, howe¬
ver, no corresponding legislation regarding the abducted persons
in Pakistan.
The abductors in Pakistan adopted several methods to evade
the Indian Recovery Officer. Alongwith the abducted women
they shifted from the West Punjab to those districts adjoining
39, According to Clause No 2 of The Abducted Person {Recovery & Restora¬
tion) Act 19t9, “abducted person” means a male child under the age of
sixteen years or a female of whatever age who is, or immediately before
the 1st day of March, 1947, was a Muslim and who on or after that day
and before 1st January, 1949 has become separated from his or her
family and is found to be living with or under the control of any other
individual or family and in the latter case includes a child born to any
such female after the said date.”
40. Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act No. LXV of 1949.
MIGRATION
173
the Jammu and Kashmir territory, entry to which was banned to
the Indian officials on account of hostilities in Kashmir.”
According to the provisions of the Abducted Persons (Recovery
and Restoration) Act, no option was to be given to any recovered
person, he or she had to be sent to the other country. With the
passage of time it was found that recovered persons were often
loath to be sent across the border. The forcible restoration of
such recovered persons resulted in great hardship to them as also
to their children who were deprived of the affection and care at
least of one parent. It was, therefore, decided in the Indo-
Pakistan Conference held in May 1954 that suitable means should
be devised with a view to ensuring that no abducted person was
forced to go to the other country against her will. By this decision,
special homes were instituted in both the countries unwilling
persons could be lodged and given full facilities to meet their
relatives and to make up their minds without fear or pressure. It
was only after a sufficiently prolonged stay in such homes that
the final wishes of the recovered persons were ascertained by the
Indo-Pakistan Tribunal. In that case, if a recovered woman
refused to go to the other country she was not forced to do so.**-
Discontinuance of the Recovery Work
The abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act
continued to be renewed every year upto 30th November 1957.
By then, the abducted women began to show increasing reluctance
to go to the other country after leaving their children. By the
Indo-Pakistan Government decision of 1954. they could not be
forced to go to the other country against their wishes. Secondly,
the most serious consideration which prevented the Government
of India from renewing the Abducted Persons (Recovery and
Restoration) Act of 1949 was the problem of the post-abduction
children. During the period from January 1, 1954 to September
30, 1957, no fewer than 860 children were left behind by the
41. Diary of Akali Chakkar Kaiir Singh (Punjabi), edited by the writer,
Khalsa Samachar Amritsar, 1959, p. 12
42. Recovery And Restoration of Abducted Persons in India, Government of
India Publication, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 3
m
174
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Muslim women restored to Pakistan, where as 410 children were
taken by them. These children created problems for the State
which had to take care of them.^^
Estimate of the Recovery Work
In recovering abducted women, the Government of India
achieved greater success on their side than the Pakistan Govern¬
ment. The statements exchanged between the two governments
indicated that 25,856 and 9,366 persons had been recovered in
India and Pakistan respectivelyIt is a significant fact that in
both countries a Jarge majority of persons recovered were not
those included in the lists of missing persons furnished by the
respective Governments. No less than 4415 abducted persons
out of 30,335,*® were declared as “the non abduction cases” by
the Pakistan Government. The information regarding the abduc¬
ted women supplied by the Indian Government could not be
wrong as it was based on the data collected from the individuals
concerned. About 4191** abducted persons, that is to say 13.8
percent of the list furnished by the Indian Government, were
reported by Pakistan Government to have died in Pakistan. This
figure too does not appear to be correct as the corresponding
number of the abducted women who died in India was surprisingly
low, viz. 3.3 per cent.*’
The most peculiar phenomenon with regard to the recovery
work of non-Muslim women was that the non-Muslim abducted
girls very often refused to be evacuated. They were too afraid
of the rigidity of the caste system and were overconscious of
having lost their chastity. In the Hindu society, women has been
depicted as an idol of chastity, purity and loyalty to her husband.
These very notions prevented them from facing their relatives.
Though they were completely helpless under the circumstances,
some of them really believed that their husbands and other rela-
tivi
0V(
rec
nit
“tl
all
ab<
to
tbJ
act
ou
hu
to
ex]
wh
DO
th(
43. Ibid , pp. 6-7
44. Ibid, p. 5
45. Idem
46. Idem
47. Idem
MIGRATION
175
fives had failed to protect them and hence they had lost all rights
over them. Delay was yet another major factor impeding their
recoveries, because it gave their abductors the time and opportu¬
nity to din into their ears so many false and baseless rumours like
“there is no food in the East Punjab’*, “near and dear ones had
all been murdered”, etc. In certain cases, the arguments of the
abducted girls were very correct and genuine. One of them said
to the District Liaison Officer, Gujranwala, “How can I believe
that your military strength of two sepoys could safely take me
across to India when a hundred sepoys had failed to protect us and
our people who were massacred”. Another said, “I have lost my
husband and have now gone in for another. You want me to go
to India where I have got nobody and, of course, you do not
expect me to change husbands every day”. A third said, “But
why are you particular to take me to India ? What is left in me
now religion or chastity ?”^®
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX
Extracts from the Findings Court Martial
Regarding the Jassar Train Incident
The Court having considered the evideace before them give
their opinion as stated below :
Routing of the Train
(a) Originally orders were given by Brig, Stevens who
was in charge of transportation of refugees for the .
train to be routed from Sialkot to Jassar. Orders
were issued accordingly by D.Q. (Rail) M.E.O Pak
to the Railway Control Office, Lahore, on the 22nd
October, who passed them on at 15.10 hours to the
Station Master, Sialkot, who in turn passed on the
information to H.Q. Sialkot Sub Area. The Court
is satisfied that these were the only orders received
in Sialkot either by the Station Master or by the
Military, and were duly acted upon.
(b) The Indian M.E.O. represented to the Pak. M.E.O.
that the train should go via Wazirabad—Lahore.
48. L.A.R, File No. LIX/3-D.L.O., Gujranwala’s Report.
176
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
On the evening of the 22nd October, orders were
issued by D.Q. (Rail) M.EO. Pak. to the Railway
Control to halt the train at Sialkot, while the matter
was referred to Brig. Stevens. The latter issued
orders for the re-routing of the train via Lahore at
about 10.00 hours. On the 23rd October both these
orders failed to reach Sialkot as :
(i) D.Q. (Rail) M.E.O. Pak. gave the orders to Railway
Control Lahore. (It is to be noted that D.Q. (Rail)
had only just taken over the appointment and did
not realize that Sialkot was not controlled by the
Lahore Division).
(ii) Railway Control, Lahore, was unable to get through
to Sialkot to pass on the message owing to trouble
with their ordinary telephone.
The Court considers that D.Q. (Rail) M.E.O. Pak. should
have informed Sialkot Sub-Area direct and the Railway Control
Lahore should have informed D.Q. (Rail) M.E.O. Pak. when they
were unable to pass his message to Sialkot.
The Court further considers that D.Q. (Rail) cannot be
blamed for negligence as he was new to his job and had acted in
good faith. The court also considers that in view of
(a) the orders received by the Station Master, Sialkot
(b) the fact that many previous evacuee trains had passed
through Jassar without undue molestation and
(c) the tact that the Indian Dominion was sending Muslim
refugees by that route,
the Sialkot Sub-Area was not at fault in not querying the
routing of the train.
The Movement oj the Train
Information regarding the arrival of this particular rake was
first received in Sialkot by the Station Master at 15.10 hrs on
the 22nd October. The rake actually came in at about 22.00 hrs.
Loading commenced at about 5.15 hrs. on the 23rd. The train
left Sialkot at 10.00 hrs. and reached Jassar about 11.30 hrs.
The court considered that
MIGRATION
177
(a) the decision not to load the train during the night of
22/23 Oct. was sound,
(b) the despatch of the train early next morning was
perfectly reasonable,
(c) no undue delay occurred in moving the train to
Jassar, except that its speed between Narowal to
Jassar may have been less than normal and
(d) adequate escort were provided of mixed troops up to
Jassar.
Action at Jassar
The evacuees and their kits were unloaded just beyond Jassar
Station on the right of the railway. This took about an hour.
During this time, adequate protection was afforded by the 16
P.R.O. train escort and by a platoon from 512 Garrison Coy.
under Major Khan and a small detachment of about 2 and 6
from 15 P.R.C. under Major Shah.
The Court considers that
(a) Some groups of armed villagers had undoubtedly
followed the train from Narowal towards Jassar
and must have been in the vicinity. They do not
consider that there were any armed Mussalmans
under the railway bridge as stated by the 9th
witness.
(b) The Court noted that the 9th witness could not
have been under the bridge. He was standing on
the ground due to an intervening bank. The court
also accepted the fact that had the attackers been
there, they would have been seen by Major Shah
and Major Dunn.
(c) Major Shah and Major Khan were unaware at
this time that these groups of men were in the vicinity
as they had gone ahead by truck and would not have
seen those who followed the train.
(d) Major Shah and Major Khan were in no way in
collusion with the villagers;
(i) Major Khan had only arrived that morning.
178
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
(ii) Major Shah uould not have called the Major
Khan’s platoon, if he had been in collusion
with the villagers.
(e) Major Khan was justified in not accepting the full
command of the escort and Major Shah must be
considered the Escort Commander.
I
(f) Although the evacuees had been warned not to take
more kit than they could carry, most of them had,
in fact, taken- more and the surplus had to be
discarded at Jassar.
Action after the Main Attack
The leading portion of the convoy had run forward during
the attack and was escorted to the Ravi Bridge. The rear portion
was brought up by Major Khan and Major Shah. No further
attack was made on the convoy during this period.
The Court considers that during this period one or two of
the escorting troops did remove valuables from the refugees.
The Court notes that a detachment of 1 N.C.O., and 3 men
were sent to collect any wounded or any children and that the
personnel of 15 P.R.C. returned along the evacuees route. It is
considered, however, that more action might have been taken that
night to collect wounded or stragglers from the crops in the fields.
Casualties etc. and Evacuees
(a) The number of men, women, and children who left
Sialkot was 3,569
(b) The numbers counted by the 18th witness as having
reached India were :
23-25 October 3405
29 October 23
31 October 23
Total 3451
(c) The number still known to be on the Pakistan side at
Narowal hospital:
Dead 7
Living 23
Total
30
MIGRATION
179
(d) The number of dead evacuees reported by the police
was 35
(e) Therefore the total is made as follows :—
(i) Living 3474
lii) Known dead 42
. (iii) Unaccounted for 53
Total 3569
(f) Of those living, the following have suffered major
or minor injuries:
(i) In India 460
(ii) In Narowal 19
Total 479
(g) Of the injured, mentioned in para (f) above, the
following had been hit by 303 bullets ;
(i) In India 5
(ii) In Narowal 3
Total 8
(h) Of the dead mentioned in para (c) (ii) above the
number killed by bullets was four.
Four others had no injuries but had died from natural causes.
Action by Civil Authorities
No action appears to have been taken by the civil or by
police authorities. The Deputy Commissioner had been warned
that the convoy was due to move on the 22nd and 23rd October.
This was subsequently cancelled and information was given for the
24th and 25th October. No information was however, given to
Deputy Commissioner on the evening of the 22nd October when
the firm time of departure was known.
Though there may have been instances of a few of the troops
not having done their duty by firing unaimed shots, the Court is
satisfied that the conduct of the troops was generally satisfactory.
The Court wishes to record that they are unanimous in the
above findings.
President Sd. J.R. Cornor Col.
Member Sd. Teja Singh Capt.
Member Sd. Subah Sadiq Capt.
File No. C.F. 315-ER-47, Partition Branch Records
East Punjab Government
CHAPTER X
AFTER-EFFECTS
Refugee Concentration and Resettlement
The cross-migration of the population created a number of
problems for the newly born States of East Punjab and West
Punjab. The refugees were concentrated in a very large number
on both sides of the border. The refugees in the West Punjab
were mostly concentrated in fourteen refugee camps located bet¬
ween Kasur and Attock, their main camps being at Lahore,
Lyallpur and Montgomery.^ By January, 1948, the number of
the refugee camps rose to seventy-five^. A Directorate of Move¬
ment and Quartering was organized and it worked for six months
in order to disperse the refugee concentrations.^ In the East
Punjab, it had been planned to have one big camp with a capacity
of five lakhs at Kurukshetra and a second line of camps at Amrit¬
sar, Gurdaspur, Jullundur, Ludhiana and Ambala. The transit
camps in the border districts served as feeders to the second-line
camps and the central Kurukshetra Camp.** Both the Central
Governments of India and Pakistan and the Provincial Govern¬
ments of the East Punjab and the West Punjab had to open
Rehabilitation Departments for the reception, care and rehabili¬
tation of refugees.
The Sikhs and the Hindus had left in West Punjab extensive
areas of agricultural land which they had owned or tilled as
tenants. All of that agricultural land was not available for the
rehabilitation of refugees as many of the evacuee land-lords had
rented their land to Muslim tenants. The West Punjab Govern-
1. Economy of Pakistan, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Government of Paki¬
stan, (1950), p. 390.
2. J. Russel Andrus and Aziz F. Mohammad, Economy of Pakistan, p. 468
3. Economy of Pakistan, Pakistan Government, p.288
4. Millions Live Again, p. 7.
AFTER-EFFECTS
181
raent adopted two expedients to settle the Muslim displaced
persons—the 75 per cent of whom were agriculturists.®
(/) On the lands which were abandoned, agricultural
refugees were settled. Each refugee family (estimated
at five members) was allotted 5 to 8 acres of
irrigated land or 12| acres of unirrigated land.® A
formula was worked out by which the refugee
owners or occupancy tenants from the East Punjab
were to obtain “land of equal-produce value” and
not necessarily of equal area. The maximum limit
was 250 standard acres.'^
(//) The Muslim tenants on evacuee land were required
to give up some part of the land cultivated by them
in exchange for remission in land revenue.®
The land was allotted on a yearly basis to those persons who
were prepared to cultivate it personally. A pair of bullocks and
a plough were provided to five families settled on land up to 60
acres in area.*
In the East Punjab, the agriculturists belonging to a particular
district of the West Punjab were directed to proceed to the specific
districts in the East Punjab under the following arrangement :
]
Refugee Landholders of
West Punjab
Lahore and non-colonists
from Montgomery District
Rawalpindi, Sheikhupura and I
Gujranwala Districts J
Shahpur and Gujrat Districts
Multan District
Jhang and Muzafargarh *|
Districts J
Resettlement in the
East Punjab
Ferozepore District
Karnal District
Ambala District
Hissar District
Rohtak District
5. 1947-57, Ten Years of Pakistan, Pakistan Government, p. 240.
6. West Pakistan Year Book, 1958, p. 159
7. J, Russel & Andrus and Aziz F. Mohammed, The Economy of Pakistan,
p. 470
8. Ibid p. 470
9. Ten Years of Pakistan, p. 239
182
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Dehra Ghazi Khan and Mianwali
Districts
Sialkot District
Hoshiarpur, Amritsar
and Gurdaspur Distiicts^*^
Gurgaon District
About 350,000 peasant and cultivator families from the West
Punjab were moved straight to the Muslim evacuee villages by the
East Punjab Government,Those families, which had gone to the
West Punjab as colonists, returned to their ancestral villages.
The Sikh and the Hindu landholders suffered a heavy loss by
migrating to the East Punjab. It was estimated that out of 18.8
million cultivable acres in the West Punjab, about 6.7 million
acres belonged to the non-Muslims who piad 34 per cent of the
total land revenue. The Muslims in the East Punjab owned 4.7
million cultivable acres out of a total of 14.2 million acres and
paid only 27 per cent of the land revenue.^^ jjj (jjis way, the
non-Muslims had left behind about 20 lakh acres in excess of what
Muslims had left in the East Punjab. The East Punjab shared
forty-four per cent of the population of the united Punjab with
only thirty-eight per cent of its land.^® Besides, the East Punjab
received only three million canal irrigated acres out of a total of
over fourteen million acres, that is, about twenty-one percenP^.
In order to promote an equitable distribution, the Government
adopted the following scheme of graded cuts in such a way that
the small landholders were to have a minimum cut:
Area abandoned
Net allotment
1 \ acres
21 acres
27 acres
\
10 acres
30 acres
40 acres
10. Rural Rehabilitation in Punjab Government, p. 1
11. Ibid., p. 1, Quasi Permanent Allotment of Land, issued by Publicity Depart¬
ment Punjab Government, gives the total number of peasant families to be
500,000
12. Rehabilitation— Punjab on the March 1951, p. 6
13. Ibid ' ,
14. Grow More Yoodi—Punjab on the March 1951, p. 1
AFTER EFFECTS
183
Area abandoned
Net allotment
50 acres
60 acres
100 acres
1 0 acres
200 acres
I
250 acres
500 acres
32-^ acres
37^ acres
51|- acres
66|- acres
79 acres
89 acres
126 acres
176^ acres
281^ acres
326^ acres
376|^ acres^®
1000 acres
3000 acres
4000 acres
5000 acres
This graded cut on land holdings had a very great effect on
the East Punjab economy. The disparity in area available as
compared with the area abandoned and the quality of soil and
irrigation facilities sharpened a conflict between the landlords and
landless tenants. The graded cuts had pruned large holdings and
even middle-class farmers who were quite contented to get battai
in the West Punjab found that with their reduced holdings they
could no longer afford the luxury of tenant-farming and had to
adopt farming on their own, very often to their ultimate benefit.
The Hindus and Sikhs, who migrated to the East Punjab,
had a greater urban element and a higher standard of living than
the Muslims of the East Punjab who had a predominantly rural
character.’® The Hindu and Sikh urban population left behind
154,000 houses in the West Punjab towns, whereas the Muslims in
the East Punjab left only 112,000. There were 51,000 shops and
business premises abondoned in the West Punjab by the Hindus
and the Sikhs, whereas the Muslims left behind 17,000 only.’’
Consequently, a large number of the Hindus and the Sikhs who
had very good houses to live in West Punjab were forced to live
in poorly built ones vacated by the Muslims. In certain cases, in
15. Rural Rehabilitation in the Punjab^ p. 3
16. Economy of Pakistan, {Go\t. PuhVic&tion), op. cit, p. 392
17. Urban Rehabilitation, The Punjab on the March, 1951, p. 13
184
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
the West Punjab the refugees with ordinary status in the East
Punjab villages occupied far more decent houses in the towns.
M. Masud has rightly stated the condition in the West Punjab.
“The whole populace was afflicted by a rapacious greed for pro¬
perty abondoned by the Hindus.”^® In the East Punjab, the
shortage of houses in the towns led to the development of town¬
ships and industrial areas near the principal cities. The partition
of the Punjab proved a great leveller, especially in the East Punjab.
Millionaires were sometimes rendered paupers. The landed
aristocracy and upper middle classes received a rude shock and
most of them were condemned to destitution. After losing their
hoards, the erstwhile rich had to make a fresh start in the struggle
for existence. Only hardworking, able and intelligent persons could
find their feet, while the indolent and parasitic element suffered a
good deal. Apart from the colonists and refugee farmers from
the districts of Lahore, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, a large number
of the Hindus and Sikhs from Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions
were shopkeepers-cum-moneylenders who despised manual work.
Deprived of their easy way of making money, many of them
were compelled to change their profession and drift towards the
rank of workers. Those who managed to stick to their traditional
occupations did well and prospered.
Disparity in Occupations
According to Winifred Holmes, “A simple exchange of peasant
population on an equal basis would have been moderately a
straightforward matter. But here everything • was uneven”’® as
there existed a wide disparity in the occupations pursued by the
outgoing and inflowing people. The following table gives the
various occupations followed by the Muslims of the East Punjab
and the Hindus and the Sikhs of the West Punjab :
18. M. Masud, Pillars of Pakistan, Lahore, p. 5
19. Winifred Holmes,‘Life in the Punjab’, Quarterly, Kaidichi,Vo\’
III, No. 4, page 10
AFTER-EFFECTS
185
Hereditary Occupation
Hindus and the Sikhs in
Muslims in East
West Punjab
Punjab
Agriculture
8.2 lakhs
29.60 lakhs
Traders
14.01 ”
2.79 ”
Weavers
00.08 ”
3.70 ”
Shoemakers
1.25 **
1.64 ”
Carpenters
0.56
0.79 ”
Blacksmiths
0.57 ”
—
Potters
0.45 ”
1.64 ”
Dyers
0.04 “
0 41 ”
Bakers and water carriers 0.57 ”
1.84 ”
Barbers
0.17 “
0.86 ”
Sweepers
2.10 ”
0.07 ”
Washermen
0.05 ”
0.52 ”
Tailors
0.02 ”
0.08 ”
Total
28.07 lakhs
43.94 lakhs^®
The exodus of Muslim skilled labour from the East Punjab
substantially crippled the industries, like hosiery, metal-works and
railways, in which the Muslims formed about ninety per cent of
skilled or semi-skilled labour. The East Punjab, which was
already backward in industrial development, suffered much on
this account. Most of the factories and workshops were closed.^^
The textile industry, carpet and blanket-weaving, foundry and
engineering industries, which were mostly in the hands of the
Muslims, suffered a serious set-back. In the same way, conditions
were no better in the West Punjab as has been graphically
described in the First Year of Pakistan* “The disturbances forced
the Muslim workers of the East Punjab industries like hosiery,
handloom, weaving, carpet—and blanket-weaving, foundry and
engineering to the West Puniab but stores and other essential
materials were not available. There was a great demand for
goods but there were neither stores nor trained personnel of the
20. Economy of Pakistan, Pakistan Government, p. 397
21. Industries and Civil Supplies, Public Relations Department, Punjab Govt.
Simla, p. 1
186
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
higher grade to produce them..., the greatest shortage was in ’
cloth and there was the most acute unemployment among the
weavers.”22 The Muslim artisans suffered considerably on account
of the exodus of the non-Muslims. They were reduced to a
miserable plight “because they were illiterate, ignorant and had
very meagre financial resources. They were compelled to sell
their technical skill for a very poor return, reducing their position
to wage-earners. Before partition, the supply of raw material,
finance and marketing facilities for finished products were in the
hands of the non-Muslims who were their financial organizers.
Their disappearance completely disorganized the artisans and
craftsmen. The influx of uprooted Muslim artisans from the East
Punjab made the difficult situation more difficult.*’^
Social Effects
As a result of the partition, there was a sharp decline in the
morals of the people. The serious economic crisis created by the
forced migrations provided a climate for immorality. The prev¬
ailing lawlessness common in the East and the West Punjabs
removed all social restraints and scruples. About fifty thousand
women were abducted in both the Punjabs^^. The violent comm¬
unal riots, murders and heinous crimes brought the people’s
moral to the lowest ebb.
The partition of the Punjab caused an upheaval in the social
structure. The refugees found themselves aliens in their new
surroundings. The very places, the physical and geographical
environment and people among whom they were required to spend
their lives and develop new relationships were unfamiliar. This
created a feeling of frustration and discontentment among the
refugees. In the West Punjab, this led to the evil practices of
beggary, prostitution, delinquency and crime.^s
22. First Year of Pakistan, Pakistan Government, pp. 131-134
23. Economy of Pakistan, Pakistan Government, p. 397
24. Recovery and Restoration of Abducted persons in India, Ministry of External
Affairs Government of India, p. 6
25. Social Welfare work in Pakistan, Pakistan Quarterly, Karachi, Vol. VI,
No. 1. p. 13
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AFfER-EFFECTS
187
The partition of the Punjab gave a severe blow to the common
village traditions. Persons belonging to the same baradari were
scattered over different villages and towns in the same and even
different districts, with the result that social restraint exercised by
the baradari was relaxed. People were invariably strangers to
their neighbours, because belonging as they did to different places,
they had settled at one place. There was so much antipathy
among tHc refugee settlers in the same village that it sometimes
resulted in thefts and abduction of women in the East Punjab.^®
The partition of the Punjab and the subsequent mass
migrations introduced the new element of refugees in the social
set up of the East and the West Punjabs. Refugees from the
West Punjab mingled with the inhabitants of the East Punjab
and those from the East Punjab and the East Punjab States with
the people of the West Punjab. This mingling of the population
leed to so many new social developments. A large number of
the Sikhs and Hindus from the Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions
who were engaged in trade resettled in the backward towns and
villages of the East Punjab. This quickened the pulse of social
life. The drab bazaars with ill-kept shops were completely
changed, yielding place to well-stocked and orderly shops. The
refugee shopkeepers greatly increased the circulation of goods
even in the villages inhabited by the parsimonious Jats of the
Rohtak side. The townsmen in the districts of the East Punjab
were socially backward and their women kept purdah. The
vivacious refugee women, particularly from the Rawalpindi
Division, brightened the town life. The free and easy culture of
the West Punjab had a liberalizing influence on the women of
the East Punjab, who, emulating the example of their sisters from
the West Punjab, began to discard the purdah.^"^
As a result of the migrations, the West Punjab lost its former
cultural variety. “In the towns, most of the life and colour had
been provided by the Hindus and in the countryside the Sikhs had
26. M.S. Randhawa, Out of Ashes, New Delhi, 1954, p. 113.
27. Ibid, p. 219.
188
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
contributed invaluable pioneering drive and enterprise.”28
partition this social and cultural variety was no longer present.
Political and Administrative Effects
After partition, the West Punjab had an'area of 61,980,
squares miles and it formed the biggest provincial unit of Pakistan.
Its population was 15.80 million the second largest in Pakistan.^®
After partition the East Punjab formed one of the smallest
provinces of India. It had an area of 37,428 square miles and
a population of 12.6 millions.^® About one-fifth of the total
population in the East Punjab comprised displaced persons in the
following proportions :
Hindus
51.9%
Sikhs
39.7%
Harijans
6.9%
Christians
0.2%
Others
1.3%«
The partition of Punjab solved the communal and minority
problems in the West Punjab, as all the Sikhs and the Hindus
migrated to the East Punjab. Similarly, it solved the Muslim and
non-Muslim problem in the East Punjab, as almost all Muslims
migrated to the West Punjab. But the exodus of the Muslim
population from the East Punjab did not solve the minority
problem in the new State. The cross-migrations of pcpula*
tion improved the position of the Sikhs as a powerful minority.
In the united Punjab, the Sikhs were only thirteen per cent,
whereas in the East Punjab after migration, they formed about
thirty per cent of the population. In the united Punjab, the Sikh
population was so scattered that they did not form a majority in
any of the districts. After partition, however, the Siks formed a
majority in the districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Ferozepur,
Jullundur, Hoshiarpur and Ludhiana in the East Punjab.
“This great concentration of very nationally minded and very
28. Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan, London, 1962, p. 70.
29. Pakistan Report, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations, p. 3,
30. Statistical Punjab, Punjab Government (India) Publication page 11.
31. Ibid.
AFTER-EFFECTS
189
martial people in a comparatively very small area must be a cause
of anxiety to the Government of India.”®^ Professor Tinker has
it that “Among the military castes in India today, the most obvious
political problem is posed by the Sikhs. The Sikhs lost some of
their richest agricultural land by partition and have nourished a
sense of grievance ever since. They would dearly like to take
another crack at Pakistan and their tough bellicosity has been
channelled into the army service. Their sense of grievance and
isolation has led to tbe demand of a Punjabi-speakin^ Sjkh
State.”33
In the field of administration, the partition of the Punjab
greatly reduced the efficiency of the services. Every administrative
unit in the Punjab was bifurcated, resulting in inefficiency on both
sides. The secretariats of both the new-born States of the East
Punjab and the West Punjab had to be reorganized. The preva¬
lent communal riots had created police and goonda raj which
needed strong and firm handling, whereas the administration on
both sides of the border was seriously defective. None of the
West Punjab Ministers had any administrative experience and they
committed blunders.®^ The Civil & Military Gazette, Lahore,
editorially commented on the administration in the West Punjab
on the 26th September, 1947. “At the moment the province is
being ruled not by Khan Ifitikhar Hussain of Mamdot and his
colleagues but by the police constables.New heads of the
departments find that organization has collapsed and discipline is
non-existent. Magistrates and petty officials are discovering that
it is impossible to implement orders which are ill-conceived and
not unoften mutually contradictory.”^^ The newly created
province of East Punjab had a Ministry consisting of a Premier
and Home Minister to begin with. The Secretariat of the new
Government was still in the process of transfer to Simla. The
officers who had been recently transferred were overburdened
32. Sir Percival GriflFth, India Revistied, Asiatic Review, April 1948
33. Dr. Hugh Tinker, India <& Pakistan, page 115
34. Murtza Ahmad Khan, Akhrai-i-Islam az Hind, 1948 (Urdu), P. 180
35. C. &. M. Gazette Sepember, 26, 1947
190
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
with new problems and often had no time to master their normal
functions and build contacts with the people.
The partition of the Punjab and the reorganization of the
Secretariats caused a number of vacancies almost in every depart¬
ment. In order to fill up the vacancies rapid promotions were
made, causing great inefficiency, both in the East and the West
Punjabs. Accompanied by on all round decline in society, corrup¬
tion which is the greatest bane of corporate life, rose its ugly head
in every form and permeated even the highest circles in adminis¬
tration.
Since the East Punjab Government had to spend huge sums
on the refugee resettlement, a Resources and Retrenchment
Committee was appointed in July 1948. It recommanded increased
water-rates and registration fee and a reduction of expenses on
contingencies, travelling allowance and salaries in order to make
the State financially sound.3® As a result of partition, Lahore
the ancient capital of the Punjab was left in Pakistan and a new
seat of administration had to be established in the East Punjab.
As a temporary measure, the Government headquarters were
located at Simla. But it was subsequently found that it could
never be a permanent capital on account of transport difficulties
and expensive living conditions there. It was, therefore, decided
that a new capital should be raised at the present site of Chandi¬
garh which enjoyed the advantage of being situated in a safe zone,
and was very central, being about 150 miles from Delhi, Hissar,
Ferozepore, Amritsar and Gurdaspur. It is said that the plan
for a new Capital when implemented, would result in a “new
town symbolic of the freedom of India unfettered by the tradition
of the past.”^’ In the beginning, the advisability of constructing a
new capital at such a very high cost was doubtful, keeping in view
the shattered economy of the East Punjab. But as time passed, people
were reconciled to the plan for a new capital which provided great
opportunities for planning and rebuilding life on a new pattern.
36. Statistical Abstract Punjab, Punjab Govt, page 263.
37. Ibid., page 190
AFTER-EFFECTS
191
Indo~Pakistan Water Dispute
One of the legacies of the partition of the Punjab was the
Indo-Pakistan water dispute. The partition adversely affected the
canal irrigation system, developed during the British rule. It
irrigated about 26 million acres—the largest irrigated area—the
U.S.A. had only 23 million irrigated acres. More than 26 million
people—equal the entire population of Italy—depended on the
waters of the Indus and its tributaries, flow of which has been
described as the “life blood” of the inhabitants. Some of the
canals in the Indus basin carried more water than the River
Thames in flood.®®
The disruption of the irrigation system caused by the partition
of the Punjab had two aspects :
(a) that which related to the canal headworks, and
(b) that which related to the canal water.
(a) The Canal Headworks Dispute
As previously discussed, the boundary line in the Punjab was
based on the district boundary lines.®® The Sulemanki Weir was in
the of Montgomery district in the West Punjab and its embank¬
ment was in the Ferozepur District in the East Punjab. Since the
Sulemanki Weir controlled the Pakpattan canal irrigating the
Montgomery and Multan Districts, and the Fordwah and Sadiqia
canals irrigating the Bahawalpur State—all flowing in Pakistan—the
Chairman of the Boundary Commission had stated in his award,
“It is my intention that this boundary line should ensure that the
headworks at Sulemanki will fall within the territorial jurisdiction
of the West Punjab. If the existing delimitation of the boundaries
of Montgomery District does not ensure this, I award to the Wset
Punjab so much of territory concerned as covers the headworks,
and the boundary shall be adjusted accordingly.”^®
As to how much territory was to cover the Sulemanki head-
works and whether the protective embankment was a part of the
headworks were the issues in dispute between the representatives
38. The Indus Water Dispute, Government of India, pp, 2, 6
39. Vide Chapter VI, The Award
40. Para 5, Raddiffe Award, Annexure A, see pages 93-94
192
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
of India and Pakistan* The West Punjab Government claimed 25
square miles in the Ferozequr District to cover the area of the Sule-
manki headworks, whereas the representative of the East Punjab
argued that the headworks was not to include the embankment
which was in the East Punjab.^^
There v/as also a dispute regarding the Ferozepur Weir which ^ai
controlled three canals. The Eastern and the Ganga Canals,
irrigated the Ferozepur District and the Bikaner State in the East P**'
Punjab, and the Depalpur Canal irrigated the Lahore and Mont-
gomery Districts in the West Punjab. Regarding the Ferozepur Pm
headworks, commonly known as the Hussainiwala headworks, the cor
Chairman of the Boundary Commission had stated, “But I must the
call attention to the fact that the Depalpur Canal which serves Th'
areas in the West Punjab takes off from the Ferozepur headworks, Pai
and I find that it is difficult to envisage a satisfactory demarcation the
of the boundary at this point that is not accompanied by some ves
arrangement for joint control of the intake of different canals Gc
dependent on these headworks”.^^ xhe West Punjab considered as
that the Award had recommended a joint control of the Ferozepur aa
headworks and, in order to, have this joint control the West Punjab n
had occupied 9.3 square miles of land or about 6fl00 acres in the Pq
Ferozepur District. The East Punjab Government maintained that
the Awaid only meant some sort of agreement between the two \^\
governments for the supply of water to the Depalpur Canal and by
not the joint control of the headworks itself. De
Both the governments continued to stick to their respective jqj
points of view. The dispute lingered on for over a decade, and
ultimately both issues were decided in the first week of January
1960. In the case of the Sulemanki Weir, the Indian Government jgj
surrendered about nine square miles of land comprising about
7000 acres along with the left marginal bund to Pakistan in order
to give her effective control of the headworks. In the case of the
Ferozepur Weir, Pakistan surrendered about 9.3 square miles of
41. Press communique issued by Indian Government Press Information, 44
Jullundur, January 1960 45 ^
42 Para 10, Radcliffe Awards see page, 91
liiMi
B
AFTER-EFFECTS
193
land to India. Thus the dispute regarding the canal headworks
ended amicably after about thirteen years.^s
(b) The Cana! Water Dispute
The boundary line between the East Punjab and the West
Punjab cut across a net work of canals. The Upper Bari Doab
Canal irrigated the districts of Lahore and Montgomery in the
West Punjab and had its headworks at Madhopur in the East
Punjab. Similarly, the Depalpur Canal which irrigated areas in the
West Punjab was controlled by the Ferozepur Weir in the East
Punjab. This disruption of the irrigation system had far-reaching
consequences. A dispute arose regarding the supply of water by
the East Punjab to the Upper Bari Doab and Depalpur canals.
The East Punjab Government contended that under the Punjab
Partition (Apportionment of Assets and Liabilities) Order 1947,
the proprietary rights of the waters of the rivers in the East Punjab
vested wholly in the East Punjab and that the West Punjab
Government could not claim any share of these waters
as of . right. The West Punjab Government argued that in
accordance with international law and equity, it had a right to the
waters of the East Punjab rivers as they flowed in the West
Punjab
An interim agreement for the supply of water to the canals
irrigating the West Punjab from the headworks in India was signed
by the Chief Engineers of the East Punjab and the West Punjab in
December, 1947. By this agreement, the supply of water was to be
continued upto the 31 March. 194S.^® Since this agreement had not
been renewed, the supply of water was discontinued from the 1st
April, 1948 It was revived after about three weeks, following an
agreement between the Chief Engineers of the East Punjab and the
West Punjab, by which the West Punjab Government agreed to
deposit immediately such sum adhoc sum as may be specified by the
43 Press Communique, Indian Government Press Information Bureau,
Jullundur, January, 1960
44. Indus Water Dispute, Government of India Publications, p. 6
45, Inter-Dominion Agreement of the 4th May 1948 on the Canal Water
Dispute. The Indus Water Dispute, op. cit., p. 19
194
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Prime Minister of India”4« By this agreement, Pakistan admitted
India’s superior claim to the rivers flowing through the East Punjab.
In the conference in 1948, India argued that it was the policy of the
united Punjab to develop irrigation in the western part where there
was a large area of crown-wasteland capable of yielding a quick
financial return and this postponed the development in the eastern
part where no major project was constructed after the opening of
the Sirhind Canal in 1882. After partition the East Punjab had only
a small proportion of revenue derived from irrigation, a small
share of water supplies of the rivers and a fraction of the canal-
irrigated area of the united Punjab. According to F.J. Fowler,
these arguments could not be assailed.
In July 1950, Pakistan refused to make payment to India on
the plea that the West Punjab had equal claims on the rivers
flowing in the East and West Punjabs. It was argued that wat* r
supplied to the Upper Bari Doab was from the River Ravi which
also flowed in Pakistan. The case with the Sutlej, which supplied
water to the Depalpur Canal, was similar This gave rise to a
complicated problem relating to the ownership of the waters of the
rivers of the Punjab for irrigation. Both sides continued to stress
their points of view without coming to any agreement, Later on
contrary to the India Government’s wishes, this matter was referred
to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. David E. Lilien-
thal, the distinguished former head of the Tennessee Valley Autho¬
rity and of the Atomic Energy Commission in the United States of
America suggested in August 1951 “that this unnecessary controversy
can be solved by commonsense and engineering to the benefit of
the people who live by the waters of the Indus River...This is not a
religious or political problem, but a feasible engineering and
business problem for which there is plenty of precedent and relevant
experience.”^® In 1952, Mr Eugene R. Black, Chairman of the
46. Para No. 5 of the Inter-Dominion A^greement of 4th. May, 1948 Indus
Water Dispute, p. 19
47. Some Problems of Water Distribution Between East and West Punjab
F. J. Fowler, Geographical Review, London 1954, p. 588
48. J.S Bains, India’s International Disputes, Bombay, p, 43
AFTER EFFECTS
195
World Bank, suggested that engineers of the two countries along
with technical representatives of the Bank should visit the irrigation
works and sites in India and Pakistan. After a six-week tour and as
“an impartial observer free to express his views on any aspect of the
matter,” he submitted a compromise plan on February 5, 1955. The
main points of this plan were :
1. The entire flow of the three western rivers of the Indus
system (the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) would be available
for the exclusive use of the West Punjab (Pakistan), except
for a small volume of water for Kashmir.
2. The entire flow of the three eastern rivers (the Ravi, Beas
and Sutlej) would be available for the exclusive use of
the East Punjeb (India), with an exception that for a
specified transitional period India would supply to Pakistan
“her historic with-drawals from these rivers”. This
estimated period would be worked out on the basis of the
time required to complete the “link canals” needed in
Pakistan to replace these supplies.
3. Each country would construct and pay for the works
located in its territory but India would also bear the
cost of link canals in Pakistan needed to replace the
supplies from India to the extent of the benefit derived by
her thereform. This was expected to amount to between
Rs. 40/- crores and Rs. 60 crores.^*
A mission from the World Bank visited India and Pakistan in
March and April 1955 and toured the areas concerned in both coun¬
tries together with Indian and Pakistani engineers and official. Mr
Eugene Black again visited India and Pakistan in May 1959 and
secured agreement of both the Governments to work on his plan to
a successful completion of link canals. According to Mr Black, the
entire project of link canals would CDSt 1000 million dollars and
was to be completed within ten years. The Governments of the
49. Background to the News, Research and Reference Division Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, Vol. No. 7, dated June 15, 1957, pages
43-46. Subsequently these were included in the Article No. II and III, the
Indus Water Treaty of 1960.
196
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
U.K., the U.S.A , Australia, Canada agreed in principle to contri¬
bute to the Indus Valley Fund which was to undertake the cons¬
truction of the link canals in Pakistan.®® The Governments of India
and Pakistan finally agreed to sign the Indus Water Treaty, the
draft of which had been prepared by the World Bank in consulta¬
tion with their representatives on the above mentioned lines. The
Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan signed the
Indus Water Treaty in Rawalpindi on September 18, 1960.®^ In
this way a dispute more than a decade old ended amicably.
In the preamble of the Indus Waters Treaty it was stated,
“The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, being
equally desirous of attaining the most complete and satisfactory
utilisation of the waters of the Indus system of rivers and recogni¬
sing the need, therefore, of i xing and delimiting, in a spirit of
goodwill and friendship, the rights and obligations of each in
relation to the other concerning the use of waters and of making
provision for the settlement in a cooperative spirit, of all such
questions as may here-after arise...have resolved to conclude a
treaty in furtherance of these objective.”®^
Indeed, the Indus Waters Treaty®® was indicative of the spirit
of accommodation and co-operation. By this Treaty, India agreed
to continue the status quo for the supply of water to Pakistan for
ten years and also agreed to extend financial assistance for the
construction of her link canals. By this Treaty, India obtained 20
per cent of the total flow of the Indus waters, whereas Pakistan
received 80 per cent, because the westerly rivers had much more
volume of water than the easterly ones.®^ Pakistan secured the
financial assistance not only from India but also from other
countries, like the U.S.A. the UK., Australia and Canada.
50. The TribunCy Ambala dated June 19, 1959
51. Ibid, September 20, 1960
52. The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, p. 1
53. The Indus Waters Treaty consisted of twelve articles and e/ght annexures
dealing with diflFerent data relating to the waters of the rivers and their
use for agricultural purposes, both in India and Pakistan.
54. The Indus Water Dispute, p. 15. The annual flow of three eastern
rivers (the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej) is about one fourth of that of
the three western rivers (the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab).
EPILOGUE
After the publication of my first edition of the Partition of the
Punjab 1947 the limit of fifty years has been reduced to thirty years
on the release of records in England. Consequently a number of
series of records like Mountbatten papers etc., etc. have been made
available to the scholars. It will, therefore, be advisable to discuss
some of the controversial issues in light of newly released records.
According to Malcolm Darling, “The tragedy of the Punjab
could have been foreseen and we should not have handed over
millions of helpless peasants, for whose welfare we were responsi¬
ble, to anarchy and ruin.^” Penderal Moon has rightly lamented,
as to why the “ending of British Raj, which we have so long
foreseen and so long proclaimed as our goal, should involve a
last minute division of the country, the precipitate, enforced
migration of well over ten million people and casualties of the
order of 2,00,000.” He has described this as “a singular want of
pre-vision and failure of statesmanship.^”
Malcolm Darling has observed “Had the Hindus and the
Muslims alone been concerned, division of the Punjab might have
been effected without bloobshed.®” The Sikhs were as determined
to prevent domination by the Muslims as Muslims were domina¬
tion by the Hindus. The Nehru Report staled, “The communal
problem of India is primarily the Hindu-Muslim problem. The
Sikhs in the Punjab are an important and well-knit minority which
cannot be ignored.'^” The working Committees of the Shromani
Akali Dal and the Panthic Pratinidhi Board jointly passed a
resolution on June 14, 1947 emphasising that, “in the absence of
the provision of transfer of population and property and the very
purpose of partition would be defeated,®” An earlier resolution of
1 . Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Disorders, The Hindu, Madras, Oct. 11,
1947.
2. Penderal Moon, Divide and Quit, London, 1961, page 283.
1. Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Disorders, The Hindu, Madras, Oct. 11,
1947.
4. All Parties Conference Allahabad 1928, page 27.
5. C <6 M Gazette, Lahore June 15, 1947.
198
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Shromani Akali Dal passed on April 16, 1947 states : “Shromani
Akali Dal demands that before transfer of power to Indian hands
in June 1948 (which date was first fixed) the Punjab should be
divided into two provinces. The Shromani Akali Dal further
demands that facilities be provided for exchange of population
and property.**’ The Sikh leaders had stated in a memorandum to
the Sapru Conciliation Committee, “We have been asked as to
whether we have any views to express in case the Pakistan scheme
is imposed on us by an authority whose power we cannot hope
to challenge successfully and which may ^e the British Govern¬
ment or the agreed will of the Hindus and Muslims of India.
In that case we would insist on the creation of a separate Sikh
State.with provision for the transfer and exchange of
population.’’’
Had the Viceroy made an effort to explore every angle of
that complex situation in the Punjab, he would have surely
secured some political arrangement in this regard between the
Akalis and the Muslim League. As the subsequent events have
proved, Mr. Jinnah would have agreed to the transfer of popula¬
tion. This presumption is based on the following grounds : —
1. When Lord Ismay approached Mr. Jinnah in early August
1947 to issue a statement assuring the Sikhs their religious
freedom and categorically stating that Pakistan was as ’much for
the Sikhs as for the Muslims, the latter refused to issue any
such statement®.
2. The letter of Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of the West
Punjab, to Mr. Jinnah proves beyond doubt that the Sikhs were
not wanted in Pakistan. Sir Francis wrote, “I am telling every
one that I do not care how the Sikhs get across the border the
great thing is to get rid of them as soon as possible.®”
6 . The Hindu, Madras, July 16, 1947; lOR Dy No. 1497 GG 23.4.1947
File MB 120, India Office Records, London.
7. Constitutional Proposals of Sapru Committee, 2nd Edition, 1946, page LX.
8 . Lord Ismay’s conversation with the writer as recorded in Panjab Past and
Present April 1982 p. 216.
9. Vide chapter “Nature <& Causes of Migration.”
EPILOGUE
199
.3 Giani Kartar Singh told the writer that he had information
in 1947 that Mr. Jinnah had instructed Sir Francis Mudie to turn
out the Sikhs from the West Punjab. It was this reason for which
he went to Lyallpur to exhort the Sikhs to migrate to India.^®
4. Mr. Jinnah told Sir Francis after the August 15. 1947
that when he had proposed exchange of population, people laughed
at him. Exactly the same thing was happening which he had said
several years previously.^ ^
5. As discussed earlier Mr. Jinnah was in favour of an
exchange of population on communal basis and he had given
public statements to that effect
Had the provision for the transfer of Sikh population from
the West Punjab to the East Punjab been made in the 3rd June
Plan or an Indo-Pakistan Board been constituted to facilitate the
transfer of population with an exchange of property, the Sikhs
would have been satisfied to some extent. There were certain
proposals to make some adjustments. V. P. Menon and Major
Short suggested that Nankana Sahib might be given ‘Vatican’
status.^® Sir Evan Jenkin, Governor of the Punjab, had suggested
that the Montgomery district might be allotted to the East Punjab
in order to accommodate the Sikh colonists in the West Punjab.^*
But nothing came out of these suggestions.
A Akali-Muslim League settlement would have perhaps mini¬
mised the communal conflict. But as Alan Campbell Johnson
stated the leaders of both communities were small men, who were
called upon to grapple with big events. He stated -‘The local
Muslim League leaders claim to take over power in the Punjab
with seven per cent communal majority was no more constructive
than the Sikh insistence upon the partition of the province and at
10 . Giani Kartar Singh’s conversation with the writer.
11 . Sir Francis Mudie’s conversation with the writer as recorded in Panjab
Past and Present, April 1981, p. 81.
12 . Vide Chapter “Nature & Causes of Migration.”
13. Lonald Moseley, The Last Days of British Roj, London 1961, lOR MB
File No. 130. India Office Records, London.
14. Ibid, page 212. Transfer of Power, Vol. XII, Document 56.
200
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
the same time retention of the right to choose >\hich section of it
they would join.Francis William quoted Lord Attlee as saying
that Mr. Jinnah was “not a man 1 ever thought high of. I had
known him since 1927.”^® When the writer discussed with Lord
Attlee the causes of the bloodshed which followed the transfer of
power, the latter remarked that the Government at that time
bogged down with Mr. Jinnah who could not rise to the occasion.^’
Had Mr. Jinnah allowed the Muslim League leaders of Punjab to
come to some sort of understanding with the Sikh leaders-out of
court agreement as Sir Evan Jenkins suggested-the history of this
region would have been different.
The employment of British troops might have suppressed the
communal rioting for the time being. But the British troops
though available^® after the 15th August could not be employed on
account of certain technical difficulties. Lord Attlee writes, “But
it is exiomatic in the British Commonwealth that the British troops
can only be employed under the orders of the British Government
at Westminister. You cannot hand over British troops as mer-
cenaris to the will of a Prime Minister of another part of the
Commonwealth. We could not put our people in the position of
fighting on the decision of another Government.^®’’
In order to meet the Sikh point of view as presented by Akali
party some Britishers in India were exercising their mind. One
such British Officer was Sir Edward Penderal Moon 1. C. S. He
had served the Indian Government from 1929 to 1944 and for
sometime he was the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar. He was
appointed Secretary Development Board 1946*47. During 1947
he was working as Revenue and Public Works Minister in Bahawal-
pur State now in Pakistan. Later on he wrote a book ‘^Divide and
15. Reflection on Transfer of Power, Asiatic Review, July 1952.
16. A Prime Minister Remembers, page 211.
17. Writers conversation with Lord Attlee. Panjab Past and Present ^^x\\
1982, p. 220.
18. Sir Francis Mudie had suggested to Lord Mountbatten to employ
British troops to quell communal liots in the Punjab and they were avail¬
able at Karachi. Panjab Past and Present April 1981, p. 89.
19. Francis William, A Prime Minister Remembers, Tronto, 1981, p. 204-5.
EPILOGUE
201
Quit’' and was the co-editor of Transfer of Power series published
by Her Majesty’s Govt, in England. He made two proposals after
the 3rd June Plan. First was the formation of East Punjab and
the second was joining of East Punjab with Pakistan.
While addressing Lord Ismay, Moon put forth a proposal that
the East Punjab might be formed wherein the Sikh population from
the West Punjab might be migrated. He stated, “It will consi¬
derably facilitate matters if it can be so arranged tnat the new
Eastern Punjab has the strongest Sikh complexion and does not,
therefore, include Gurgaon, Hissar, Rohtak and Karnal. The
Sikhs have already put this demand to Congress who hesitate to
accept it. I would suggest that this Sikh demand should be
encouraged and conceded. You can doubtless be of assistance
in this regard.”^®
It stems that the above proposal was considered at the highest
level and was discussed by Lord Mountbattcn with Pandit
Jawahar Lai Nehru and Mr. Jinnah but it was some how or the
other not considered feasible. There is an indication of this fact
in the letter of Lord Ismay to Moon dated 31 July, 1947 : “The
idea of eliminating Hindi speaking parts of eastern Punjab and
thus dividing the poor Punjab into three bits instead of two was
put to His Excellency, but both the leaders agreed that it was not
possible for H. E. himself to meet their claim now. They seemed
fairly content with his promise to write and draw the attention of
leaders to their request and H. E. has done this.^^’*
Lord Ismay ended his letter by appreciating Moon’s proposal.
But there were fifteen days left and he argued things had gone
too far making any change in the 3rd June Plan. He replied .
“From the point of view of avoiding a row in the central Punjab,
I expect that you are right about the best course to adopt. But
things have gone much too far for H. M. G. to be able to take a
hand and if provincial boundaries are again to be redrawn it would
20. Transfer of Power, Vol. XI Ed, N. Mansergh and P. Moon, British
Government, London 1982, p. 692 (Document No. 371,)
21. Transfer of Power, Vol. XI, (Document No. 373) page 846.
202
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
have to be done by the successor authorities.”^^
Sir Penderal was not content with the formation of Sikh
dominated East Punjab. That was perhaps the step in the right
direction. But he went a step further and suggested The step
would be to indicate that it is optional for this Sikh Eastern
Punjab to join either Hindustan or Pakistan and there is no
presumption that it must join one rather than the other. “The
Sikhs will probably make this clear themselves, but if they ask for
some pronouncement to this effect from H. M. G. it will probably
be advisable to accede to their request.^^”
Sir Penderal Moon advocated Sikh Muslim accord as a
solution of the Punjab problem. He wrote to Lord Tsmay, the
Chief of Lord Mountbatten staff, “without Sikh Muslim Pact there
will be a chaos in the northen India.^^” Moon had been persua¬
ding the Muslim League leaders to come to terms with the Sikhs.
In his communication to Lord Ismay dated 27th June 1947 he
stated “Feroz Khan Noon made, I understand, a direct approach
to them (Sikhs) indicating that the Muslims would grant them
special concessions if they would throw their lot with Pakistan but
he met with rebuff. This was to be expected. Sikhs are still
smarting from the injuries inflicted on them by the Muslims.^®”
Sir Penderal Moon was pursuading the Sikhs to join Pakistan.
He wrote to Lord Ismay “Certain Sikhs in touch with both Baldev
Singh and Tara Singh are going to formulate informally and
entirely privately the Sikh conditions for joining Pakistan. If these
offer, as I believe, they will be, a possible basis for negotiation,
certain Muslim League leaders will be informally approached.26”
Moon was not deterred by the rebuff of the Sikhs as he
himself reported to Lord Ismay. He counselled patience in this
respect and wrote in the same letter “They should not look
for any immediate results, there is yet hope that with
22. Ibid.
23. Transfer of Power, Vol XI, p, 692, (Document No. 371).
24. Transfer of Power, Vol. XI, Document No. 371.
25. Ibid.
26. Transfer of Power, Vol. XI, (Document No. 371), page 692.
EPILOGUE
203
patience and perseverance that the Sikhs will be brought to the
view that Eastern Punjab which must in any case be formed
should join Pakistan.^’”
There are certain convictions which prevented Sikhs to
join hands with Pakistan. For this purpose we have to understand
the Sikh psyche. In all gurdwaras they repeat the litanical prayer
viz ‘Hail all those martyrs who suffered for the sake of religion.
Hail those who were cut to pieces, boiled alive in cauldrons and
were tortured to death by removing their skins from their bodies.”
This refers to the tortures inflicted on the Sikhs during the rule
of later Mughals and it did not foster happy memories among
the Sikhs about the Muslims rule. Eversince the introduction of
provincial autonomy in Punjab, Sikhs have b^en complaining
against the Muslim domination. This led to anti-Muslims bias
especially due to the domination by the Muslims in affairs of
Punjab. To crown all in the communal riots o^ March 1947 in
Rawalpindi District a large number of Sikhs had been made
target by the Muslim fanatics. No Muslim leader expressed
regrets over these merciless killings of Hindus and Sikhs. This had
made compromise with Muslim League almost impossible in that
tense atmosphere. In connection with the Sikhs the correspondence
exchanged between Lord Mountbatten and Pandit Jawahar Lai
Nehru which is available in Mountbatten papers is quite revealing.
In his D. O. letter dated 4th July 1947 Lord Mountbatten writes
to Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru : —
“As a result of discussions I have had from time to time with
the Sikh leaders I should like to put to you their point of view.
2. “They are naturally worried about the position in the
Punjab where unless major alterations are made by the Boundary
Commission, the Sikh community will be divided that almost half
will remain in the Muslim province of Western Punjab.
3. “They hope that the Boundary Commission will make such
major alterations. But that is not a point which immediately
concerns the political parties. Apart from this they ask for
204
PARTITION OF PUNJAB * "
/
assurances that they will have weightage in the legislature of
Eastern Punjab. They hope also that they will have weightage
in the Central Houses of Union of India and a seat in Union
Government.
4 “They have suggested that they should have special repre-
sentation in the existing Constituent Assembly. Clearly T cannot
help them on this point or indeed on any of others except by
approaching you, but you may wish to consider the matter.
5. “Finally they have suggested that the transfer of popula¬
tion should seriously be considered in the Punjab.
6. “I expect all these points have been put to you but I
should like to tell you how much I sympathise with the Sikhs and
how much I hope you will be able to help them.”
Similar letter with almost identical contents was addressed
by Lord Mountbatten to Mr Jinnah. It appears that Mr. Jinnah
did not reply as his reply is not available in the Mountbatten
papers. However, Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru did send a reply
dated 17th July 1947 which is as follows :—
“Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I thank you for your letter of the 4th July regarding your
discussions with the Sikh leaders.
2. “We appreciate thoroughly the anxiety of the Sikhs. They
have been hard hit by this division. They might be helped some¬
what by the decisions of the Boundary Commission. As for
assurances in regard to weightage etc., I fear this raises compli¬
cated issues. All our troubles or nearly all, have been due to the
separate-electorates and system of weightage originally introduced
for the Muslims. It became clear that this did little to the
minority concerned and only created separatist tendencies. The
addition of a seat or two makes no essential difference. But it
means the acceptance of a fundamentally wrong principle. Once
admitted this principle leads to far reaching consequences and ill-
will. It is possible of course, that without weightage and separate
electorate some kind of reservation might be given with freedom
to contest the general seats also. We should like to help any
minorities getting additional seats from general constituencies.
EPILOGUE
205
3. “The question of transfer of population does not rise
immediately. If the people concerned desire it, it must be seriously
considered.^®’*
The delay in announcement of Punjab Boundary Award,
some-how other caused suspicion in Pakistan that eleventh hour
changes have been made in the award. But there were several
reasons for this delay. Unlike Bengal or Assam Boundary Awards
the Punjab Boundary Award was of crucial significance. The
success of the entire Partition Plan depended upon its acceptance
by both the parties. The time for its announcement was dis¬
cussed several times in the staff meetings of Lord Mountbatten.
The last Viceroy explains the delay. “The final Punjab Boundary
Award was not completed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe until 13th August.
As I was on the point of leaving for Karachi to attend the
Independence ceremonies there on the 14th when it was sub¬
mitted and on the following day saw the Independence ceremonies
in Delhi. I then held up the Award until I could discuss it with
Pandit Nehru and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on 16th August.^®’*
The most important communication which caused a lot of
misunderstanding was the letter of Sir George Abell, Private
Secretary, Lord Mountbatten. It was addressed to Abbot, Private
Secretary to Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab. It was
dated 8 August and it reads as follows :—
“I enclose a map showing roughly the boundary which Sir
Cyril Radcliffe proposes to demarcate in his award, and a note
by Christopher Beaumont describing it. There will not be any
great changes from this boundary, but it will have to be
accurately defined with reference to village and zail boundaries
in Lahore district.
“The award itself is expected within next 48 hours and I
will let you know later about the probable time of announcement.
Perhaps you would ring me up if H. E. the Governor has any
views on this point.®®”
28. I.O.R.—MB—149 India Office photo copies of Mountbatten Papers.
29. IOR/L/PFJ/10/119, Mountbatten’s letter dated 19.3.1948.
30. Transfer of Power ^ Vol. XII; Documents No. 377; page 579.
206
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Lord Mountbatten wrote to Lord Israay regarding Abell’s
letter on 2nd April 1948. So far as my memory serves me the
first indication I had that the Award was almost ready when
George Abell informed me (it must have been on 9th August)
that he had sent up a note to Jenkins the night before giving
him a preliraina ry forecast of where the boundary was likely to
be drawn. He did not consult me before sending off this fore¬
cast (nor did he show it to me) because he said that it was done
on “staff level” and that he had obtained it from Beaumont
(Radcliffe’s Secretary) merely to give Jenkins an early warning
of what was lilcely to be coming. I might add that none of my
present staff nor John Christie whom I have consulted, knew that
forecast had been sent, nor did I see the forecast so far as I
remember.®^” In April 1948 in a telegram to Lord Ismay
Mountbatten made the following comment about this letter of
Sir G. Abell’s letter addressed to Mr. Abbot:—“The point that
rises here was that Abell sent the letter concerned without my
knowledge. It may be hard to convince people that it was so.
It will look to have been as odd procedure.*^” In another letter
to Sir Evan Jenkins dated 19th March, 1948 Lord Mountbatten
stated, “The information given in Abell’s letter about the date
when the Award would be ready was of course wrong.®®”
Sir Evan Jenkins in a letter dated 7th April, 1948 to Lord
Mountbatten in which he discussed the points of controversy
which had risen over the Punjab Boundary Award described the
two documents in question as follows :—“The enclosures were a
schedule (I think typed) and a section of a printed map with
a line drawn there on together showing boundary which included
in Pakistan a sharp salient in Ferozepur District. The salient
enclosed the whole of Ferozepur and Zira Tehsils” Jenkins also
stated that “about 10th cr 11th August when we were still
expecting the Award on 13th August at latest I received a secra-
31. Ismay III/7/136, University of London Kings College—Centre of Military
Archives-London.
32. I. O. R/L/PFJ/10/119. India Office Records, London.
33. Ibid.
EPILOGUE
207
phone message from Viceroy’s House containing the words,
“Eliminate salient,” This change caused some surprise.^^”
Lord Mounibatten concluded, “But the assumption that can
be drawn is that the line indicated in the document attached to
Abell’s letter was only a tentative one and it was amended subse¬
quently to balance the Bengal Boundary line.ss”
Sir Cyril Radcliffe later on Lord Radcliffe told the writer that
he had drawn several lines to determine the boundary line bet\\een
East and West Punjab. One such line was sent to Lahore but that
was not the final line. The final line was in the Punjab Boundary
Award.
Lord Mountbatten in a personal letter dated April 2, 1948
wrote to Lord Ismay, “I shall always be grateful to you for having
cautioned me not to try and bring any direct influence to bear on
Radcliffe concerning the actual Award beyond expressing the
following general view So far as I remember, I said to him that
Sikh attitude had become rather worse than we had anticipated
and when he was balancing up boundaries of East and Wcbt
Pakistan I sincerely hoped that he would bear the Sikh problem
in mind. I think I went so far as to say that provided he was
really satisfied that the overall decision, both East and West, as
absolutely fair to both communities then 1 trusted that any
generosity to Pakistan should be given more in Bengal than in
Punjab since there was no Sikh problem in Bengal.®®”
The main issue which subsequently emerged was whether
tehsils of Zira and Ferozepur of District Ferozepur should have
been included in the West Punjab or in the East Punjab. In the
tentative sketch plan of partition and in the forecast these two
tehsils were allotted to the West Punjab but in the actual Award
these tehsils were earmarked for East Punjab.
34. /6W Jenkins letter to Mountbatten dated 7th April, 1948.
35. Ibid Mountbatten’s letter to Jenkins dated I9th, March, 1947.
36. Ismay-III/7/246, University of London Kings College— Centre of Military
Archives. London.
APPENDIX
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The British Records
The records preserved in the India Office Records and Library
London, edited by Nicholas Mansergh, E. W. R. Lumby and
Penderal Moon and published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,
London from 1970 to 1983 A.D. with following titles
The Transfer of Power 1942—
1947 Vol 1
—do—
Vol II
—do—
Vol III
—do—
Vol IV
—do—
Vol V
-do-
Vol VI
—do—
Vol VII
—do—
Vol VIII
-do-
Vol IX
—do—
Vol X
—do—
Vol XI
—do—
Vol XII
Government of India Records^ New Delhi
Ministry of Rehabilitation
, Government of India
Partition Proceedings
Volume I
do
Volume II
do
Volume III
do
Volume IV
do
Volume V
do
Volume VI
do
Volume VII
do
Volume VIII
Punjab Government Secretariat,
Partition Branch Records
(1) Files Nos,
CR. 260-EX-47, CF. 277-ER-47, CF, 311-ER-47, CF. 313 ER-47.
CF. 315-ER-47, CF. 339-ER-47, CF. 350-ER-47, CR. 352-ER-47.
CF. 354-ER-47, CF. 364-ER-47, CF. 367-ER-47, CF. 373-ER-47.
BIBLIOQRAPHY
209
CF. 385-ER-47,
CF. 398-ER-47,
CR. 424-ER-47,
CF. 227-ER-48,
CF. 355-ER-47,
CF. 444-ER-48,
CF. 523-ER-48,
CF. 609-ER-48,
CF. 703-ER-48,
CR. 7I1-ER-48,
CF. 101(2)-
ER-49,
CF. 101(12)-
ER-49,
CR. 172-ER-49,
CR. 254-ER-49,
CF. 349-ER-49,
CF. 463-ER-49,
CF. 386-ER-47, CF. 390-ER-47, CF.
CF. 404-ER-47, CF. 407-ER-47, CF.
CF. 431-ER-47, CF. 170-ER-48, CF.
CF. 246-EK-48. CF. 253-ER-48, CF.
CF. 430-ER-48, CF.'438-ER-48, CF.
CF. 449-ER-48, CF, 502-ER-48, CF.
CF. 566-ER-48, CF. 579-ER-48, CF.
CF. 677-ER-48, CF. 679-ER-48, CF.
CF. 706-ER-48, CF. 706-ER-48. CF,
CR. 785-ER-48. CF. 43-ER-49, CF.
CF. 101(10)- CF. 101(11)-
ER-49, ER-49.
CF. 101(17)- CF. 119-ER-49.
ER-49,
CF. 176-ER-49, CF. 251-ER-49, CF.
CF. 258-ER-49, CF. 261-ER-49, CF.
CF. 382-ER-49, CF. 383-ER-49, CF.
CF. 30-ER-51.
397-ER-47.
423-ER-47.
218-ER-48.
321-ER-48.
439-ER-48.
531-ER-48.
592-ER-48.
696-ER-48.
710-ER-48.
10(l)ER-49.
252-ER-49.
223-ER-49.
453-ER-49.
These files give very valuable information regarding various
items, viz, the derailment of trains, the massacre of the passengers,
cases of abduction of women, and measures to restore law and
order, the proceedings of various sub-committees, day-to-day
reports of law and the order in both the punjabs.
(2) (/) Agendas of the Punjab Partition Committee.
(ii) Decisions of the Punjab Partition Committee.
(Hi) Awards of Arbitral Tril unal on the cases referred to by
the Punjab Partition Committee.
(iv) The Punjab Governor’s Partition Orders, 1947.
Punjab State Archieves, Patiala
The East Punjab Liaison Agency Records :
Files No. LV/I/52-VI11, LV/2/25, LV/3/25, LV/4/25, LV/5/25,
LV/8/25, LV/9/25, LV/10/25, LV/11/25, LV/12/25, LV/14/25, LV/
26/41-EV, LV/28. File No. VII/42, VII/55, X1V/8/7-N, XlV/16/
14/pt-I, XXI/3, XXl/5, XXIl/3, XXlI/6, XXlII/1. XX/8/3, XXllI/
6, XXlV/2, XXV/1, XXX/3, XXV/4, XVII,T3/2. E(pt-l), LVII/
16-5 (pt-1), LVlI/17/5 (pt-II), LVII/20-7-A, LVII/22/8-B, LVII/24/
210
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
35 (pt-II), LVII/19/6(Pt. II), LVII/30/8-A, LVII/1/81-A, LVIII/2/
84, LVIII/12/164. LVIII/4/91, LVlI/5/94, LV1II/6/94-A, LVIII/14/
17(pt. II), LVIII/24. 117, LIX/2, LIX/3, LIX/4, LlX/5, LlX/6.
LIX/7, LIX/8, LIX/9, LlX/11, LIX/12, XXV/7, XXI/1, XXII/2,
XXlV/1, XXlV/2.
These files pertain to various aspects of evacuation and
recovery work in all the districts of the West Punjab (Pakistan).
Records of the Sikh History Reseerch Department
Khalsa College^ Amritsar
1. File No, S.H.R. 1804-Documents relating to the Sikhs
during the British Rule.
2. File No. S.H.R. 1815-Records relating to the Partition of
the Punjab 1947.
Item No. 4—Master Tara Singh’s letter to Sir Stafford
Criffs, dated May 1, 1942.
Item No. 3—Ambala Division Sikhs resolution against the
Corbett scheme for separating the Ambala Division from
’ the Punjab.
Item No. 5—Memoradum submitted to the Cabinet
Mission by the Shiromani Akali Dal, Amritsar
3. File No S.H.R. 3755— Statement of Major J.M. Short.
Government of India Publications
1. After Partition, Publication Division, Govt, of India.
2. Millions on the Move, -do-
3. Concerning Evacues Property, »do-
4. Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration Act 1949)
LXV.
5. Indus Water Dispute,
6. Indo~Pakistan Relations.
7. Indus Water Treaty^ I960.
.8. Recovery and Restoration of Abducted Persons in India^
Ministry of External Affairs.
9. Press Communique Ministry of External Affairs X.P.
Division dated Jan. 11, 1960.
10. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Reference
Series No. 21 and 22. 1946.
I
BIBLIOGRAPHY
211
IL Background of the Newsy Research & Reference Division,
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting :—
Vol. 1-37
Vol. V-No. 7
Vol. VI-25, 28, 41.
Punjab Government Publications
1. Orphans of the Storm.
2. Millions Live Again.
3. Rural Rehabilitation in East Punjab.
4. Relief and Rehabilitation in the Punjab.
5. Punjab—Independence to Republic.
6. Statistical Abstract 1947-50.
7. Punjab on the March (Police and Jail) 1951.
8.
-do-
(P.W.D.) 1951.
9.
-do-
(Local Self Government) 1951.
10.
-do-
(Grow More Food) 1951.
11.
-do-
(Industries and Civil Supplies).
12.
-do-
(Rehabilitation).
13.
-do-
(Education and Health).
14.
-do-
(Irrigation).
15. {Punjab on the March (Fisheries and Forest) 1951.
16. -do- (New Projects) 1951.
17. Industrial Development in Punjab.
18. Power for Prosperity.
19. Quasi Permanent Allotment of Land in Punjab.
20. Punjab Administration Reports 1849-51, 1868-69.
21. Annual Report on Land Revenue Administration 1949.
22. On Road to Progress^ 1952-53.
23. Punjab Rehabilitation, Land Settlement Mannual.
24. East Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates Vo\. 1,1947.
25. Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 1940.
\
West Punjab and Pakistan Governments Publications
1. A Note on Sikh Plan.
2. Sikh Plan in Action.
3. Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh.
4. Intelligence Report Concerning Tribal Repercussions*
212
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
5. Hindu & Sikh Women Recovered in Pakistan Vol I &
Vol. II.
6. West Punjab Governor’s Ordinance No. IV, 1947.
Extraordinary Issue of West Punjab Gazette Sept 10, 1947.
7‘. First Year of Pakistan^ Karachi.
8. Economy of Pakistany Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Karachi (1950).
9. Pakistan Reporty Food & Agriculture Organisationy Karachi.
10. Five Years of Pakistan, Karachi,
11. West Pakistan Year Book 1958.
12. Ten Years of Pakistan 1947-57.
13. Our Struggle 1857-1947,
Government of India Reports
1. Reports relating to the Cabinet Mission 1946.
2. Census of India Report Vol. VI. Punjab 1941.
3. -do- Vol. XVII. Part I Punjab 1931.
4. -do. Vol. XV, Punjab 1921
5. Government of India Act 1935.
6. Proceedings of Indian Round Table Conference Vol. If I,
1932.
7. Franchise Committee Report, Punjab Statutory Commission-
Calcutta-1930.
8. Report of Statutory Comm/5’5/on-Calcutta-1930.
9. Report of Franchise Comm/7/ee-Constitutional Reforms-
Calcutta-1919.
10. India’s Despatch of March 5, 1919 and connected Papers
Calcutta-1919.
Parliamentary Debates House of Commons, England
Hansard Volumes Nos. 430, 433, 434, 440.
Indian Annual Registers
Indian Annual Registers, Calcutta for the years
1923 Vol. 1 & Vol. II
1924 Vol. I & Vol. II
1940 Vol. I & Vol. II
1946 Vol. I & Vol. II
1947 Vol. I & Vol. II
BIBLIOGRAHPY
213
Journals
1. Problems of Public and Private, International Law, Vol. 36,
London.
“Arbitral Tribunal in India” Sir Patrick Spens.
2. Eastern World London, November 1947.
“Displaced Persons in India” R.L C. Foottit.
3. International Labour Review, London March 1952.
“Displaced Persons in Pakistan”
4. Asiatic Review, LondiOxy, 1948.
“The Boundary Award in the Punjab” Dr. Oskar Spate,
5. Asiatic Review, London, Jan 1948.
“India & Pakistan” Sir Arthur Waugh.
6’ Asiatic Review, London, Ja.n 1948.
“Indian Revisited” Sir Percival Griffiths.
7. Asiatic Review, London, July 1948.
“External Problems of India & Pakistan”, Sir Olaf Carce.
8. - Asiatic Review, London, October 1948.
“Lord Mountbatten on His Viceroyalty” Lord Mountbatten.
9. Asiatic Review, London Oct. 1948.
“Transfer of Power in India & Since” Lord Clydesmuir.
10. Asiatic Review, London July. 1952.
“Reflection on Transfer of Power,” Alan Campbell-Johnson
11. Geographical Journal, London, April 1948.
“The Partititon of Punjab & Bengal” O.H.K. Spate.
12. Indian Quarterly, Dec. 1948.
“Partition of India”
13. Hindustan Review, June 1948.
“How 8l Why Partition of the Punjab” Mangal Singh,
14. Pakistan Quarterly, Karanchi, Vol. Ill No. 4.
“Life in the Punjab” Winifred Holmes.
15. Pakistan Quarterly, Vol. No. 1.
“Social Welfare Work in Pakistan’*
Newspaper Files
1. The New Statesman and Nations, London, 19^7.
2. The Times, London, 1947.
3. The Statesman, New Delhi, 1947.
214
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
4. The Hindu, Madras, 1947.
5. The Times of India, Bombay, 1947.
6. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 1947.
7. The Dawn, Delhi, 1947.
8. The Indian News Chronicle, New Delhi, 1947.
9. The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 1947.
10. The Tribune, Lahore 1924 and 1947.
11. 772e Ambala-1960
Books in Urdu
1. Akhraj-i-Islam Az Hind by Murtza Ahmad Khan, Lahore,
1948.
2. Khoon Ki Holi, Farrukh, Amritsari.
3. Ah ! Jullundur, Lahore.
4. Mehsharistan-i-Kapurthala, Pakpattan.
5. Punjab Ki Tarikh Ke Khuni Aurak, Patiala.
6. Makhdumpur Ke Khooni Halat, Rohtak.
Books in Punjabi
1. 7947, Chief Khalsa Dewan Amritsar.
2. Shahidan de Yad, by Chakar Kaur Singh, Delhi.
3. Punjab da Khooni Itihas by Narinder Singh, Amritsar.
4. Shahidi Saka Pind Roda, District Shahpur, Ambala.
5. Pakistani Challughara, by Giani Partap Singh, Amritsar.
6. Saka Bhuller, by Dr Virsa Singh, Amritsar.
7. Congress te Sikh, by Master Tara Singh, Amritsar, 1945.
8. Swagti Aadress Azad Punjab Conference, 1944.
9. Meray Pakistan de Safar, by Akali Chakkar Kaur Singh,
Edited by Kirpal Singh, Amritsar, 1959.
Memoirs, and Speeches
1. Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten,
Robert Hale Ltd., London 1951.
2. C.R. Attlee, As it Happened, William Heineman Ltd.
London.
3. Francis William, A Prime Minister Remembers, Hienemann
Toronto 1961.
4. Francis Tuker, Wnile Memory Serves, Cassel & Ca.
London, 1950.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
215
5. Penderal Moon, Divide & Quit, Chatto & Windus, London,
1961.
6. John Connel, Field Marshal Sir Claude, Auchinleck, Cassel,
London.
7. Lord Ismay, Memoirs of Lord Ismay. London 1961.
8. Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides, Robert Hale Ltd.,
London 1955.
9. Andrew Mellor, India Since Partition, Turnstill Press,
London 1951.
10. Michael Edwards, Last Years of British India, Cassel &
/
Co. Ltd., London 1963. '
11. George E Jones, Tumults in India, New York, 1948.
12. V.P. Menon, Transfer of Power in India, Orient Longman,
Calcutta 1957.
13. Malcolm Darling, At Freedom’s Door, Oxford University
Press, London, 1949. '
14. Pyare Lai, Gandhiji Last Phase, Vol. I & Vol II, Navjivan
Publishing Home, Ahmedabad, 1958.
15. Maulana Abul Kalam Aazad, India Wins Freedom, Orient
Longman, India, 1959.
16. Justice M.C. Mahajan, Looking Back, Asia Publishing
House, Bombay, 1963.
17. Chaudhury Khaliquzzeman, Pathways of Pakistan, Orient
Longman, Pakistan.
18. A.N. Bali, Now it can be told, Jullundur, India.
19. Azim Hussain, Fazli Hussain, Bombay 1946.
20. Time only to Look Forward, Speeches of Rear Admiral
the Earl Mountbatten of Burmah, Nicholas Kaye, Loudon
1949.
21. New India Speaks, Speeches of Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru,
Calcutta 1947.
22. Speeches and Writings of Jinnah, Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore.
23. Speeches & Statements of Iqbal, compiled by Shamloo,
Lahore, 1944.
24. Speeches & Documents on Indian Constitution edited by Maurice
Gwyer and Appadorai, Oxford University Press, Bombay 1957.
216
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Biographies, Constitutional Reports, Histories Etc.
1. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide, London, 1969.
2. Michael Brecher, Nehru, A Political Biography, Oxford
University Press, London, 1959.
3. Hector Belitho, Jinnah, the Creator of Pakistan, London.
4. Richard Symond, Making of Pakistan, Faber and Faber
London, 1949.
5. Leonard Mosley, Last Days of British Raj, London 1961.
6. Ian Stephens, Pakistan, Ernest Benn, London, 1963.
7. T. Walter Wall Bank, India in the New Era, Foreman & Co.,
New York, 1951.
8. L.F. Loveday Prior, Punjab Prelude, London 1952.
9. Frank Moraes, Jawahar Lai Nehru, New York, 1956.
10. E.W.B. Lumby, Transfer of Power in India, George Allen &
Unwin, London, 1954.
11. R. Coupland, Report on Constitutional Problem in India, Vol I,
II, III, 1944.
12. R. Coupland, Report on Constitutional Problem in India, India,
Restatement, 1944.
13. R. Coupland, Report on Constitutional Problem in India,
Gripps Mission in India, Oxford University Press, 1942.
14. United Nations Security Councils Official Records, 3rd year
225-240 Meeting, New York, 1948.
15. Horace Alexander, New Citizens of India, Oxford University
Press.
16. L.F. Rushbrook William, State of Pakistan, London, 1962.
17. O.H.K. Spate, India and Pakistan, A General Regional
Geography, London 1954.
18. Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan, London 1962.
19. K. Sarwar Hassan, Pakistan and United Nations, New York,
1960.
20. Rajendra Prasad, India Divided, 3rd Edition, Hind Kitab,
Bombay 1947.
21. K. Sarwar Hassan, Genesis of Pakistan, Karachi, 1954.
22. All Parties Conference 1928, All India Congress Committee
Allahabad..
r
23.
24.
25
26
2:
21
2
3
$
\
i
BIBLIOGRAPHY
217
23. Chaudhary Rehmat Ali, Pakistan, The Fatherland of Pak
Nations, 3rd Edition, Lahore, 1946.
24. Chowdhary Rehmat Ali, Millat & Mission, 43rd Edition
Lahore, 1944.
25. A Punjabi, Confederacy of India, Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah
Niwaz Khan, Lahore, 1939.
26. Nawab Nazer Jang Bahadur. Pakistan Issue, Muhammad
Ashraf, Lahore 1945.
27. Memorandum Handed over to Sir Stefford Cripps by Shiromani
Akali Dal in 1942.
28. Kartar Singh (Giani), The case for a New Sikh-Hindu Province,
I.M.H. Press, Delhi.
29. Mohammad Noman-A/w^/Zm India, Allahabad, 1942.
30. Sadhu Sawrup Slngh-Sikhs Demand their Homeland, Lahore
Bookshop, Lahore, 1946.
31. Constitutional Proposals of Sapru Committee, 2nd Edition,
Padma Publications, Bombay 1945.
32. G.D. Khosla, Stern Reckoning, Bhawani & Sons, New Delhi.
33. Muslim League's Attack on the Sikhs and the Hirdus, S.G.P.C.
Amritsar, 1952.
34. K.L. Gauba, Inside Pakistan, Bombay, 1948.
35. M.S. Randhawa, Out of Ashes, New Delhi, 1954.
36. C.N. Vakil, Economic Consequences of Divided India, Bombay.
37. J. Russel Andrus and Azizali F. Mohammad, Economy of
Pakistan, Oxford University Press, London, 1958.
38. Dr. Khalid Din Sayeed, Pakistan Formative Phase, Pakistan
Publishing House, Karachi, 1960.
39. Pakistan Publications, Pakistan Anthology, Karachi, 1961.
40. M. Masud, Pillars of Pakistan. Lahore.
41. A.B. Rajput, Muslim League Yesterday and Today, Muham¬
mad Ashraf, Lahore, 1948.
42. P. Sitaramyya, History of the Indian National Congress,
Vol. I & Vol. II. Padma Publications Bombay 1947.
43. Harnam Singh, Sikh Memorandum on the Punjab Boundary
Commission. Lahore, 1947.
44. F.J. Fowler, Some Problems of Water Distribution between
218
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
East & West Punjab, London, 1955.
45. J.S. Bains, India's International Disputes, Asia Publishing
House, Bombay.
46. Durga Das, From Curzon to Nehru, London, 1969.
47. Chronology of Pakistan, Kamal Publications, Karachi.
48. Framing of the Indian Constitution, B Shiva Rao, Vol. I, The
Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delh i 1966.
Reference Books
1. Stephen P. Lendas, Exchange of Minorities, Macmillan &
Co, New York. 1932.
2. Herbert Morrison, Government and Parliament, Oxford
University Press, London.
3. David Lloyd George, The Truth About Peace Treaties, London.
4. Hobson-Jobson-'io\[n Murry London-Second edition, 1903.
5. Nandu Lai, Geographical Dictionary of Ancient & Medeival
India, Second Edition, London, 1927.
6. Furhang-i-Jehangiri, Persian MS Language Deptt., Patiala.
7. Ayeen Akbery Udins\diiQ(\ by Francis Gladwin (1785)
8. Khulosatut Twarikh (Persian) edited by H Zafar Hassan
Delhi 1918.
9. Bute Shah Twarikh-i-Punjab, (Persian MS) Sikh History
Research department, Khalsa College Amritsar.
10. Col. Steinback The Punjab, London Smith Elder & Co. (1845)
11. Ronaldshay, Life of Lord Curzon, Vol, 11, London, 1928
12. Captain Murray, History of the Punjab, Allen & Co.,
London, 1846.
13. Thomas Walters, On Yuan Chewang's Travels in India,
Delhi, 1961.
14. Z A. Ragozin, Vedic India, London 1895.
15. Ralph T.R. Griffiths, Hymns of Rig Veda Vol. II. E J.
Tazarus&Co., Benaise, 1926.
16. Alexander Cunningham. Ancient Geography of India, Edited
by S, Majumdar. Calcutta, 1924. (Chuckervertty Chatteriee
& Co.)
17. Kirpal Singh, Maharaja Ala Singh cf Patiala and His Times,
Khalsa College, Amritsar, 1954.
I
INDEX
Abbot, S.E.,
Abdali, Ahmad Shah
Abducted Persons Recovery
and Restoration Act
Abdullah, Haroon
Abdur Rab Nishtar
Abell, Sir George
Abul Fazal
Abdul Latif. Syed
Adampur
Aden
Afghanistan
Agra
Agni Puran
Ahmadya Community
Ajmer
Ajnala
Akali Party
Akhtar Hussain
Alexander Cunningham
Alexander Horace
Aligarh
Allahbad Unity Conference
Alwar State
Ambala
Amery Tribunal
Amritsar
A
205
3, 4,7
172, 173,
13
134
60, 101, 102, 106, 119, 205, 206.
2
141, 142
133
57
3
6
1
80
2
82,96, 114
23, 24, 46, 120, 200
55
1
140
13
30
152
4, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 32. 33,
34, 79, 83, 108, 119, 153,
167, 181.
65
4, 9, 15, 32-34, 52, 60, 61,
74, 75, 79, 80, 83, 94, 96.
99, 104, 105, 108, 109,
112-114, 118, 127, 134, 148,
162—65. 188, 190, 200.
220
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Andrus, J. Russel
Andrew Mellor
Arbitral Tribunal
Arifwala
Aitock (or Campbelpur)
Atomic Energy Commission
Attlee, C.R. Sir,
Assam
Ayub Khan, Colonel
Auchinleck, Claude
Australia
Azad, Abul Kalam
Azad Kashmir
Azad Punjab scheme
Bahawalpur
Baldev Singh,
Baluch Regiment
Baluchistan
Banru
Basantar River
Batala
Beas
Bengal
Beaumont Christopher
Bhakhar
Bhamber
Bhoma (Distt. Amritsar)
140
39, 97
62-69
68, 162.
4, 9, 34, 41, 47, 131, 148,
170, 180.
194
35, 38, 39, 40, 2C0.
18, 19, 35, 40, 44, 63, 77, 103,
106, 107, 205.
127
134, 136.
196,
24, 124.
170
17
B
68,90, 92, 109, 112, 116, 131,
191,200.
27, 33, 36, 42, 44, 46, 49, 87,
88, 93, 121, 122, 124, 134, 202.
132, 155
18, 19, 35,
4, 166
91
82, 96-99, 114.
1, 92, 100, 112, 113, 195.
18, 19, 35, 40, 43, 44, 47, 48,
50, 53, 56, 63, 77, 103, 106,
107, 111, 126, 137, 143, 205,
207,
102, 205, 206.
150
2 , 112
170
INDEX
Bhango Rattan Singh
Bihar
Bikaner
Birdwood, Lord
Black. Eurgen R.
Bombay
Brecher, Michael Edward,
Bruce, J.C., Major General
British Commonwealth
Bulgaria
Burma
Bute Shah (Ghulam
Mahyuddin)
Cabinet Mission
Calcutta
Canada
Central Steering Committee
Chandigarh
Channu
Cathianwala
Chamberlain, Neville
Chenab River
Chhanga Manga
Chicha-Watni
Christie, John
Chunia
Churchil, Winston
Clydesmuir, Lord
Communal Award
Congress-Indian National
Congress
Connel, John
' Constitutional Assembly
47
16, 35, 143.
2, 67, 68, 70, 90, 92, 101.
97
194, 195.
35, 57. 69.
14, 97, 98, 101, 103, 117.
119
200
140
65, 69
2
C
35, 36, 38, 88.
90, 104, 105, 137.
196.
53, 56, 57.
190
91,
115
45
83, 91, 195
68
68, 162.
206
81, 162.
38, 50.
38
7, 28
17, 18, 23, 24, 36-38, 40, 41.
43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 80, 105,
111, 120, 141, 142, 144, 201.
13S
35-37, 53, 101, 143.
222
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Convention of NevieJy
Convention of Lu-Ussanne
Corbett. Sir Geoffrey
Cornor, J.R. Col.
Coupland, Reginal
Czechoslavakia
Daphar
Darling, Malcolm Sir
Daska
Dasua
Deg Nala
Delhi (or New Delhi)
Dera Baba Nanak
Dera Ghazi Khan
Dera Ismail Khan
Digamber Singh, Brigadier
Din Mohammad, Justice
Dipalpur or Depalpur
Draft-Declaration
Dunn, Major
Eastern Canal
East Punjab Liaison Agency
East Pakistan
East Punjab
140 -
140
10,11
179
13,87, 105.
45
D
68
5, 7, 119, 197.
81
■ 149
91
3, 4, 26, 52, 59, 63, 102, 116,
120, 132, 144, 152, 190, 205.
162
4, 9, 34, 47, 79, 131, 169, 182.
4
127
78, 80, 85, 90, 92, 99, 110.
82, 109, 113, 171, 192, 193, 194
14, 15
177
E
192
168, 171
207
10, 53-61, 64-69, 72, 76, 77,
79, 80, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89,
91, 94, 99, 103-105, 107-111,
114, 116, 122, 123, 127, 128,
130, 132, 133, 135, 140, 141,
146, 148, 149, 151-154, 156,
160-163, 165-172, 175, 179,
180, 190-195, 201-204,207.
130
Edward Michael
INDEX
223
England, Britain or U.K
Faridkot
Fatehwala
Fazilka
Fazl-i Hussain
Ferozepur
First World War
Fardab Canal
Jowler, F.J.
Gaddoke
Gajjal
Gang Canal
Gandhi Ji (M.K. Gandhi)
George Lloyd
Ghaggar Agreement
Ghoragali
Gopi Chand Bhargava (Dr.)
Government of India Act
1919
Government of India Act
1935
Greece
Gujar Singh
Gujrat
Gujranwala
26, 35, 36, 38, 88, 196, 197,
F
9,26, 128
115
99, 100
20
4, 34, 60, 68, 79, 80, 82,
91, 92, 96, 99-102, 104-106,
108, 109, 113, 116, 119, 120,
127, 134, 162, 181, 188,
190-193, 206, 207.
86
19l
194
G
115
115
101, 192
18, 19, 31, 39, 48, 142.
86
67
75
54
38
127
140
3
4, 6, 34, 47, 79, 131, 155,
156, 166, 181.
4, 6, 32-34, 47, 60, 79-81, 83,
108, 127, 131, 134, 150, 151,
162, 169, 175, 181, 184.
224
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Gurdaspur
Gurdev Singh
Gurgaon
Guru Nanak
Hafizabad
Hague
Harnam Singh
Haryana
Hassan K. Sanvar
Hazara
Henderson, Arthur
Himalyas
Hissar
Hiuen Tsang
Hoshiarpur
India
Indian Independence Act
1947
Indian Penal Code
Indo-Pakistan Board
Indo-Pakistan Conference
Indo-Pakistan Tribunal
Indo-Pakistan Water dispute
Indus River
Indus Water Treaty
4, 15, 32, 34, 47, 60, 61, 79-83,
86, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99. 104,
108, 109, 113, 114, 127, 133,
134, 150, 182, 188, 190.
65
4, 34, 79, 182, 201.
86
H
81
194
65, 80.
1
97, 100
4
88, 105.
3,4
4, 34, 60, 75, 79, 80, 181,
190. 201.
1
4, 33, 60, 75, 79, 80, 181, 190,
201 .
1
1, 18,28-30, 35,39, 40,49-51,
97, 99-102, 106, 107, 109, 112,
125, 126, 133, 134, 143, 144,
152, 153, 169, 174, 189,
192-196, 198, 199.
53, 56, 61, 63, 77, 78, 79,
108-110, 121.
172
199
173
172, 173
191
1, 3, 194, 195, 196.
196.
INDEX
225
Interim Government
International Court of Justice
Islam Head works
Ismay,’ Lord
Jaisalmir
Jallo
Jammal uddin Abdul Razak
Jammu
Jaranwala
Jassar (Distt. Sialkot)
Jehangir (Emperor)
Jenkins Evan M. Sir
•Jhang
Jhelum
Jind
Jinnah, M. A.
Jogendra Singh Sir
Johnson, Alan Campbell
Joint Defence Council
Joshi, G. N.
Joyonwala
Jullundar
Jamuna River
37-39, 44.
194
91
46, 49, 87, 103, 120, 121, 198,
201, 202, 206, 207.
J
13
75
1
13, 96-98, 181
8
166, 175-178.
1
44, 69, 89, 101-103, 106,
117, 119-121, 199, 205, 206.
4, 6, 26, 34, 47, 79, 131.
4, 6, 9, 26, 34, 47. 79, 195.
26, 67, 70, 128.
14, 18-22, 37,40,41,43-46, 48,
77, 88, 89, 92, 96, 102-104,
123, 124, 143, 145, 198-201,
204.
27
43, 103, 107, 135, 144, 146, 199.
125, 126, 132, 133, 137, 138.
65
155
4, 15, 16, 32-34, 60, 74, 79,
80, 82, 83, 98, 108, 109,
113, 119, 127, 133, 134,
149, 188.
3, 4, 173.
K
Kabul 142
Kalia 115
226
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Kals
Kamalpuran
Kamoke (Distt. Gujranwala)
Kangra
Kania (Justice)
Karachi
Karnal
Kartar Singh Giani
Kartarpur
Kapurthala
Kashmir
Kasur
Katlani Kalan
Kayani, M. R.
Khaksar Movement
Khaliquzzaman Chowdhary
Khalsa Defence of India
League
Khalsa National Party
Khanki
Khan, Major
Khare Dr.
Khem Karan
Khanewal
Khizar Hyat Khan Sir,
Khosla, G.D, Justice
Khushab
Khyber pass
Killa s
Kohat
Kriplani,
Kurukshetra
Kutch
115
115
151, 167, 171.
4, 9, 12, 13, 33, 79, 98, 109,
113, 119.
63
107, 143, 153, 205.
4, 34, 79, 165, 181,201.
42, 45, 49,103, 121-123, 145, 199.
133
26
13, 96-98, 102, 114, 128,
173, 195.
81, 86, 108, 114, 116, 180.
115
160
21
14
28
14, 19, 20.
91
177, 178.
143
115
68
22-24, 40, 42.
56, 130.
166
3
115
4, 9, 10
48
180
1
INDEX
227
L
Lahore 2-4, 6, 15, 16, 32-34, 41, 42, 46,
47, 56, 57, 59-61, 74, 75, 76,
79, 80, 81, 83, 84,86,93, 94,
96, 102, 104, 105, 108, 109,
111-114, 116, 118, 119, 127,
128, 129, 131-134, 142, 144,
147, 149, 162, 163, 165, 166,
168, 175, 176, 180, 181, 184,
193, 205.
Lahore Resolution (Pakistan
Resolution)
13, 21, 31, 32.
Lajpat Rai, Lala
10
Landas, Stephen P.
140
Lehna Singh
3
Liaqat Ali Khan
38, 44, 45, 88, 102, 107, 134,
152. 153, 154, 205.
Lilienthal, David E.
194
Lockhart, Sir Rob
134
London
80, 88.
Lovett, Major General
119
Lower Chenab Canal
91
Ludhiana
4, 9, 34, 60, 74, 79, 80, 92
104, 113, 127, 134, 165, 188.
Lucknow
19
Lyllpur
4, 6, 11, 34, 47, 60, 75, 81, 83,
91,108,109, 113,120, 122,
123, 127, 131, 134, 144, 145,
154, 166, 168, 180, 199.
M
Mabbuke
115
Machhike
115
Madhupur
92, 98, 108, 113, 193.
Madras
35 /
Maewala
115
228
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Mahaidepur
Mahabharat
Mahewala
Mahajan, Mehar Chand
Justice
Maharaja of Patiala
Majid, H.A.
Maler Kotla
Malhotra, K. S.
Mandi Hydro Electric Scheme
Mansur Qadir
Mahi Indus
Messervy, Sir Frank
M astgarh
Mastke
Masud, M.
Mathura
Meeruth
Mekran
Menon, V. P.
Mianwali
Military Evacuee Organisation
(M.E.O.)
Miranpur
Mohammad Ayub Khan
Mohammad Iqbal, Sir
Mohammad Ismail-Justice
Mohammad Zafar Ullah
Khan
Mohammad Shah Niwaz
khan
Mohan Singh
Montgomery Distt.
115
1
115
78, 80, 89-91, 110.
/
44, 45, 86, 93, 94. -
66
16
66
62,109, 113.
65
166
119, 134.
115
115
184
4.
10
2
87, 89, 199.
4, 6, 34, 47, 79, 131, 150, 169,
182.
163, 164, 166, 167, 175, 176.
68
96
12, 19.
63
80, 100, 102, 128, 129.
12
27
4, 6, 11, 34, 47, 60, 75, 79-83,
91, 92, 108, 109, 116, 122,
127, 131, 134, 155, 162, 168,
171, 180, 181, 191, 193, 199.
INDEX
229
Montford Report
Moon, Sir, Penderal
Moreas, Frank
Moti Lai Nehru Report
Mountbatten, Lord
Mudie, Sir Francis
Mughalpura
Multan
Mumtaz, Daultana
Mohammad Munir, Justice
Muslims League
Murree
Murray Captain
Muzafargarh
Nabha
Nagar Aimanpur
Nakodar
Nankana Sahib
Narwana
Narowal
National Progessive Party
Nawab of Mamdot or Khan
Iftkhar Hussain
27
46, 131, 132, 197, 200, 201, 202.
118
5, 8, 197.
38-44, 47-51, 60, 69, 78, 98,
102-104, 106, 107, 121, 125,
130, 133, 134, 201-207.
102, 106, 130, 133, 134, 145,
154, 160, 198, 199.
165
1-4, 6,7, 11, 12, 16, 26, 32,34,
41, 47, 60, 79-82, 91, 108,
117-119, 129, 131, 148, 169,
184, 187, 191.
54, 60
78, 92, 99, 100, 106, 110.
13, 14, 16, 18, 19-25, 31, 32,
35-42, 44-46, 48, 50, 51, 80,
89, 90,92, 97, 106, 111, 120,
129, 143, 144, 198-200, 202,
203.
75
3
4, 6, 11,34, 47, 79, 131, 150,
169, 182.
N
26, 67, 70, 128.
115
82
46, 81, 83, 86, 89, 91, 108,
122-124, 199.
91
81, 91, 114, 162, 177, 178.
20
99, 106, 120, 143, 189.
230
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Nawshehra Virkan
Nehru, Pandit Jawahar Lai
Noon, Feroz Khan
North Western Frontier
Province
Nurwala
Okara
Orissa
Otu Reservoir
151
37, 39, 41, 48, 88, 118, 133,
134, 141, 154, 201, 203, 205.
202
4, 9, 12, 18, 19, 35, 44, 48.
115
O
82, 162.
16, 86.
67
P
Pakistan
Panjhuwan
Pakpattan
Panihic Assembly Party
Panthic Pritinidhi Board
Panth Parkash
Partition Council
Partition Plan or 3rd June Plan
Pasrur
Patel, Sardar V.B.
Patiala
Patiala and East Punjab
1, 13, 14, 19,21, 22, 24-27,
39-41, 43-47,49,50, 53, 82,
96-99, 101, 102, 104, 106,
107, 109, 112, 125, 127-129,
134, 135, 137, 138, 143-145,
147,151, 152, 169, 170, 172,
174-176, 178,180, 190-192,
194-196, 198, 200-203,
205—207.
115
82, 162, 191.
144
49, 144, 197.
117
53, 69, 87, 93-95, 103, 104,
106, 120, 127, 138, 139, 152.
77, 81, 85, 98, 107, 108, 119,
123-125, 142, 199, 201, 205.
81, 162.
48, 87, 118, 143, 152-154.
9, 26, 67, 70, 128, 172.
172
Stales Union
INDEX
231
Pathankot
Pattoki
Patrick Spens Sir,
Peshawar
Phularwan (Distt. Shahpur)
Pind Dadan Khan
Prior, Sir Geoffrey
Punjab
Punjab Boundary Award
(Radcliffe Award)
Punjab Boundary Commission
(Radcliffe Commission)
Punjab Boundary Force
Punjab Disturbed Area Act
Punjab High Court
Punjab Legislature Assembly
Punjab Partition Committee
Punjab Partition Order
Punjab Public Safety Ordi¬
nance
Punjab University Lahore
Qadian
Radcliffe, Sir Cyril, (Later
Lord)
82, 92, 97, 98, 109, 113, 114.
162
62, 63.
4
170
165
147
1, 3-6, 8-10, 12-16, 18-28, 32-36,
40-45,47, 48, 50, 53-55, 58,
60, 63-67, 69, 70, 72-74, 77,
79, 88-91, 98, 101-103,
105-112, 114, 117-121, 123,
126-130, 137, 140, 145, 169,
186-191, 194, 197,199-203.
61, 96, 98, 100-103, 107-111, 113,
161, 191, 192, 205-207.
59, 77-80, 86-90, 92-96, 98, 99,
101-104,106, 110, 112, 121,
144, 191, 203, 204.
103, 117, 125-128, 132-136,
155, 162.
117-127.
59
23
54, 55, 58-63, 66. 67, 69, 80,
93-95. 103, 105, 127.
63, 69, 109, 193.
117
56, 58, 69.
Q
89.
R
77, 78, 80, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95-
97, 99-104, 106-110, 205-207.
232
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Raiwind 162
Rajendra Prasad (Dr.) 141
Rajputana 4,92.
Rajagopalacharia’s 17
Rakh Branch 91
Ram Chandra I.C.S. 55, 66.
Ranjit Singh, Maharaja 3, 26.
Rashtrya Swayam Sewak Sangh 128
Rasul
Rattoke
Ravi River
Rawalpindi
Rees, General G.O.C.
Rehmat Ali, Chowdhury
Reserve Bank of India
Report of Franchise
Committee
Rig Veda
Rohtak
Round Table Conference
London
Rupar
Rushbrook William L. F.
Sachar, Bhem Sen
Sachdeva, M. R.
Sadiqia Canal
Sahjra
Saleem
Samundari
Sargodha (Distt. Shahpur)
26
115
15, 26, 32, 83,91, 98, 112,
114, 164, 178, 194, 195.
4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 32, 34, 40, 47,
79,108, 117-119, 129, 131,
148, 170, 181, 184, 187, 196,
203.
119,120, 127, 128, 133-138.
142
72
5
1
4, 9, 34, 79, 181, 187, 201.
8, 10
92
144
S
128
54
191
115
65
81
131
INDEX
233
Sapru Conciliation Committee
Scotland
Security Council (U. N. O.)
Setalvad, M.C.
Shah, Major
Shahdra
Shahpur
Shakargarh
Shambu
Sharif, Mohammad, Justice
Sheikhupura
Sheikhupura Kohna
Shiromani Akali Dal
Short, J.M., Major
Sialkot
Sikander Hyat Khan, Sir
Simla
Simon Commission
Sindh
Sirhind or Sirhind Canal
Soba Singh
Spate O.H.K.
Stephens, Ian,
Stevens, Brigadier
Subah Sadiq, Captain
Sujan Rai Bhandari
Suleiman Hill
Suleimanki
Sunder Singh Majithia, Sir
198
132
102, 128, 129
80, 85, 128.
177, 178.
74, 81,91, 114, 164.
4,6, 34,47,79, 150, 181.
82, 86, 97, 98, 108, 109,114, 134.
167
56
4, 32, 34, 47, 60, 79-81, 83, 91,
108, 109, 113, 123, 127, 131-
134, 154, 155, 162, 181, 184.
115
16, 17, 36, 42, 49, 80, 144,
197-199.
51, 52, 87, 88, 103, 121, 199.
4, 6, 32, 34, 47, 60, 74, 79-81,
108, 127, 131, 133, 162, 164,
166, 175, 176, 178, 182.
19-23, 87.
4, 33, 60, 79, 90, 92, 94, 101,
104, 105, 111, 189, 190.
28
12, 16, 18, 19, 35, 69.
2, 67, 194.
3
80, 92,
117, 130.
167, 175.
179
2
4
116, 192.
14
234
PARTITION OF PUNJAB
Sundram K.V.K.
Sutlej River
Sutlej Agreement
Swalik
Sawarn Singh
Syedwala
Sylhet district
Tara Singh, Master
Tarn Taran
Teja Singh, Captain
Teja Singh, Justice
Tennesee Valley
Thames, River
Theh Jhallrorhian
Thindaur
Times, London
Tinker, Hugh (Prof.)
Toba Tek Singh
Trivedi, Chandu Lai, Sir,
Turkey
Ujjal Singh
Uj River
Unionist Party
United States of America
United States of Rajasthan
Upper Bari Doab Canal
United Provinces
Uri
Usraania University
116
3, 4, 81, 91, 92, 100, 109, 112,
113, 116, 195,
67
92
54, 94, 120.
91
44
T
15-17,27, 36,42,45,93,103,
124, 148, 202.
U
109, 114.
19-24,
191, 194, 196.
172
83, 98, 108, 113, 193, 194.
35, 172.
97
12
114
179
78, 83, 91, 110.
194
191
114
133
42
117, 189.
81
134
140
INDEX 235
W
Wah (Distt. Attock)
120, 137.
Waigal
115
Wales
132
Walton Training School
164
(Lahore)
Wavel, Lord
38, 39, 42.
Wazirabad (Distt. Gujranwala) 81, 166, 167, 175.
West Punjab
10, 54-62, 64-69, 72, 76, 77,
•
79-82, 86, 89, 92, 94, 100, 102,
103,105,107-111, 113,114,
116, 122, 127, 130-133, 135,
140-142, 144-146, 148-154, 156,
161-163, 166-169, 171, 172,
180-195, 199, 203, 207.
West Punjab Economic
Rehabilitation Ordinance
146, 156-160
West-Pakistan
207
West minister (London)
200
William, Francis
200
World Bank
195
World War, Second
35
Y
Yaqub Shah Syed •
54
Z
Zahid Hussain
54
Zand Avesta
1
Zira
82, 96, 99, 100-102, 206, 207.
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